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The idea of life extension through bio-medical intervention in the ageing process (ageing 
enhancement) provokes excitement and concern in equal measure, both among the public and 
in academic discussion. This thesis addresses three common concerns that arise in discussions 
of ageing enhancement. The first is the worry that either the pursuit or experience of ageing 
enhancement will undermine various resources that are necessary to giving our lives value or 
meaning. The second worry is that such interventions violate requirements of egalitarian justice; 
the primary way of expressing this concern notes that ageing enhancement is by definition 
aimed at benefitting the elderly, and argues that egalitarian considerations demand either that we 
direct such resources at the young, or place significant restrictions on access to medical 
treatments for elderly people. Finally, the third worry is that successful ageing enhancement will 
cause unacceptable overpopulation, because the associated increases in the number of people, 
and their associated consumption, cannot be permissibly ameliorated by other policies. The 
conclusion from proponents of these concerns is that the state should not support research into 
or implementation of ageing enhancement, and perhaps should place restrictions on ageing 
enhancement should it become available.   
The thesis places these concerns in a broader philosophical context to specify their strongest 
form, and to consider responses to those strongest versions. It also relates the three worries to 
practical considerations of feasibility; it is not enough for proponents to outline an ethically 
acceptable mechanism for meeting the three worries if these mechanisms are unlikely to emerge. 
I argue that although none of the three worries rules out ageing enhancement in principle, the 
latter two are sufficiently well grounded in their strongest versions, to place ethical constraints 
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Attempts to control the ageing process through some form of enhancement are not novel as a 
philosophical concern. However, their place as a live question in public discussion has grown in 
prominence during recent years, with greater media attention following the entry of globally 
recognised brands such as Google (through its subsidiary Calico), and eye-catching prize money 
like the Palo Alto Longevity Prize into the endeavour. Recent experimentation shows that 
currently available pharmaceuticals reduce senescence in mice quickly and significantly (Zhu et 
al, Forthcoming). As Ehni (2012: 226) notes, other methods have also been effective in species 
including nematode worms, fruit flies and mice. He cites caloric restriction, genetic 
manipulation, and evolutionary strategies (e.g. Rose, 2008), though is more sceptical about other 
methods such as anti-oxidants (see also Butler et al, 2000); stem cell research; and hormone 
treatments (see also Olshansky et al, 2002).1 De Grey (e.g. 2004a) recommends a multi-strand 
‘engineering’ approach to repairing accumulated damage. Summarising this research, Sethe and 
de Magalhães (2012: 176) suggest that “although the essence of the basic process of aging 
remains contentious, there are many technical possibilities for how aging might be slowed.” 
Physical ageing can involve a great deal of pain, unhappiness, and significantly increased chance 
of death,2 and the idea of extending healthy lifespan is attractive to many people. But the idea of 
anti-ageing technology, which in this thesis I call ‘ageing enhancement’, raises a number of 
concerns related to how such interventions will upset our mutual co-existence in society. This 
thesis considers those concerns, grouped into broad three categories: the Meaning Objection, 
the Egalitarian Objection, and the Overpopulation Objection. Each of these objections appears 
repeatedly in the existent philosophical literature; from my own (admittedly limited) anecdotal 
experience, they are also the three concerns raised most frequently by non-philosophers.  
The first aim of the thesis is to consider the most philosophically rigorous versions of the three 
objections, connecting them to the broader philosophical literature beyond the discussion of 
ageing enhancement, and indeed beyond bioethics. With that in mind, I will briefly outline what 
I take to be the mutual target of the three objections.  
For the sake of simplicity I consider only possible interventions that affect the individual 
treated, i.e. I will ignore the possibility that we might engage in genetic interventions that would 
mean future generations were born with extended life expectancy. It is also important to 
consider the possible effectiveness of ageing enhancement, as this will determine the results on 
which the objections rest. Ehni outlines three broad possibilities. Ageing enhancement may not 
extend the lifespan, but instead may lead to ‘compression of morbidity’, i.e. a decrease of the 
                                                     
1 For further discussion, see Olshansky et al (2006); Butler et al (2008) and de Magalhães et al (2012). 
2 Indeed, Maynard Smith defines ageing as “a progressive, generalised impairment of function resulting in 
an increasing probability of death” (cited in Kirkwood, 1999: 35). 
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absolute and proportional amount of our lifetime that we suffer frailness and ill health due to 
physical ageing.3 The second possibility is a moderate increase in lifespan. Olshansky et al (2006) 
suggest that we might see a seven-year increase in lifespan, and a similar slowing of the ageing 
process, over the next 40-50 years. Finally, the boldest predictions consider the possibility of 
‘ending ageing’ or ‘negligible senescence’, with de Grey (e.g. 2004a) predicting potential 
lifespans of 1000 years. Clearly, this would have considerable implications for how we organise 
society.4 
I will predominantly discuss the three objections without specifying the effectiveness of ageing 
enhancement, although where appropriate I consider the implications of different levels of 
effectiveness. It is worth saying something briefly in defence of considering the possibility of 
negligible senescence, since de Grey’s predictions (as its most high-profile proponent) have 
come under considerable criticism from many gerontologists on the grounds that his suggested 
mechanisms are pseudoscientific (e.g. Estep et al, 2006),5 while Capitaine and Pennings, 2012: 
255) suggest that de Grey’s prediction would require that we “repair an insurmountable amount 
of damage”, and are thus unfeasible.6 On the other hand, some gerontologists accept that ageing 
is in principle controllable in the way de Grey predicts e.g. de Magalhães (2014) – although he is 
doubtful about de Grey’s timetable; Finch (2009); and Rose (2008) – although he is sceptical 
about de Grey’s methodological focus. If such outcomes are possible from research into ageing 
enhancement ethical assessment ought to consider the implications. If they are morally 
unacceptable while less effective outcomes are morally permissible, that gives us some guidance 
in how to conduct research.  
Finally, the central normative issue I address is how the state and other institutions should 
approach ageing enhancement, rather than how individuals should react. As such, I will 
generally assume that the state will have some degree of control over access. I thus take the 
three objections to claim that the state should not support research into ageing enhancement, 
and that it should not be included in state-funded healthcare, insurance schemes, and the like. 
Of course, if the state does abstain from such activity, a possible stronger conclusion is that it 
should also ban private research into ageing enhancement, and prevent individuals from 
accessing any resultant treatment with their own resources. Since I argue that, given certain 
conditions, the state should support ageing enhancement, I do not give much consideration to 
                                                     
3 See e.g. Fried (1980) on ‘compression of morbidity’ and ‘compression of senescence’.  
4 Capitaine and Pennings (2012: 254) suggest a fourth result of ‘prolonged senescence’, which would 
represent “the failure of the anti-aging research enterprise: life itself is prolonged, while the healthspan is 
not”. I will not directly consider this possibility, as it simply represents the prospect of failure that is 
imminent in any research project.  
5 De Grey (2006) offers a rebuttal.  
6 This seems to presuppose a ‘cumulative damage’ theory of ageing, which Rose (op cit) criticises.   
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this latter question; but I do address it in places where I consider the possibility that the 
requisite conditions will not be met, particularly in Section 6.4, and Chapters 7 and 8. 
That concludes my sketch of the target, and so the first aim of the thesis. The second aim is to 
sketch a middle path through a polarised debate. While I will argue that none of the three 
objections considered gives conclusive reasons to oppose ageing enhancement, I will suggest 
that some of the issues they raise should shape how we think of ageing enhancement in the real 
world: how we should regard it, implement it, and prepare for it, and where it should lie in our 
priorities. Key to this approach is the idea that ageing enhancement must be permissible not just 
in principle, but in practice; the question is not whether we could in principle solve the 
problems raised by opponents, but whether we will.  
Chapters 1 and 2 assess the Meaning Objection. Chapter 1 addresses accounts from Callahan 
(1995) and Kass (2001) about the place of ageing and death in the ability of elderly people to 
live meaningful lives. I argue that the theory of meaning outlined by each author is subject to 
considerable objections, and outline a more flexible theory of meaning that does not require a 
place for either ageing or death at a particular time, and which allows us to face up to our 
mortality with more than the passive acceptance that Callahan and Kass promote. 
Chapter 2 outlines a more contemporary concern from Agar (2010), who worries that truly 
radical ageing enhancement will change our personalities considerably, such that we will lose 
touch with what we currently value. While accepting the force of Agar’s axiological 
conservatism, I insist that his worries about ageing enhancement are implausible given other 
facts about human psychology. I conclude from these two chapters that while ageing 
enhancement might require some of us to reassess what we care about, this does not constitute 
a strong objection to enhancement. 
Chapters 3-6 focus on the Egalitarian Objection. I flesh out this objection by relating it to 
discussions in the broader philosophical literature, suggesting that some egalitarian 
considerations lend support to ageing enhancement. While I acknowledge that egalitarian 
principles should constrain our behaviour around enhancement, I reject the objection’s 
implication that this can be linked straightforwardly to numerical age. Chapter 3 outlines the 
various options that form the egalitarian field (equalitarianism, prioritarianism, and 
sufficientarianism) and argues that egalitarianism cannot only be applied across lifetimes, but 
must also be considered at particular times. I consider and reject two Rawlsian accounts that 
challenge this view by making our time-relative concerns derivative on our lifetime concerns.  
If egalitarian principles apply both at lifetimes and in a time-relative way, we need some sense of 
which principles to apply at each level, and how they fit together. Chapter 4 suggests that only a 
sufficientarian time-relative principle can explain our apparently conflicting concerns with 
hardship, responsibility and compensation in egalitarian justice. Having outlined a 
sufficientarian view based on the idea of protecting a tolerable existence, I suggest that this 
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lends prima facie support to ageing enhancement. However, this support is clearly vulnerable if 
certain lifetime principles are chosen. Chapter 5 repeats the task of the previous chapter at the 
level of lifetimes, rejecting certain substantive versions of the Egalitarian Objection as based on 
inferior lifetime principles, before defending a prioritarian view.  
Chapter 6 then considers how these principles fit together, since at least one natural 
understanding – that lifetime priority should form a tie-breaker for people at equal momentary 
levels – seems to support the Egalitarian Objection. While the idea of using lifetime priority as a 
tie-breaker works in some circumstances, it should not be so used where the tie to be broken 
will result in someone falling irremediably below the tolerability threshold. However, I suggest 
that any significant role for lifetime priority raises questions about the egalitarian credentials of 
ageing enhancement, not because it will benefit the elderly, but because it may only benefit the 
best off in society. I consider the practical implications of this concern, including around the 
role of healthcare allocations for reparative justice, and suggest that the most plausible 
egalitarian concern about ageing enhancement will be about the relative priority it takes either in 
public or private spending if it will largely benefit the best off.   
The final two chapters address the Overpopulation Objection. Chapter 7 outlines the objection 
and considers several versions of a common response from proponents of ageing enhancement, 
that if we are concerned about overpopulation we should look to reproduction rather than 
curbing access to life-extending interventions. I suggest ethical constraints on a plausible 
programme of incentives to reduce reproduction, as well as some pragmatic concerns for the 
principles that meet those constraints, which show an appeal to reproductive control to be 
considerably more complex than it appears. However, similar ethical constraints block a 
straightforward move to the Overpopulation Objection’s conclusion that we should not engage 
in ageing enhancement.  
Chapter 8 considers the idea of overpopulation in greater detail, roughly following Ord’s (2014) 
distinction between hard and soft limits on population size. If ageing enhancement would bring 
about soft limits – limits that demand considerable changes in our behaviour that are both 
feasible and morally permissible – then the right thing to do is to reduce consumption. 
However, if ageing enhancement would require significant changes in our consumption, there is 
a risk that we will pursue enhancement without making those necessary changes. Since this risk 
most threatens those who are least likely to benefit from ageing enhancement, it places some 
further ethical constraints on how, and under what conditions, we should pursue ageing 
enhancement; however, these constraints are not sufficient to warrant an automatic block on 




Chapter 1: The Meaning Objection – Age, death and meaning 
The first concern I consider suggests that ageing enhancement, and perhaps even just its 
pursuit, threatens our ability to live meaningful lives. The arguments considered in this chapter 
contend that we must accept either physical ageing or death at a certain point in order to have a 
meaningful life, and that ageing enhancement would undermine that ability; the argument 
assessed in Chapter 2 proposes that radical ageing enhancement will undermine certain 
attachments that are central to our lives being meaningful in a way we can currently relate to.  
I will argue that the concerns outlined in this chapter are unconvincing. This is not to deny that 
death or ageing might take a central place in a meaningful life for some people. But if we are to 
reject ageing enhancement on the grounds of its impact on meaning, opponents must either 
show that certain attitudes to ageing or death play an irreplaceable role in giving life meaning, or 
that we can dismiss the concerns of those for whom they do not play such a role, and who 
would benefit from enhancement.  
Section 1.1 discusses the idea of meaning, and draws a distinction between two ways of 
conceiving of a meaningful life. Section 1.2 considers Callahan’s view that elderly people need a 
socially-specified role to give their lives meaning, and that this role involves them accepting 
death past a certain point in life because they should focus on the next generation (1.2.1). 
Section 1.3 criticises Callahan’s claim that elderly individuals need roles that specifically 
reference their age, and Section 1.4 considers some difficulties in developing the consensus on 
the meaning of old age that seems necessary for this project.  
Section 1.5 turns to Kass’s view that the physical frailty and suffering involved in ageing can 
prepare us for death, considering some ways of understanding the idea of emotional 
appropriateness (1.5.1) and whether acceptance is the only way for mortality to have a place in a 
meaningful life (1.5.2). I argue that this idea has its priorities wrong, and ignores the possibility 
that negative attitudes to death may be appropriate and useful even at the end of life.  
1.1 The idea of meaning  
It may be helpful to have a formalised argument that summarises the Meaning Objection, at 
least approximately, covering the three versions that I consider in Chapters 1 and 2:  
P1 Ageing enhancement threatens some part of our current way of life that makes our 
lives meaningful.   
P2 A life without meaning is significantly diminished in such a way that it is unlikely 
that we could make up for that loss simply by acquiring greater amounts of some 
other goods.  




P4 Ageing enhancement will only give us more of what we already have.  
C1 There are strong prudential reasons not to pursue ageing enhancement.  
P5 Governments should not support medical interventions that are not good for their 
citizens, and perhaps should place some restrictions on them.  
C2 There are strong moral reasons for governments not to support (or, more strongly, 
to restrict) ageing enhancement 
In general, the next two chapters will consider and argue against various versions of P1. One 
might raise doubts about several of the other premises, but P1 seems to me both fundamental 
to the argument, and clearly wrong in the cases I consider. In Callahan’s version of this 
argument, with which I begin, P1 refers to a particular role for elderly people in contemporary 
society.  
One way of thinking about the meaningful life is to view it as akin to a shopping list: once you 
have ticked off all the items (career; parenthood; milk), there is no point hanging around in the 
aisles. This view assumes that life should conform to a predefined shape that lends prospective 
purpose to action; a subset of this idea sees different ‘life-stages’ as both inevitable for everyone, 
and involving uniquely appropriate activities. Such a view can tolerate diversity by ascribing a 
range of appropriate activities to particular life stages, but it cannot tolerate too much 
divergence from the list. An alternative conception sees meaning in life not as a pre-conceived 
list to be discovered, but as something to be developed by the individual, using the social and 
personal resources available to them. This is clearly a rather looser idea of meaning, and some 
worry that its lack of external reference renders it ultimately arbitrary. I will consider this idea in 
Section 1.3. 
Although there are some who consider death the greatest possible evil – de Unamuno claimed 
not to fear hell, since “nothing appeared to me quite so horrible as nothingness itself” (1921: 9) 
– common opinion assumes a quality of life below which it is not worth living such that the 
claim that more life is good for a person refers only to a life ‘free enough’ from the most 
unpleasant possibilities of existence. This raises the question of what those possibilities are. 
Physical pain is an obvious candidate, but people also have psychological and emotional 
boundaries beyond which life no longer seems worthwhile, even given continued physical 
health. 
One extension of this idea found in Williams (1973) is that life without certain boundaries, 
including the boundaries set by mortality, might become meaningless. Williams imagines an 
immortal woman, Elena Makropulos, who comes to find that nothing holds any attachment for 
her, and she grows withdrawn from the world and life itself. Elena’s immortality may make her 
seem so far beyond our experience that it is hard to believe we could relate to her condition. 
But Williams suggests that Elena has an “almost perceptual” realisation that there is something 
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missing in her relation to the world; that there is nothing in the world which, from her 
perspective, grabs her emotionally and presents itself as worth caring about. Williams seems to 
think that this is an inevitable condition of her immortality. 
I want to suggest that Elena spots something rather less novel. As Williams acknowledges, her 
problem is that the world alone cannot provide our meaning. This brings Elena sharply back 
within our boundaries. Nothing happens to her to make her life ‘meaningless’; but she loses her 
internal resources to engage with the world in a way that generates meaning, because she 
engages in the activities that keep the rest of us satisfied to such a degree of repetition that they 
lose all subjective meaning for her, revealing them as objectively vacuous. But while Williams 
assumes that something special happens to Elena to make her see her life as meaningless, the 
alternative is that she merely realises that the kind of meaning she has been searching for – one 
given unbidden by the world that the agent cannot refuse – is unavailable at any age.  
One possible reaction to this realisation is Elena’s; she ends her life since the world offers no 
reason to persevere. Another possibility is to deny that meaning requires an objective relation 
with the environment, and to insist instead that it is generable. To find meaning in this sense is 
not to discover an objective fact about our purpose. Rather it involves confronting and making 
sense of some elements of one’s life, in such a way as to give answer to a potential question. 
The question is not so much the ‘Why am I here?’ of objective meaning (to which the answer is 
either causal or ‘No reason’), as ‘What can I make of this?’ But meaning-generation requires 
both internal and social resources. It is a dearth of the latter that grounds Callahan’s worry that 
endless pursuit of life-extension for elderly people undermines their ability to live meaningful 
lives.7  
1.2 Knowing their place 
Callahan worries that a contemporary focus on individual liberty has eroded the social resources 
that help individuals make sense of old age, leaving nothing in their place (1995: 60). He argues 
that a meaningful life has a particular shape, with natural limits; indefinite attempts to breach 
those limits will rob elderly people of meaning (35-36). According to this account, meaning 
involves specific roles for older members of society, the primary of which is service to younger 
generations (43), which includes knowing when to die rather than use up medical resources.  
In Callahan’s view, modern society uniquely fails to provide meaning for its elderly members 
because of our refusal to accept that there is anything special about old age, whereas “the elderly 
were often granted a high status in earlier, more traditional societies because of the belief that 
age carried with it not only wisdom, but a privileged ability to interpret the moral traditions of a 
society” (37). The implication is that earlier societies appreciated something we now miss: that 
                                                     
7 Callahan’s target is not so much ageing enhancement as life-extending healthcare in general. But the 
form of his argument transfers easily to ageing enhancement, and I will write as if it were his target. 
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elderly people have certain qualities because of their age, and that we cannot give them their due if 
we fail to respond to these qualities; but these same qualities mean that there are certain proper 
ways for the elderly to live, which excludes the pursuit of life extension.  
This is doubtful as a generalised claim about the past,8 and Callahan offers no examples, but I 
will assume that he has specific societies in mind, and the evidence to back up his claim. The 
idea that age entails the possession of certain qualities is a stereotype of considerable influence. 
One also finds such unsupported caricature in writings that reject health rationing: Kilner 
challenges the assumption that younger lives are obviously worth more by noting that Kenya’s 
Akamba often prefer an elderly to a young man for a hypothetical life-extending treatment, 
since the former “is a father to many people”. Kilner then claims that although rarely true in our 
society, this claim “evokes a broader thought. The old man is a leader, a wise counsellor, and an 
inspiring figure worthy of respect.” (1992: 189)  
‘The’ old man is none of these things, as there is no such individual. Take wisdom, claimed for 
elderly people by both Callahan and Kilner. While age affords time to learn and reflect, some 
people do not engage in reflection, and time often cements existing prejudice. Kirkwood notes 
that it may make sense to ascribe wisdom to old people “just because they are old...when getting 
to be old is a rare occurrence” (1999: 4). In such societies, age may reflect canniness in having 
outlasted one’s peers (although it might equally involve luck and privilege). But, he adds, in a 
society where many reach old age, it would be naive to think that wisdom was a necessary or 
even likely component of lasting so long. Modern societies may also undercut the supposed 
wisdom of elderly people through the speed of social change. In static societies, one could 
reasonably suppose that the situations confronted by young people are similar to those their 
grandparents confronted at the same age. In societies where social patterns and norms change 
rapidly, this is less likely.9 
1.2.1 Taking age seriously 
Callahan claims that we value elderly people as consumers, voters, volunteers, and sources of 
“funds, family anecdotes, and occasional baby-sitting”, but that none of these roles value “their 
age as such” (1995: 37-38). I assume these examples are supposed to support the need for an age-
specific role for older people; the implication is that contemporary liberal society only values 
elderly people if we can make use of them, i.e. in ways that do not offer them resources for 
meaning. Yet there are age-neutral ways of valuing elderly people that do not involve such 
cynicism, including most of the roles Callahan lists. Being valued as a voter is, ideally, to have 
                                                     
8 For instance the “status of an old person in the [ancient] Roman world depended more on the person 
him or herself than on the general fact that he was or she was old” (Parkin, 2003: 34). It does not follow 
from the fact that a society venerated some elderly people that elderly people generally received such 
treatment.  
9 See also Keizer (2012).   
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one’s opinions and interests matter, while family membership bears no necessary reference to 
age.  
Callahan thus needs further reasons why elderly people require society to value their age ‘as 
such’. One explanation comes in the comment that the features he lists are those in which older 
people “resemble younger age groups” (38). Perhaps the worry is that this implies the paradigm 
for meaningful living comes from youth, with elderly people being assessed for how well they 
can ape others. But this relies on the unfounded assumption that we value certain features 
because they are possessed by young people. We could instead say that older people derive 
meaning from certain roles, including the ones Callahan lists, and that some of those roles are 
available regardless of age. There is no need to assume that young people provide the paradigm 
of the voter, volunteer, family member or indeed the consumer. If they do, this may be a reason 
to re-examine our conceptions of these roles as age-relative, rather than searching for different 
roles for elderly people.   
Another explanation is that elderly people are the only age cohort who are “dispensable” in 
modern society (36), and so require a special role that makes them indispensable again. By 
implication, it is because age makes elderly people uniquely dispensable that their role must 
respond to age. But even if we grant the doubtful idea that all individuals require 
indispensability, this does not follow. We would need to assume that a solution must respond to 
the very factor that caused its concomitant problem. Even if elderly people are dispensable 
because of age, all they require according to this argument is indispensability. If an elderly 
person finds meaning in volunteering work, and becomes genuinely indispensable in the lives of 
those he helps, then if dispensability per se is the problem, it cannot matter that his role is not 
age-specific.  
Perhaps we should interpret dispensability differently, as applying not to individuals but age 
groups. For an age group to be indispensable, they must have a role that involves their age as 
such because otherwise other age groups could fill in for them, making them dispensable. 
Callahan would need to show that other age groups are indispensable, or there would be no 
special problem for old age. I doubt that this is true for non-elderly (whom Callahan calls 
“mature”) adults, for whom Callahan cites two roles: procreation and “managing” society (43). 
If his argument is to work, these roles must be  
(1) inaccessible to elderly people, since an age group cannot be indispensable in a role that 
is open to another age group; and 
(2) necessary components of meaning for all mature adults. Otherwise it would be unclear 
what role group indispensability plays in individual meaning. 
Many elderly people are capable of contributing to social management. Since some elderly 
adults are capable of helping to run society, social coordination does not respect mature adults’ 
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age ‘as such’. This role fails to meet requirement (1), and does not make mature adults 
indispensable. 
People certainly lose their reproductive capacity with age, so reproduction is (depending on how 
we define old age) perhaps more plausibly closed off to elderly people. However, many mature 
adults choose to remain childless, adopt or foster, while others are simply unable to have 
biological children, all seemingly without threatening the meaningfulness of their lives. So it 
cannot be that procreation makes every mature adult indispensable, or that it is a necessary 
component of an individually meaningful life. One response to this is to claim that mature 
adults are indispensable for their procreative activity as a group, even if individuals do not 
contribute to this role. Yet this fails requirement (2); how does the meaning I attach to my life 
derive from the fact that people of my age are having children? What possible relevance could 
that have for me if I choose not to do so, and feel no connection to the idea of parenthood?  
In fact, this discussion underlines the doubtfulness of the need for indispensability. This is too 
lofty an aspiration for most of us. We should reject the claim that elderly individuals need a role 
relating to their age as such because they need to be indispensable. Nonetheless, I will now set 
aside such concerns, and consider various possibilities for such roles. 
1.3 Unique roles 
Callahan suggests several roles as “sources of meaning and significance” for elderly people, but 
only one is relevant to ageing enhancement. This is the idea elderly people’s “primary 
aspiration” should be serving youth and the future (42-43). As Callahan describes it, service to 
young people rules out ageing enhancement, since such interventions would use resources that 
could go to medical care of young people. Although this has obvious links with the Egalitarian 
Objection, the problem as it stands here is not one of distributive fairness, but of purpose; if 
elderly people are concerned with extending their own lives, they cannot really be focused on 
serving the next generation. Instead, they should “step aside in an active way”, both refusing 
additional healthcare and “working until the very end” for the next generation (43). I consider 
the idea of a complete life, and the broader issue of intergenerational distribution of medical 
resources, in greater detail in Section 5.2. I will now suggest two worries about the view that 
elderly people must derive meaning through service.  
While elderly people can certainly find meaning in helping others, this is not unique to them as 
an age group; we can accept that this has a place in a meaningful life without making it their 
primary focus, just as we do for other age groups. If service grounds meaning for elderly people, 
the implication is that an elderly person who fails to step aside at the right time will lack a 
meaningful old age, and thus be doing himself a disservice. But ‘serving’ elderly people might 
equally provide meaning for the rest of us. And just as we can aid elderly people while placing 
limits on our duty of care, they might ‘serve’ the rest of us (and each other) within limits.  
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Many elderly people have already given decades of service to society. Lorna Goodison’s poem 
‘Bam Chi Chi La La’ (2004: 22) imagines a woman working as a charwoman in London, 
dreaming “of her retirement mansion in Mandeville”. Here we see a person living for a certain 
kind of old age. Having worked hard with this aim in mind, she may wonder at the claim that 
she cannot live meaningfully unless she serves the next generation by sacrificing her leisure time. 
Such a person might wonder why, at this stage, the demand for her service should increase. This 
is not to advocate “a right to self-absorption” (Callahan, 1995: 49), for a person can 
acknowledge social obligations without being committed to the extent of service Callahan 
advocates; the question is rather why one’s service should become more demanding once one 
has reached old age. Such a demand assumes a single shape for life, whose focus is very much 
on youth; youth is the time for living and pursuit of one’s own interests and goals, old age a 
time for service. This shape will not be attractive to those who sacrifice much in their mature 
years so that they may enjoy their old age.  
1.4 Thin meaning 
If meaning requires not just social resources but also internal resources to engage with them, as 
I have suggested, there is a real possibility that a society that offers only one avenue of meaning 
for a large section of its population will exclude many people. Callahan notes that, “there would, 
at minimum, have to be a strong social consensus in...favour” of his view of meaning in order 
to “override the harsh symbolism...that would be implicit in working through the details of a 
denial of that medical treatment which saves lives” (200).10  
The potential for regaining the social consensus Callahan imagines was present in traditional 
societies is thus crucial for his argument, and indeed seems central to any theory which tries to 
set a rigid theory of meaning for large numbers of people. Moreover, it seems clear that what is 
necessary is an ‘attitude’ consensus, i.e. sincere agreement in settled ways of thinking and 
emotional reactions. This contrasts with pragmatic compromise, where individuals may reach 
mutually acceptable positions without altering their attitudes or preferences. Democratic politics 
often involves pragmatic compromise; politicians attempt to persuade voters and 
representatives to adopt new attitudes, but bargaining and deal-making are par for the course. 
This does not mean that democracies cannot reach substantive agreement on policy decisions; 
various attitudes may recommend the same policy on different grounds, and different parties 
can agree to mutually acceptable decisions that do not give anybody everything they want (see 
e.g. Appiah, 2006: 69-86). Yet for people trying to make personal sense of their lives, pragmatic 
compromise, which alters behaviour rather than attitudes, is insufficient. We cannot make the 
meaning a person attaches to their life the subject of a pragmatic compromise; it must be 
something that they accept and internalise, or it is no meaning at all. 
                                                     
10 One could insist that an old age of service would be objectively meaningful whether its participants 
realised it or not; but it’s not clear why people should care about that sort of meaning at all. 
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Callahan acknowledges this need for attitude consensus, but offers no substantive advice other 
than advocating “societal self-reflection”, without indication of how this process will operate. 
He further claims that liberal individualism’s “thin theory” of value means that, “there is at 
present no meaning for the aged unless they can supply it for themselves” (1995: 60). So 
perhaps his position is that although ‘thick’ meaning is hard to come by, it is the only kind 
worth having because it alone can provide the social resources that elderly people currently lack, 
and so re-establish some sense of meaning in their lives.  
Many elderly people do lack an explicit framework or template for making sense of their lives, 
and so do many of the rest of us. Of course, our values and choices do not emerge from the 
void; we develop various preferences without choosing them, while the social and natural world 
constrains our possibilities considerably. But there is no strict template of the kind Callahan 
offers for anyone. The question is why anyone should necessarily want such a narrow template.  
Callahan may think elderly people lack the requisite social resources for meaning, such as a 
cultural background or options for activities and relationships that can provide meaning. This 
would be relevant, since personal meaning for most people requires social resources and 
connections. Certainly, some elderly people feel isolated in contemporary society. Yet this may 
be for a variety of reasons, such as the professionalization of care and increased geographic 
mobility that takes some adult children away from their elderly parents. A successfully pluralistic 
society offers various options for developing individual meaning, and there is no reason that 
such a society cannot establish institutions, or encourage informal networks, that offer advice 
and information to those in need of it, without having a single outline of ‘the meaningful life’. 
We should also beware the assumption that today’s elderly really are more isolated than their 
forebears, since the social data does not support this common assumption (see e.g. Thane, 2000: 
407-435; 480-481). 
A further argument for a thick theory of meaning is that without such a theory the practice of 
medicine cannot have “a clear direction and purpose”, while the welfare of elderly people 
depends on such a purpose. This hits at the heart of the application of Callahan’s discussion to 
ageing enhancement. Callahan notes the possibility of a person retaining physical health beyond 
the stage at which his “life seems to possess significance for him”, and suggests that this should 
not be an aim of medicine. He contrasts this with the opposite of “a person’s body losing its 
wholeness and dying well before the person has been able to live out a full life”, which is 
defined inter alia as a life the end of which “will not seem to others an offense” (66).  
There is a switch, at least terminologically, from a subjective, personal sense of meaning to an 
objective, social sense. Callahan argues that medicine should not aim to keep people alive past 
the point where they see no reason to live. Of course, we must be careful in specifying this 
claim, since people may rediscover purpose after a time. We tend to be much more sceptical, 
even appalled, when non-elderly people claim to see no reason to live than when elderly people 
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make such a claim. There is good reason for our caution when younger people are concerned; 
but since elderly people can also rediscover their sense of purpose, perhaps we should be more 
cautious in our acceptance of claims by elderly people that their lives no longer seem worth 
living, rather than falling back on generalisations about age and natural lifespans. Nonetheless, 
the idea that we should resist forcing or cajoling people to live beyond the point where they 
cease to see any value in doing so is an attractive model for medicine. And there are plausible 
criticisms of a medical model that is obsessive about maintaining life at any cost, that medical 
staff may fail to represent accurately the likely benefits and potential costs of heroic measures to 
extend life.11 But it is misleading of Callahan to pair this agreeable thought with the conclusion 
that medicine should keep people alive only until some socially agreed terminus of meaning; the 
more natural contrast is the view that medicine’s aim should be to avoid individuals’ bodies 
losing their ‘wholeness’ before their lives cease possessing significance for them.  
Finally, Callahan might think that a thin theory of meaning is not really a theory about meaning 
at all. The thin theory of meaning is explicit about relying heavily on individuals’ subjective 
evaluations. The idea of discovering the meaning in one’s life, on the other hand, at least implies 
a significant role for something external to the individual agent. The resultant criticism might be 
that the thin theory of meaning leaves us relying on something that is ultimately arbitrary, when 
a search for meaning is a search for something more substantive. Callahan also worries that 
leaving the meaning of an individual’s old age as a purely private matter entails “evasion” or 
“banishment” of the issue (Callahan, 1995: 31), criticising Gruman’s account of an 
individualistic vision of old age, which leaves questions of value endlessly “open for future 
resolution”. Similarly, De Lange (2012: 143) objects to individualistic thinking on the grounds 
that “individual constructions of meaning are not invented out of the blue, since they are 
mediated by public discourses” or social understandings.  
We might read this complaint in two ways, neither of which is particularly helpful for the thick 
theorist’s argument. On the one hand, the criticism may simply be that meaning requires us to 
marshal social as well as personal resources. And here there is a cogent criticism of some 
instances of the thin theory, at least as it may be applied in practice. This is simply that if the 
thin view insists that all facets of one’s life and identity must be equally up for grabs, and that 
there can be no input from external sources, it may lead us vulnerable to the ‘paradox of 
choice’.12 People are capable of choosing only from within limited options; we need to begin 
with some solid grounding on which to make choices. The kind of open-ended reinvention that 
Gruman suggests will be unappealing or simply unachievable for many people. The thick 
theorist’s worry may be that if liberalism insists that we must make a choice on everything, and 
hold everything endlessly open to revision, then it leaves us with nothing with which to make 
                                                     
11 See e.g. Gawande (2014).  
12 e.g. Schwartz and Ward (2004); Vohs et al (2008). 
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those choices. Able to decide everything, we will be left paralysed. And here, it seems entirely 
plausible that social roles may be part of the solution. In taking on a social role, an activity 
becomes more than just another choice I have made. It becomes a part of my life that I cannot 
regard as easily abandoned; but it can only do so if I do not regard it simply as yet another 
option I am trying on for size, and could cast off effortlessly. And most social roles seem in part 
to depend on others’ understanding of us; we cannot determine many of our social roles by 
ourselves, so the romantic liberal vision of the heroic individual shaping her identity entirely on 
her own terms looks unrealistic.  
But the liberal theory of meaning need not maintain that meaning comes entirely from within. 
The things that we value and see as meaningful are shaped by social influences. The thin theory 
does claim that the individual is the ultimate arbiter of this question; but the resources they 
bring to bear on it do not emerge in a vacuum. Even if most people want to ‘close the question’ 
of how their lives can be meaningful, providing the social resources for that endeavour need 
not, and indeed should not, attempt to make one size fit all; in de Lange’s terms, even if some 
public discourse is necessary for individual meaning, no particular discourse is, and there is no 
reason for that discourse to be dictated, rather than enabled, by the state. I agree that we may 
need to restructure how we engage with elderly people who feel isolated and aimless; but 
providing a monolithic outline of the meaningful life, rather than trying to socially engage with 
people as individuals, seems as bad as leaving them entirely to their own devices.  
A shift toward thin theories of meaning may well have opened up our choices in ways that can 
be difficult and frightening, and that may sometimes make us long for a time when things were 
apparently simpler. The thin theorist insists that the cost is worth it, or at least can be. Perhaps 
there is something to Callahan’s concern: modern liberalism in practice sometimes seems 
unwilling to even provide suggestions or support for the difficult task of working out who we 
are and what we value. But a thin theory can walk the line between isolated individuals and rigid 
social structure, with a view of individuals supporting one another in coming to find their own 
sense of meaning.  
On the other hand, the criticism may be read as rather stronger, claiming that there is an 
objective truth to what makes life meaningful, constituted by some facts about value that hold 
entirely independently of how we feel about things. If there is such an objective meaning that 
applies to everyone, it is clearly a normative fact that fails to engage some people. The thick 
theorist must then claim that we have good reason to insist upon this objective meaning even 
for those who do not engage with it subjectively, and who engage with another (presumably 
illusory) sense of meaning. This would be a claim that it is more important to have a 
‘meaningful’ life in this sense than to feel as though one’s life has meaning.  
Yet a failure of some to find a certain way of life meaningful should surely undermine an 
objectivist’s claim that it is meaningful. On what could one possibly base such a claim other 
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than evidence that humans in general do find such a life meaningful? And if some individuals 
simply fail to conform in that regard, our initial reaction ought not to be that they have made a 
mistake, but that it was we who were mistaken in the apparent universality of our claims. On 
the other hand, Callahan might want to claim that even if some people do not grasp onto his 
vision of meaning immediately, they will do if it is impressed on them in the right way. But even 
if this is true – which I doubt – he would also need the further claim that no other form is 
available; for if alternatives are also acceptable, the fact that his vision is one way to find 
meaning in life gives us no impetus to accept it. Again, the existence of individuals who appear 
to derive meaning from life despite a lack of ‘age-appropriate’ roles undermines this claim 
evidentially.  
Although Callahan’s vision may appeal to some, there is no reason to think that it is a necessary, 
or even attractive, outline for all of us. If Callahan’s solution is deeply flawed, then his 
opposition to extending the lives of elderly people on the ground that it gets in the way of that 
solution is flawed as well. Elderly people need not conceive of themselves as primarily existing 
to ‘serve’ younger generations by getting out of their way in competition for social resources. 
Although there may be necessary social components to a meaningful life, an insistence that life-
extending healthcare necessarily gets in the way of those components seems groundless.  
1.5 Preparing for death 
One of Callahan’s central concerns is our attitude to mortality. Part of the motivation behind 
his discussion involves a repurposing of death; rather than being negative, death is a necessary 
part of the meaningful life, since it is the ultimate way to make room for the next generation. 
But although he opposes life extension beyond a certain point, Callahan (80) supports 
interventions that compress senescence without stretching out our lives, reducing the effects of 
old age to a shorter period at the end of life. Kass (2001) disagrees; death without senescence 
would “become even more of an affront”; our current trajectory of physical ageing is necessary 
for a meaningful death, and hence a meaningful life. This section outlines Kass’s argument, and 
some problems with it, before addressing the more general thought about having the right kind 
of attitude to death and mortality.  
There are two strands of argument at work in Kass’s discussion. The first suggests that death is 
made (more) agreeable if it ends a period of suffering rather than a period of enjoyable life. 
Since death is only good in comparison to the period from which it relieves us, according Kass, 
we should not try to improve the final stages of life. Presumably, the worse off one is in the 
time before one’s death, the better, since death is then a greater release. But this argument 
seems to be a non-starter; the relative disvalue of dying when one’s life is going well could easily 
be outweighed by the additional value that comes from restricting senescence.  
Senescence may also alleviate the suffering of mourners. Kass offers the example of a widow 
whose sorrow is mitigated by the relief of her spouse’s pain; although she mourns his demise, 
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she is also glad of it. Yet while we benefit from the knowledge that loved ones no longer suffer, 
we suffer more before their deaths than we would if their suffering were reduced while alive. 
The reason we are relieved when death ends a loved one’s suffering is because we do not want 
them to suffer in the first place. Moreover, if senescence is great enough, we may suffer the 
financial, physical and emotional burdens of care. I also doubt very much that many people 
could really want one of their loved ones to suffer to make their death somewhat less painful in 
retrospect. Someone who chose to suffer senescence for this reason would be bestowing a 
misguided ‘gift’ on their family and friends. 
The second strand of Kass’s argument is that senescence prepares us for death by making us 
less attached to life. Since death is inevitable for all and troubling for many of us, it would be a 
mistake to avoid senescence. Kass highlights this proposal with Montaigne’s claim that, “in 
proportion as I sink into sickness...I no longer cling so hard to the good things of life when I 
begin to lose the use and pleasure of them, I come to view death with much less frightened 
eyes”. This idea seems most applicable to the kinds of appetitive decline that many people 
experience in old age. It is more complex to apply to other senescent ailments that do not 
directly involve appetitive loss or mental withdrawal, such as the pain of arthritis, or the 
embarrassment and frustration of incontinence. Still, Kass might point to the fact that 
individuals who undergo these problems sometimes come to see life overall as less desirable, 
and hence death as less fearful. 
Again, one might question whether the benefit of a reduced fear of death will necessarily 
outweigh the various harms of senescence. And although Kass assumes the only way to come to 
accept one’s death is via painful experiences in life, as I note in Chapter 5 some people become 
less fearful of death because they are satisfied by positive experiences in their lives. So Kass’s 
route is not the only one available to accepting death.  
However, I want to focus on the more fundamental axiological assumption, present in both 
Kass’s and Callahan’s discussions, that there is a uniquely desirable attitude towards death, 
which is that of calm acceptance. Section 1.5.1 considers a related discussion by Kagan, who 
claims that two typical negative attitudes towards death are misplaced. Section 1.5.2 then 
considers the idea, discernible in both Callahan and Kass, that the only way to make sense of 
death is to embrace it in some way, and suggests an alternative way of relating to our mortality 
that does not collapse into denial. 
1.5.1 Attitudes to mortality 
Kagan argues that neither fear nor anger is an “appropriate” attitude to death; he claims fear is 
only appropriate when, inter alia, there is “some uncertainty about whether the bad thing will 
actually happen” (2012: 292), while anger is only appropriate both when directed at a person, 
and when one has been wronged (299-300). Death, says Kagan, fails all these conditions. While 
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this does not entail the conclusion that calm acceptance is the only appropriate attitude, 
rejecting two common negative attitudes to death may support Kass and Callahan’s assumption. 
Kagan appeals to our intuitive sense of propriety in various cases, but offers no general criteria 
for emotional appropriateness. One might think it sufficient to establish that an emotional 
reaction is inappropriate if it neither serves a further purpose, nor is good in itself. Perhaps Kass 
has something like this in mind; an attitude of calm acceptance is a good in itself, whereas 
‘negative’ emotions are only appropriate if they serve some further function (e.g. anger might 
motivate us to action). However, I think Kass has something slightly different in mind, which is 
that acceptance of death is the only way to make sense of our mortality, which is a necessary 
component in a meaningful life for self-reflective creatures like us.   
Kagan, on the other hand, seems to have something more like D’Arms and Jacobson’s 
evaluative account (e.g. 2000) in mind. They suggest that in many cases emotions contain 
evaluative attitudes and that these can be the objects of ‘fittingness’ evaluations. For instance, to 
be envious is to represent the object of one’s envy as having something that one lacks, and to 
further represent that fact as bad. When we assess whether something is worthy of envy, then, 
we are factually assessing whether the envied person fulfils these criteria. If this is right, then to 
make the argument that certain emotions are inappropriate with regard to some object of 
evaluation, we need to identify necessary components of those emotions that are lacking in the 
object. Although he is not explicit, this seems to be Kagan’s strategy, since he appeals to certain 
features that an object of evaluation should possess to make emotions appropriate, rather than 
the functional role of the emotion. I will now argue that he does not succeed.  
Kagan offers several examples where fear seems inappropriate due to the certainty of an 
outcome. For instance, he imagines a teenager whose mother has said she will collect him from 
a party between 11pm and 1am. In this case, says Kagan, the teen might reasonably fear an early 
pickup, since he wants to stay at the party. But if he knows that his mother will arrive at 
midnight exactly, fear would be unreasonable (297-298). Even if we agree with Kagan regarding 
this example, another may make our intuitions less clear. S has been kidnapped by a regime that 
has tortured its victims in the past. His jailer tells S he will torture him in exactly one hour, 
outlining the unpleasant process in gruesome detail. His painful torture is near-certain – 
certainly more so than the midnight collection in Kagan’s case. Any account of fear that renders 
it an inappropriate response in this situation must be rejected. S should be very afraid (at least, 
fear would not be inappropriate).13  
In fact, Kagan’s example is also problematic, not because the adolescent should fear being 
collected at exactly midnight, but because he should not fear being picked up at all. Being 
                                                     
13 Kagan might say that although S’s torture is certain, there is some doubt what it will be like. But we can 




collected at 11pm rather than 1am is not worthy of fear. Rather, he should hope that the pickup 
time is later. It is certainly only appropriate to hope under uncertainty. This better fits Kagan’s 
uncertainty principle; hope is clearly irrational in the case when the teen’s mother has specified 
an exact time, assuming she is punctual. Similarly, hope would be (epistemically, even if not 
practically) irrational in the kidnapping case; S’s torture is all but guaranteed. So while we might 
argue that we should not hope to avoid death, this says nothing about fear.  
Kagan also claims (299-302) that we can only reasonably become angry in situations caused by 
other people. Death, of course, does not always involve another person. Fessler (2010) argues 
that the evolutionary function of directed anger (which, we may think, should inform our view 
about what the emotion is likely representing) is that another has transgressed. Anger directed at 
another individual specifically seeks to blame, so it is inappropriate to get angry at anything not 
capable of intentional action, since that is a requirement for culpability. Yet even if we can only 
reasonably direct anger at persons – so that it is irrational to shout at my computer when it 
deletes an important document, for instance – anger need not be directed. I can be angry about 
something without being angry at anyone. One may be angry about impending death without 
thinking that somebody is to blame for it, and so without needing to be angry at anyone. I can 
be appropriately angry about something that is nobody’s fault, such as the flood that has delayed 
my train to an important meeting. My anger signals a belief that something important has gone 
wrong; if I blame myself or another for that, then I will be angry at them or at myself. But if I 
do not blame anyone, there is no reason why I cannot be angry that things have gone awry.  
Kagan also claims that anger is only appropriate if you are wronged. This claim seems 
unsupported; it is appropriate to be angry at oneself for making a stupid but crucial mistake, but 
in such an instance you have not wronged yourself. Similarly, one might be angry not because 
one has been wronged intentionally but because a significant harm is undeserved. So there is no 
good representational argument for thinking that acceptance is the only appropriate attitude to 
death.  
However, as I suggested, there may be an alternative theory behind the idea that only 
acceptance is an appropriate reaction to death, which is that this is the only way that we can 
incorporate our knowledge of mortality into the task of making sense of our lives, i.e. living 
meaningfully. If we cannot live meaningfully unless we accept death, and Kass is right that 
restricting senescence will scupper our chances of accepting death, we should not even restrict 
senescence. In the next section, I suggest that this alternative argument also fails.  
1.5.2 Making sense of death  
Death presents a challenge to any secular theory of meaning. Since it is foreseeable but 
ultimately unavoidable, one response is to accommodate death in our sense of meaning, 
recasting it as friend rather than foe. Kass and Callahan effectively offer different versions of 
this choice. Callahan incorporates mortality into meaningful life through a change in attitude, 
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making it a necessary element of serving young people, and thus of his account of a meaningful 
life. Since death is necessary for life’s meaning, it cannot be an affront to meaning. Kass’s view 
holds that so long as we focus on the withering of our bodies, death appears as a release rather 
than a deprivation. These are therapeutic acceptances; we defang death by having it serve our 
interests, thereby rendering it an ally.  
Yet death in such cases only ‘serves’ our interests in the sense that it aligns with them, and the 
accommodation comes not from death but from us. If I change my preferences so that they are 
met by what you were going to do anyway, and then claim that you are acting ‘in my interests’, I 
get matters significantly wrong, for my subjective interests track your actions, not vice versa. 
Both Callahan and Kass engage in a similar gerrymandering so that death can be categorised as 
beneficial. The dissonance is starker for Kass, whose account makes death worse when we 
continue to live in the way that has afforded our lives meaning until old age. We achieve a good 
death by having it serve our interest in ending the suffering caused by senescence; yet since that 
interest could have been served by the very measure Kass rejects – ageing enhancement – there 
is something odd in his claim for the value of death. 
However, the problem is also present in Callahan, albeit more complexly. He advocates a 
change of attitude, embracing as positive an element of existence that many see as negative; in 
his words, service to young people includes acting as a role model by ageing “with 
grace...accept[ing] decline and loss” (1995: 49). Consider what Callahan might say to someone 
who sees death as a threat to meaning in her life. He would presumably insist that her life 
cannot have full meaning unless she finds a place in it for death. He would then point to his 
own account as providing a positive role for death, as the mechanism by which older 
generations most fully step aside. He would conclude that we should change our attitude about 
death in order to give it a positive role in our lives.  
But for those of us who do see death as something to regret or even fear, this advice gets things 
in the wrong order. It seems rather like intentionally deciding to fall in love in order to avoid 
feeling lonely; while it is true that that a successful acquisition of such an attitude would ‘solve’ 
the problem, it is hard to see how one could sincerely set about acquiring such an attitude. That 
is not to say that either Kass or Callahan are being insincere; they may genuinely see death in the 
way that they describe. The point is that it is too simplistic to say that because thinking about 
death in a certain way will allow some people to make sense of it, everyone should think that 
way. Those who do fear death cannot be given pragmatic reasons to stop fearing it; we want an 
account of death that remains true to our perception of it, or convinces us sincerely to change 
our attitude; an account that recommends changing our view of death in order to make it 
meaningful seems to answer the question ‘What can I make of this?’ with ‘Nothing. Let’s call it 
something else.’  
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There is a connection here with Nietzsche’s claim that the problem with suffering “is not 
suffering itself, but the meaninglessness of suffering” (1998: 49). If we can identify a cause that 
death serves, it is no longer unbearable because it is no longer meaningless. This thought 
saturates the arguments discussed above; identify a purpose for death, and it will be meaningful. 
Without a positive purpose, it cannot make sense.  As muddled as it seems, this claim might 
come through if there were no other way of making sense of death, if the only other option 
were to have it as a terrifying spectre that we ignore until forced to confront it. Such an attitude 
at least has considerable pragmatic downsides, since a failure to confront mortality as a reality 
will reduce our ability to plan for it. And if our fear sits in the back of our minds, repressed but 
not entirely forgotten, it may also be psychologically damaging. So I agree to an extent with 
Kass and Callahan that a culture of outright denial is unlikely to be beneficial.  
Yet as Momeyer (1988: 11) notes, there is a further option between denying the inevitable and 
embracing it, which he calls “resistance”. The lesson of resistance is that making sense of 
something need not involve imagining it as a benefaction. I do not evade or deny my mortality 
when I think that I do not want to die, when I feel my own mortality as an awful limit on life, or 
when I welcome effective measures to extend my life. Resistance involves confronting the 
challenge death poses. The response it gives might be ineloquent: ‘Damn’. But it is a reply, and 
it does give death a place in my life, as a barrier, a limitation that I refuse to validate. We can 
find meaning, inter alia, in our opposition to death. 
Camus advocates a similar attitude of revolt against what he perceives as the inevitable absurdity 
in life (1975: 53), which Nagel (1979: 22) chastises as “romantic and slightly self-pitying”. Might 
something similar be true of resisting death? I think not. Resistance is not a denial that death is 
inevitable, and so is not ‘romantic’ in the sense of being delusional. As for self-pity, there is no 
reason that an attitude of resistance needs to involve “shaking a fist at the world” (Nagel, ibid) 
or conceiving of one’s death as a grand tragedy. Resistance to death is an attitude that confronts 
death, and one’s negative emotions about death, honestly and without feeling as though one has 
failed through such an attitude; since one could express similar feelings about the death of 
others, there is certainly no need to be self-absorbed in a solipsistic sense.  
There are perhaps two concerns about such a response. I have suggested that it would be 
insincere for at least some people to recast death as an ally simply in order to avoid it 
threatening our ability to live meaningfully. An appropriate way to respond to death should 
sincerely reflect our fundamental evaluative take on it; gerrymandering death as an ally fails to 
do this. But there is another, instrumental, take on this idea. Even if there is significant value in 
my notion of having a sincere take on the world, this is not the only source of value in our lives; 
our happiness and our peace of mind are also central. This response is important, as it suggests 
limits on the value of sincerity. If our sincere take on our mortality threatens to ruin our ability 
to cope with life at all, I agree that we may have reason for self-deception; while happiness is 
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not the only value, nor is sincerity. But this seems to me unlikely, and unsupported by evidence. 
Moreover, if there are attitudes to death that we might take that do not involve embracing it, 
then we should also note that the accepting attitude looks like it may be costly in other ways, 
detailed in my criticisms of Callahan and Kass. 
The second worry is that since our decision over whether the state should pursue ageing 
enhancement must be taken at least at the societal level, it may not be sufficient that some other 
attitude is possible. If only a few people can take on such an outlook, or if most people are in 
fact like Kass and Callahan in their outlook on life, perhaps ageing enhancement would rob 
more people of meaning than not. But this argument does not work; for we would need to 
show not just that most people can only make sense of death by accepting it, but that the only 
way for them to accept it is to block ageing enhancement. In fact, the availability of ageing 
enhancement provides a distinct opportunity for people to embrace death; by refusing ageing 
enhancement, people could make a choice to embrace death at a particular age, rather than 
having it forced upon them. Moreover, in the absence of evidence that most people are unable 
to make sense of death without embracing it, it is not clear why we should allow such an 
assumption to dictate our policy decisions. There may be challenges in the attitude of resistance 
in ensuring that people do not slip into denial, and that the casting of death as a foe does not 
cloud our judgement in making decisions about the ends of our lives. But these challenges do 
not seem to me insurmountable.  
Finally, even if we accept that most people would be best off accepting death, it is not clear that 
ageing enhancement or its pursuit must undermine that possibility. Perhaps Kass’s argument 
should give us pause for thought about how we represent the prospects of technologies that are 
not yet reality; talking publicly about the ‘end of ageing’ or ‘conquering death’ may be unhelpful 
in fostering denial rather than resistance, even if we do think that those goals are in principle 
realisable. But it is also clear that many people are fairly sanguine about death both long before 
they slip into senescence, and while still embracing life-extending technologies. One can surely 
think that death would not be so bad, while still preferring more life – of a certain quality – if 
that is available. It is one thing to accept that there are limits – that we will never eliminate death, 
or disease, or other ills – but it is quite another to refuse to engage with attempts to push those 
limits. Insofar as the Meaning Objection rests on the assumptions that ageing enhancement will 
undermine our ability to emotionally embrace mortality, and that this is a necessary part of a 
meaningful life, I reject it on both counts.  
1.6 Summary  
The arguments considered in this chapter suggest that ageing enhancement will undermine our 
abilities to make sense of our lives, and to live meaningfully. Callahan worries that elderly 
people lack a distinctive social role that can give meaning to their old age, and that the relentless 
chasing after youth represented by modern medicine contributes to that. But although the thin 
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view of meaning is by no means easy to pursue, Callahan’s view is overly restrictive, relying on 
an overly narrow view of old age that cannot play the role he supposes, and places unwarranted 
burdens on elderly people.  
Kass’ concern is that attempts to eliminate ageing ignore the role that ageing plays in helping us 
to accept our mortality. I argued both that this claim is untrue, and that the costs of Kass’ 
position anyway seem to outweigh the benefits. I then went on to argue that Kass’ view 
implicitly suggests that the only way to make sense of mortality is to accept it, arguing that this 
commits a similar mistake to Callahan’s view of being overly narrow. Both Callahan and Kass 
take an aspect of human life that many of us find troubling, and try to make it less troubling by 
giving it a role. But I have suggested that this tactic could only be taken up by many people in 
an insincere way, even if it is not intended that way; those of us who find physical ageing and 
death genuinely troubling cannot simply render them less troubling by thinking of them as allies. 
These worries are based on an overly narrow view of how to make sense of life, and so cannot 
form a plausible objection to ageing enhancement. In the next chapter, I consider a related 
worry based on the claim that ageing enhancement will undermine our relationship with 



















Chapter 2: The Meaning Objection – Radical enhancement and 
value  
I have considered two arguments that suggest ageing enhancement would rob us of meaningful 
life. This chapter considers a third worry in this vein, inspired by Agar (2010), that ‘radical’ 
ageing enhancement would divorce us from current sources of value. Section 2.1 outlines Agar’s 
view that we ought to adopt a kind of conservatism towards sources of value, and discusses its 
application to both radical ageing enhancement and, briefly, radical cognitive enhancement. 
Radical enhancement will significantly change our attitudes towards current sources of value; 
value conservatism says that even if post-enhancement life would be good, relative to our new 
values, we should have a bias towards existing sources of value. This section concludes that 
although problematic, there is some plausibility to this worry with regard to cognitive 
enhancement. Section 2.2 explains that the changes Agar thinks we will undergo following 
radical enhancement differ greatly between ageing and cognitive enhancement, and considers 
some initial empirical concerns with Agar’s predictions about ageing enhancement. Section 2.3 
explains how the difference outlined in Section 2.2 undermines the criticism as applied to 
radical ageing enhancement, even if we grant it to some degree with regard to radical cognitive 
enhancement.  
2.1 The value criticism 
While Callahan is concerned with the effect on our ability to find meaning in our lives, and both 
he and Kass are worried about our ability to cope with death, Agar’s concern focuses on our 
relationships with particular sources of value. Again, I will not address every detail of Agar’s 
view, but instead consider the strongest version of his criticisms, which deviates somewhat from 
the official version.14  
One way to approach Agar’s account, and to see both what is plausible in and problematic 
about it, is in relation to Cohen’s (2011; 2012) discussion of value conservatism. Cohen’s central 
claim is that we should have a “conservative bias” to particular sources of value; as I will 
suggest, a very similar idea informs Agar’s concern. This bias involves preferring existing 
sources of value over novel sources when the two come into conflict, even if the latter would 
deliver greater overall value considered objectively. One of Cohen’s examples is All Souls 
College, Oxford. He suggests (2012: 146-148) that the College’s members have reason not just 
to preserve it, but to preserve it largely as it is, even if some changes (such as moving from 
being entirely self-funded to seeking external funding) would enhance the very values that the 
                                                     
14 A significant deviation is that I pay no attention to what Agar calls ‘species-relativism’ about value, 
which says that radical enhancement would make us no longer able to appreciate distinctly human sources 
of value.  
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College seeks to promote, such as the ability to educate students. This is because there is 
additional value to doing things the way that they always been done, and to respecting the 
historical trajectories of how sources of value came to be valuable. All Souls College has a 
certain character, and the preservation of that character is worth something. We should also 
respect sources of value not just for their history, but for their particularity; Cohen also insists 
that we should not melt down a beautiful statue, even if our intent is to create an object with 
greater aesthetic value.   
Although both Cohen and Agar discuss various sources of value, I will focus on personal 
relationships, because they relate quite obviously to ageing enhancement, and because they are a 
case in which I think most people hold some degree of conservative bias. As Cohen 
acknowledges, some of the examples he uses will simply not convince some people. For 
instance, in his discussion of All Souls, the conservative position is countered by a modernising 
position, which sees no distinct value in leaving things the way they are. Cohen thinks that 
almost everyone will accept a degree of conservative bias with regard to some sources of value. 
Close relationships are generally such that the individual matters because of particular ways that 
they are, and the relationship is valued for its distinctive history (see, e.g. Kolodny, 2003). We 
would not abandon a friendship simply for the promise of a new friend, for instance, even if the 
latter person promised greater quantities of what we love in current friends, because we both 
share a history with our current friends, and because we value them as individuals. So we have 
some reason to avoid changes that would undermine our current relationships, even at the 
promise of novel relationships that promised more of what we value currently.  
This does not mean we cannot be content for our relationships to evolve over time, with their 
particular nature sometimes changing quite radically; if two childhood friends keep in touch 
throughout their lives, it would be decidedly odd if the character of their friendship was 
unchanged, or if they tried to keep it as such. But there may be some parameters on acceptable 
changes. For one thing, the same degree of change that we might see across a lifetime of 
friendship happening quite suddenly might threaten the relationship in a way that more gradual 
change does not. There are also changes that would alter the character of a relationship in such 
a way that we would want to resist such a change now, even if we would not regret it once it 
had happened. Such changes will also involve considerable change in the particular values and 
personalities of the individuals concerned. For instance, imagine a couple with political careers 
who, while they genuinely care for one another, maintain their relationship largely because it is 
politically useful. This relationship might suit their needs very well, and thus make them happy; 
but if they could foresee this change when they are young and more deeply in love, they would 
(and perhaps should) resist such a change, both in themselves and their relationship. So while 
there is plenty of scope for flexibility even in relationships, there do seem to be certain 
parameters within which the nature of particular relationships is valuable in a way that makes a 
conservative bias plausible. 
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Agar claims that both radical cognitive enhancement (RCE) and radical ageing enhancement 
(RAE) would fundamentally change our interests and values. This will, he claims, impact our 
relationships in various ways. If I undergo RCE, my interests and tastes will change radically as 
well, in ways that make it unlikely that I will retain much in common with those with whom I 
currently have important relationships. Following RAE, says Agar, I will want to avoid many of 
the activities that maintain my relationships, since I will become significantly more risk-averse. 
In both situations, Agar predicts that I will change my attitudes in ways that would 
fundamentally warp how I relate to my loved ones. Even if my enhanced life would contain 
more overall value relative to the new interests and concerns I would have post-enhancement, 
Agar claims we have reason to hold onto what we currently value. This is a sentiment that 
Cohen would endorse; the picture Agar paints is of my attitudes changing such that I no longer 
relate to my partner in the ways that are constitutive of the particular character of our 
relationship, and which fail to respect our history together.  
Although it takes us away from ageing enhancement, it is worth briefly discussing Agar’s worry 
about RCE, as it will help to highlight the problems with his RAE argument. Although I will 
not endorse Agar’s criticism of RCE in anything like its full strength, I will suggest that the 
concerns he raises point to an additional risk to RCE, which potential enhancees should take 
into account, but that even this weaker position does not apply to RAE. Agar suggests that 
RCE will reduce my toleration for some activities I currently enjoy; just as we grow out of the 
activities we enjoy as children as we learn to appreciate more complex pastimes, RCE may 
increase our cognitive abilities at the cost of finding current pastimes dull.  
Agar outlines two worrying post-RCE scenarios with respect to my relationships (taking a 
romantic relationship as a central case). The first is that I undergo enhancement and my partner 
does not. I would lose enthusiasm for many of the common interests we share, and which 
maintain our relationship, because they would be too simplistic for me to enjoy. Perhaps the 
relationship between the cognitively enhanced and unenhanced would be akin to that between 
adults and children. We can relate to children on many levels; but those relationships are quite 
different from romantic relationships. Undergoing RCE when your partner does not, then, will 
irreparably alter the character of your relationship.  
The second scenario is that we both undergo RCE. Although we would both be capable of 
enjoying the same activities (because our cognitive capacities would still be roughly on a par), 
Agar thinks it likely that our respective enhancements would take our interests in very different 
directions, again undermining the common ground that cements our relationships. In both 
cases, I have strong reason to resist such changes, even if I were confident that I could find a 
new relationship with someone who was more in tune with my new interests, and even if that 
new relationship would be overall better for my enhanced self than my current relationship is 
for me now. 
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Agar’s concerns regarding RCE are exaggerated. Cognitive capacity is not the only source of 
shared interests. Highly intelligent people can enjoy quite simple activities; even if poetry is 
superior to push-pin that does not mean that poetry aficionados cannot take pleasure in the 
occasional trite game. It is certainly true that as our cognitive capacities develop, we are no 
longer satisfied with a steady diet of the same activities that kept us entertained when we were 
younger, and it may be that this trend would continue with radical enhancement. So an 
unenhanced person who insisted on her enhanced partner only doing things that she would also 
enjoy would create problems in a relationship. But if the enhanced partner had space to exercise 
her newfound intelligence, there is no reason why the relationship could not survive unequal 
enhancement if the couple also shared other interests; there are plenty of activities that can be 
enjoyed by enhanced and unenhanced alike. Moreover, it is not at all clear that we should be as 
pessimistic about the prospect of two enhanced individuals ending up with similar interests, 
particularly if they shared strong interests to begin with; although our passions and preferences 
are partly shaped by our cognitive capacities, plenty of other factors play a role.  
Still, it seems as though the character of one’s relationship could be radically altered by RCE, 
and that this has a very different significance than the kinds of gradual changes that occur in 
relationships currently; even if a couple who have been together many years are both very 
different people than they were when they met, those changes have been partly structured by 
and reflective of changes in the other. At the least, then, Agar’s argument suggests RCE is a 
greater risk than acknowledged for those of us who have some level of conservative bias 
towards our relationships. But I will now suggest that even if we are permissive about Agar’s 
criticism of RCE, the same concerns cannot plausibly extend to RAE.  
Although his predictions about the effects of RAE on enhancees are very different from the 
effects of RCE, when it comes to personal relationships it seems as though the same worries are 
present. However, I will suggest that the argument has far less force when it comes to RAE 
because the nature of its effect, even if we accept Agar’s predictions, is importantly different in 
a way that Cohen’s discussion highlights. I will also suggest that his empirical predictions are 
rather less plausible for RAE.  
While Agar’s vision of RCE involves a significant change in one’s attitudes to others – one 
comes to see them as trite and not worth spending time with – the picture he paints of RAE has 
different implications altogether. Even on Agar’s pessimistic picture, RAE will not make me see 
my partner herself as any less a source of value. Rather, I will be less willing to interact with her 
because of circumstantial pressures. Agar makes a variety of predictions about the attitudes of 
those with extended lifespans, but I will focus on just one, central criticism: the claim that those 
with significantly greater life expectancies will become very risk-averse due to the much greater 
loss involved in their death. As with my discussion of RCE, I will focus on the supposed impact 
on personal relationships, although Agar intends it to apply much more widely.  
33 
 
Agar suggests that death would be much worse for those who had undergone RAE, because 
they would have far more to lose (116-117). He proposes that an individual’s death is bad in 
proportion to the good life of which it deprives them.15 The negligibly senescent will lose a great 
deal more when they die at any particular age than an unenhanced person at the same age. This 
greater cost will impact our everyday life. Many things we do now carry a slight risk of death. 
When I go to the cinema there is some small risk that I will be run over as I cross the road, or 
that the building’s roof will collapse on me. The expected benefit (the benefit of the outing 
going well multiplied by the probability of that occurring) of my cinema trip following RAE 
stays the same, but the expected cost rises steeply because although the roof collapsing on me is 
no more likely, it is much worse if it kills me. If my life is sufficiently extended, the expected 
cost of the trip will outweigh the expected benefit. This applies to a host of ordinary pastimes. 
Agar thus suggests that the negligibly senescent would become cautious shut-ins, avoiding the 
risks of interacting with others or engaging in common activities.  
Although he does not make the connection explicitly, it is clear that this would have a 
significant effect on a relationship. According to Agar’s predictions, the long-lived would avoid 
many of the ordinary activities that, while mundane, maintain personal relationships. As such, 
even if the long-lived did not come to see their loved ones differently, as in the case of RCE, 
their relationships would be unsustainable.  
2.2 Empirical worries   
It seems unlikely that people would make the judgements Agar supposes following RAE. I have 
no idea what level of risk I took last time I went to the cinema. I certainly do not know what the 
risk was in the detail required to have made a rational calculation incorporating my expected 
remaining lifespan and the value of the trip. I think this is true of almost everyone. Why should 
the enhanced do what hardly any of us do now, and take the time to assess risk in an accurate 
enough way to rationally calculate whether individual activities are worth it? Remember that 
RAE, unlike RCE, has no effect on cognitive abilities or tendencies. So the negligibly senescent 
will be susceptible to the same risk-denying psychological biases as the rest of us, such as robust 
over-optimism about personal chances of injury and accident (e.g. Weinstein: 1987), and just as 
incapable of making such calculations as we are.  
Perhaps Agar thinks all we have to do is track risk in a rough and ready way, i.e. simply become 
aware that death would be much worse for us following RAE, without an exact comparison. 
But we do not always think about risk in the sense required. Changes in risk typically need to 
impinge on our experience if they are to prompt changes in our behaviour. For instance, 
Tversky and Kahneman discuss what they call the availability heuristic, whereby we call to mind 
                                                     
15 I think there are reasons to doubt whether this is the correct account of death’s badness; but all Agar 
actually requires is that this is how people will think of the badness of death, which seems more plausible.  
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similar events to estimate likelihood. One example is a tendency to attribute greater likelihoods 
to events when similar occurrences are salient. This tendency is fairly elastic; for instance “the 
subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by 
the side of the road” (1974: 1127).  
It’s not just that we downplay certain risks that do not impinge on their experience. We may not 
consider at all risks that we cannot easily represent to ourselves, even if we know about them. 
As Ropeik puts it, “our responses to risks are not simply internal 'rational' risk analyses, but also 
intuitive 'affective' responses that apply our emotions, values and instincts as we try to judge 
danger” (2004: S57); they also determine whether we even try to judge danger. Most people just 
do not associate a trip to the cinema with death. So it’s not clear that such an eventuality would 
be salient in the sense necessary to prompt risk-assessment. We are also more likely to fear risks 
over which we feel a lack of control, or which are unfamiliar (Slovic, 1987: 283), neither of 
which apply to our everyday activities. 
Agar insists that past increases in life expectancy have led us to “become less tolerant to 
threats” to our lives, noting that “it’s difficult to think of activities routinely practiced by citizens 
of the modern rich world with levels of danger equivalent to joining a medieval duke’s army or 
giving birth in the 1300s.” He claims that while the increase in life expectancy we have seen 
since the fourteenth century has totalled about fifty years, negligible senescence promises “a 
twenty-year period in which life expectancies may improve by eight hundred and fifty years”. 
This means that “there will be abrupt and dramatic increases in our perception of the danger 
associated with many everyday activities” (119). Presumably, then, the level of risk averseness 
among negligibly senescent people will increase in a similarly abrupt way. But this supposed 
correlation is problematic for a number of reasons.   
For one thing, Agar’s numerical prediction is incorrect even based on de Grey’s optimistic 
projections about what can be achieved in terms of ageing enhancement. Agar infers his claim 
that we will see an 850 year increase in just twenty years from de Grey’s suggestion that “the 
first 1,000-year old is probably less than twenty years younger than the first 150-year old” 
(2004c). De Grey’s predicted longevity ‘escape velocity’ says that there will come a point when 
each gain in ageing enhancement buys us time to make it to the next. So the quoted claim is 
making no such prediction. Rather, the thought is that the first person to make it to 150 due to 
advances in ageing enhancement will not hit escape velocity. He will die at 150. However, 
someone twenty years younger will also benefit from whatever development enabled the 150 
milestone. Crucially, because this person hits 150 twenty years later, she will also benefit from 
further work, and will not die at 150. But the next milestone need not be 1,000. All that is 
needed to make de Grey’s claim true is that by the time she reaches, say, 180 another milestone 
has been reached, maybe 210, and that this keeps happening until we hit 1,000. But then in 
twenty years’ time our life expectancy increases by thirty years, not 850.  
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This is still quicker than any gains we have seen before. But Agar also provides no evidence for 
the association of increased lifespans with increased risk-aversion other than a correlation. But 
while it is true that we take fewer risks in the developed world than would have been 
conceivable in the 1300s, there are multiple other differences between the 14th and 21st 
centuries. People did not have a great deal of choice in 1300 about whether to fight in a noble’s 
army. Women certainly did not have much choice about how and whether to give birth. Even 
Agar’s more recent example, of the comparative death tolls in the First World War and recent 
Iraq war, is not compelling, precisely because many soldiers in the former did not have a choice 
about the conditions under which they fought or, after 1916, whether to fight at all. The 
introduction of a professional standing army, for reasons entirely unrelated to increased 
lifespans, is surely the important factor here. Claiming that their decision was influenced by 
their life expectancy ignores the more fundamental difference: having the opportunity to decide. 
So, there is no reason to think that a desire for ageing enhancement is caused by a higher than 
average concern with death. There is also no reason to suppose that those with a higher than 
average concern with death will deteriorate into a scenario where “the fear of death...completely 
dominate[s] the lives of negligibly senescent people” (114).  
2.3 Motivation and attitude changes 
Agar’s predictions about the psychological changes involved in RAE are thus doubtful. 
However, a more fundamental issue emerges from his suggestions, even if his empirical 
predictions are on target. I will suggest that Cohen’s discussion of value conservatism can help 
us see the relevance of a difference between the case of RAE, even under Agar’s most 
pessimistic predictions, and the concerns raised in the context of RCE. With regard to RCE, 
Agar imagines the enhanced person coming to see their partner and relationship in a very 
different way, i.e. as trite and unfulfilling. With RAE, this does not happen, even if Agar is right. 
Instead of coming to see my partner or our relationship differently, RAE causes me to view the 
circumstances in which I engage with her differently.  
In his description of RCE, Agar’s imagined agent undergoes direct changes in her preferences 
and attitudes with regard to their relationship. Following RCE, I no longer see my partner as 
valuable (at least qua romantic partner). Since these attitudes are central to the constitution of a 
relationship, we may say that this change is destructive of my relationship itself, or at least of the 
particular character that makes it currently valuable to me. The particular relationship is a source 
of value; so according to the value-conservative, knowingly undergoing a change that will be 
destructive of it is to ignore the importance of preserving rather than replacing sources of value.  
RAE does not involve such a change. If Agar is correct, the long-lived may be more reluctant, 
even fearful, about participating in the everyday activities that, however mundane, define their 
relationship. But this does not as such change how they feel about the other person. Rather 
than a direct change, what we see in this case is an indirect change in attitude. Following RAE, I 
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retain the same feelings about my partner; my reluctance about the relationship involves 
external or circumstantial costs. 
A simpler case may clarify this distinction. S thinks that she would like to hunt white rhino. 
There are two ways we might dissuade her. We could point out that hunting white rhino is 
illegal. If this persuades her not to hunt, she might say, ‘I wish I could hunt white rhino, if only 
it wasn’t illegal’. There is a sense in which she no longer wants to hunt; we have persuaded her 
that the risk just is not worth it. But there is also a clear sense in which she still does want to 
hunt. There is nothing about hunting itself that puts her off; it is only that hunting under these 
circumstances is unattractive. If she could hunt without the risk of jail, she would. This is an 
indirect change in her attitude to hunting. On the other hand, we might convince her that 
needlessly slaughtering animals is immoral. But then she cannot give a reply analogous to that 
given in the previous case. It makes no sense for her to say ‘I wish I could go hunting, if only it 
didn’t involve the slaughter of animals’. That just is the practice of hunting. Now she has 
undergone a direct or constitutive change in her attitude towards hunting. 
This distinction highlights that Agar’s argument glosses over an important consideration about 
motivation. We can see this by considering again Cohen’s own value conservatism. Cohen’s 
position is not only a claim about what we ought to do, but is also supposed to serve a 
descriptive role; he says that “everyone who is sane has something of this [conservative] 
disposition” (2011: 204). As I have suggested, I think it is true that, at least when it comes to 
valued personal relationships, most people do hold a degree of value conservatism. Since 
indirect attitude changes mean that I retain my fundamental attitudes towards the object of 
value (that is, my partner and our relationship), I will also retain the relevant motivations to 
engage with her, precisely because I not only value her, but I value valuing her i.e. I care about 
maintaining my attitudes towards her. So even if I do become more cautious as a result of RAE, 
I will maintain strong motivations to engage in the activities that supports our relationship.  
Agar’s claim is that I will be unwilling to engage in everyday activities following RAE because I 
will run something like a cost-benefit analysis, and find those activities wanting; when the 
expected loss from my possible death during a cinema trip goes up, I will judge that the 
enjoyment I get from a film is not worth it. But this misses two points about that trip to the 
cinema. First, when it is viewed as an activity that maintains a relationship that I still value 
deeply, it is no mere trip to the cinema; its value must include the relationship that it sustains. So 
even if the expected costs outweigh the expected benefits from the film, they are far less likely to 
outweigh the overall benefit of the trip, and of in general maintaining an attitude of willingness 
to participate in such relationship-sustaining activities.   
Second, even if RAE does make us very cautious, it will not change our psychological needs, 
which for most of us include contact with others. Agar’s mistake is in assuming that each trip to 
the cinema offers roughly the same benefit. Even if we would avoid the first few trips because 
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of the psychological mechanisms Agar suggests, later trips will take on a greater importance. I 
refuse opportunities for social contact all the time, because I assume that more will come along 
later. But if I go for some time without much social contact, almost any opportunity begins to 
look attractive. Each trip will not be framed in the same way; the longer I go without social 
contact, the greater the perceived benefit. Moreover, we do not just have a need for any social 
contact but for contact with specific people who have special significance for us. As we turn 
down trips, the cost of doing so increases with the weakening of our interpersonal ties. 
Since RAE does not directly change our attitudes towards others, our psychological tendencies, 
or our basic needs, Cohen’s observation suggests that even if we become more cautious in the 
way Agar predicts, it is unlikely to make us abandon our relationships as special sources of value 
because we will retain the strong motivation to interact with specific sources of value. The 
conservative worry, in this case, provides its own solution. Not so with RCE, since that causes 
direct changes in our attitudes (at least if Agar is to be believed). After RCE, I come to see my 
partner as not worth bothering with, and so come to see our relationship as no longer 
worthwhile. This means not only that I no longer value her in the same way, but also that I lack 
the motivation to overcome this obstacle. RAE does not face this concern, and so lacks even the 
minimal plausibility that I have suggested Agar’s argument against RCE possesses.  
2.4 Summary  
Even if we grant some degree of plausibility to Agar’s criticisms of radical cognitive 
enhancement, this does not carry over to similar worries about radical ageing enhancement. The 
changes Agar predicts about how we will come to relate to current sources of value look 
empirically doubtful, and anyway do not constitute a plausible objection to ageing enhancement.  
This chapter concludes the discussion of the Meaning Objection. I have considered three 
concerns which worry broadly that undergoing ageing enhancement will change our attitudes – 
towards ageing, death or sources of value – in ways that will undermine our ability to live 
meaningfully. Having rejected the Meaning Objection, the next four chapters consider a second 








Chapter 3: The Egalitarian Objection – The temporal subject 
Chapters 1 and 2 argued that there is no obvious problem for ageing enhancement related to 
the meaningfulness or value of life. Chapters 3-6 consider the question of who benefits. By its 
nature, ageing enhancement will have greater benefit for people the older they are,16 and will 
have no benefit for almost all young people, who do not undergo physical ageing in the sense of 
physical decline.17 A widespread programme of ageing enhancement could involve significant 
dedication of health resources to benefitting middle-aged and, particularly, elderly patients. The 
second central concern that I address is that this fails an egalitarian distributive requirement, 
because it involves extending and improving the lives of elderly rather than young patients (e.g. 
Callahan, op cit; Pijnenburg and Leget, 2007; Temkin, 2008: 205; Turner, 2009: 24). For 
simplicity I will predominantly focus on the life-extending benefits to elderly patients, since that 
is the target of most forms of the Egalitarian Objection. 
As with the Meaning Objection, I will begin with a rough formalised version of the objection:  
P6 Ageing enhancement will require considerable resources to be spent on extending 
the lives of elderly people.   
P7 We should apply an egalitarian principle to healthcare distribution. We have strong 
moral reasons not to support (and perhaps to restrict) practices that violate that 
principle.  
P8 From P6, ageing enhancement violates the best egalitarian principles.  
C2 There are strong moral reasons for governments not to support (and perhaps to 
restrict) ageing enhancement.  
The next four chapters focus predominantly on various ways of filling in the first part of P7, i.e. 
what our egalitarian principles should be, and hence whether ageing enhancement really does 
violate them. I largely focus on the weaker version of P7 (and hence C2) that says only that the 
state should not support ageing enhancement, although I consider the idea of restriction in 
Section 6.3.3. I will suggest that the best egalitarian principles do not entail that we should not 
pursue ageing enhancement, though they do suggest some constraints on that pursuit. However, 
these constraints are not best understood as a complaint about elderly patients benefitting 
instead of young patients, as the Egalitarian Objection typically has it.    
                                                     
16 Olshanksy et al (2006) suggest that “If we succeed in slowing aging by seven years, the age-specific risk 
of death, frailty, and disability will be reduced by approximately half at every age”. Since these risks 
increase with age, people will benefit more the older they get. And the life-extending prospects of ageing 
enhancement will almost (see fn 17) exclusively benefit elderly people.  
17 I say ‘almost’ because the rare, devastating syndrome progeria has been linked to an accelerated ageing 
process among very young people. See e.g. Burtner and Kennedy (2010).  
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Some advocates of the Egalitarian Objection seem to assume that once we espouse any 
commitment to egalitarianism, we can see automatically that justice demands that we prefer 
saving younger lives to older lives. But while some egalitarian principles deliver that conclusion, 
others do not. This also means, however, that proponents of ageing enhancement should not 
focus only on those egalitarian principles that most obviously support the Egalitarian Objection. 
For instance, one objection to egalitarian arguments against ageing enhancement is that even if 
equality is valuable, it is not sufficiently so to justify denying treatment to the better off when 
that denial will benefit nobody (see e.g. Harris, 2002b: 290; Davis, 2004). But a different 
egalitarian claim might say only that we should not pursue ageing enhancement because our 
resources and attention could instead go to the care of younger patients. This demands that we 
avoid ageing enhancement only when we can benefit others instead, and so is not vulnerable to 
the Harris-Davis objection. As such, it is not enough to focus on just one form of egalitarian 
theory either in defending or resisting the Egalitarian Objection. Both objection and responses 
need to engage with substantive issues in egalitarian political theory before we can reach a 
conclusion either way. 
Section 3.1 outlines three possible egalitarian distributive principles. Section 3.2 notes a 
complication regarding the temporal focus with which we ought to be concerned in applying 
such principles. I suggest that we have reason to care about egalitarianism both across lifetimes 
and relative to particular times, and that this requires distinct principles for these temporal foci. 
A time-relative concern will, in the following chapters, provide significant complications for 
many versions of the Egalitarian Objection. Section 3.3 rejects two Rawlsian views that claim to 
capture our time-relative concern without requiring a distinct principle. These are Daniels’ 
Prudential Lifespan Account (3.3.1) and Lazenby’s development of that account (3.3.2).  These 
accounts insist both that time-relative concerns are derivative on our lifetime concerns, and that 
understanding this supports some age-based rationing of healthcare. Since I argue in Chapter 6 
that a distinct concern with the best time-relative egalitarian principle should affect how we 
implement the best lifetime egalitarian principle in a way that is relevant to the Egalitarian 
Objection, it is important to explain why a view of this kind will not work. Although I focus on 
the detail of Daniels’ and Lazenby’s accounts, my comments apply more widely to attempts to 
make time-relative concerns derivative on lifetime concerns.  
Chapters 4-6 outline a position within this framework, while discussing problems with 
alternatives, and consider some versions of the Egalitarian Objection that seem explicitly to take 
an alternative position. I will suggest that the most plausible egalitarian theory does not in fact 
have the implications that the Egalitarian Objection supposes based on the observation (in P6, 
above) that ageing enhancement will predominantly benefit elderly patients; but egalitarian 
principles do have implications for how, and under what conditions, we should engage in ageing 
enhancement, among other medical interventions. 
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This thesis does not attempt to develop a complete theory of allocation for healthcare 
resources. Although I will make some suggestions and assumptions about the concerns that 
should guide our healthcare allocations, both at the level of quite abstract18 theory and more 
concrete consideration, my initial focus is what I  take to be the central assumption of the 
Egalitarian Objection: that whatever our broader theory of healthcare allocation, we should 
have distinctive principles for allocations to elderly patients, whether in considering competition 
between individual patients, or broader funding decisions.  
3.1 Equality, priority, sufficiency – the principles in abstract 
In philosophical usage, egalitarianism covers three distinct distributive rules: equality; priority; 
and sufficiency. To avoid confusion I refer to a specific concern with equality as ‘equalitarian’ 
rather than egalitarian. Where possible I remain neutral about the egalitarian currency, side-
stepping the debate between those who say our fundamental concern should be with shares of 
resources (resourcists), with levels of welfare (welfarists), or with the opportunities people have 
(opportunists),19 instead using ∑ as a generic. At some points it is necessary to abandon this 
neutrality.  
Some egalitarians claim that distributions which comply with the correct egalitarian principle 
should be understood as having impersonal value; a particular distribution can be better than 
another where some of that additional value does not make the distribution better for any 
individual (e.g. Parfit, 1997; Holtug, 2006), and so is impersonal. If some amount of ∑ is 
transferred from the better off to the worse off, so that the total amount of ∑ remains the same 
but the distribution changes, such theorists claim that the value of the distribution has 
increased, even if the value gained by the worse off is exactly matched by that lost by the better 
off. I will argue in Section 5.1 that this way of thinking opens up some theories unnecessarily to 
problematic objections. I speak instead of individuals having particular claims on each other. 
There is no need to speak of a distribution being ‘worth more’ than another; all we need say is 
that people have claims whose strength depends partly on egalitarian considerations.  
                                                     
18 Mills (cited in Shelby, 2013) objects to any use of abstract or ‘ideal’ moral theory on the grounds that 
the conceptual tools put to use in ideal theory are inherently distorted by actual injustice in society, and 
that addressing ideal theory is a distraction from the real issue of dealing with a non-ideal world. While I 
accept the thought that our central concern ought to be ‘real-world’ application, I agree with Shelby that 
ideal theory is a necessary precursor to identifying some forms of injustice, and that abstract 
considerations may affect how we ought to implement allocations that correct for injustice. This will be 
apparent in Chapter 6.   
19 Sen (e.g. 1999: 18-20; 2010: 18-19) suggests that we should be concerned with ‘capabilities’, which are 
distinct from opportunities. Since the distinction is subtle and complex, and because I am largely avoiding 




I will now outline the three positions. Equalitarians recommend an equal distribution of ∑; 
those who have less than an equal share have claims against the rest of us not to be worse off 
than we are. The better off may have separate claims – e.g. claims of ownership – that reduce 
the force of these distributive claims. But even if they outweigh them, they cannot nullify them.  
Although egalitarian principles focus primarily on claims to benefits, they should also have 
implications for the justification of taking goods from people. For traditional equalitarians, the 
further one is above the line of equality, the more justification there is to take some of that 
excess for egalitarian purposes.  
Prioritarians say that people have greater claims the less they have. While equalitarians are 
concerned with one’s position relative to others, prioritarians are fundamentally concerned with 
what one has in absolute terms. Given the following distributions (where S and R are 
individuals or groups, and D1 and D2 are different possible distributions of ∑):  
 
 S R 
D1 5 5 
D2 7 10 
 
prioritarians have greater concern for both S and R in D1 than for either in D2. The egalitarian is 
most concerned with S’s position in D2, and may not be at all concerned with D1. 
One’s absolute position is in some respects affected by one’s relative position, so prioritarians 
cannot be indifferent to inequality per se. But the fundamental focus of the prioritarian concern 
is the absolute position; a concern with relative positions is important only insofar as it affects 
absolute positions. People have stronger claims to our help the worse off they are; 
correspondingly, the better off people are, the more justified we are in taking from them in 
order to fund redistribution. 
Sufficientarians are also absolutists. They say it is morally significant whether people have 
‘enough’, i.e. that they breach some threshold. Below the threshold, claims are discontinuously 
stronger than those above the threshold. The strength of justification for taking from people 
who are above the threshold will depend on whether there are multiple thresholds or only one, 
but can be subject to a variety of rules e.g. prioritarianism, or maximisation of group utility.  
The distinction between sufficientarians and prioritarians needs clarification, or perhaps 
legislation. Casal (2007: 297-298) says that sufficientarianism is comprised of two theses: “the 
positive thesis stresses the importance of people living above a certain threshold...the negative thesis 
denies the relevance of certain additional distributive requirements”. Prioritarianism is 
concerned with a continuum: the worse off you are, the stronger your claims, with no 
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thresholds prompting discontinuities. What should we say about a position that endorses the 
positive sufficientarian thesis, but not the negative, i.e. a position that states there is something 
special about a threshold(s), but which does not deny other important distributive 
requirements? Shields (2012) claims that a position can be sufficientarian, but endorse only 
Casal’s positive thesis; sufficientarianism on this view is defined by a concern with thresholds, 
not a rejection of other distributive principles, even prioritarian ones. However, one might 
equally argue that prioritarians can introduce discontinuities into their theory, such that the rate 
at which claims get stronger as one becomes worse off changes as we cross thresholds. Indeed, 
this seems to be Casal’s claim when she says that a concern with sufficiency can “supplement” a 
more general prioritarian thesis (318). Such a distinction assumes a principle is only 
sufficientarian if it endorses both the positive and negative theses. The positive thesis alone can 
be incorporated into prioritarianism, albeit in a way that many prioritarians would reject.  
There is clearly a danger here of those who hold substantively similar views talking past one 
another due to an attachment to different labels. I will follow Shields’ categorisation over 
Casal’s, but I think there is plenty of substantive agreement between the two positions. The 
distinctive aspect of sufficientarianism seems to me to be an insistence on thresholds. 
Moreover, there is evidence that Frankfurt (1987), whom many see originating modern 
sufficientarianism, only holds the negative thesis with regard to an upper threshold, but also has 
some concern for considerably lower thresholds such as mere survival.20 Whatever one thinks 
about this multiple thresholds view, it implies that even in its original form, sufficientarianism is 
not committed to anything like the strict negative thesis that Casal implies. My discussion relies 
on this distinction only in form, not substance; those who see the negative thesis as essential to 
sufficientarianism should substitute terms accordingly. 
3.2 The temporal subject  
Many egalitarians seem to assume, at least implicitly, that egalitarian principles apply solely over 
lifetimes. On such a view, equalitarians, for instance, would aim for people to have equal shares 
of ∑ over the course of their lives, allowing inequalities at particular times so long as they 
balanced out overall. But our egalitarian concerns at least seem to be engaged by people’s 
conditions at particular times too. S is currently badly off, and R is doing well, though S will 
have the better life overall. Pure lifetime principles mostly say we should prefer to benefit R, 
and have no reason to prefer S. R, after all, has the worse life overall.  
                                                     
20 Frankfurt (38) discusses the idea of contentment as being ‘not much interested in being better off’, 
which certainly implies something like the negative thesis. But he criticises equalitarianism as sometimes 
being inimical to very low thresholds like survival (31), making no mention of anything like the negative 
thesis. It would be puzzling for him to discuss the idea of contentment if he had already established that 
we should have no concern for distributions above mere survival, as applying the negative thesis to such a 
low threshold would imply.   
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This conclusion does not depend on knowledge that S’s condition will improve again. As 
McKerlie (1989a) notes, it may be that S’s good-quality life is all in his past; so long as we get 
the right lifetime result, this is of no concern to the pure lifetime egalitarian. While S’s better life 
does seem a consideration in favour of benefiting R, it fails to capture the whole story. S is the 
one who is currently worse off. This latter, time-relative concern is not merely a concern with 
the present; if we can predict that this situation will occur in the future, S’s position at that 
future time seems to generate a claim to avoiding that position, which clashes with R’s claim on 
the basis of lifetime egalitarianism. A pure lifetime theory cannot accommodate such a concern, 
except derivatively on how it affects lifetime chances.  
McKerlie (1989a; 1997; 2001; 2013) outlines the problem most clearly with regard to 
equalitarianism. Focusing on lifetime equality ignores even quite drastic inequalities at particular 
times, so long as these inequalities balance out overall. This also applies to lifetime versions of 
prioritarianism and sufficientarianism; both will automatically prefer the person who is 
absolutely worse off in lifetime terms over the person who is worse off – even very badly off – 
now.21 McKerlie suggests that this ignores a morally compelling aspect of our distributions; we 
have egalitarian reasons to help people at particular times. As Bou-Habib (2011) puts it, a pure 
lifetime distribution seems committed to ignoring ‘hardship’. Chapters 4 and 6 suggest some 
more theoretical reasons to be concerned with particular times as well as lifetimes; but for now, 
I suggest that there is something compelling about the concern with ignoring distributions at 
particular times. As much as we should be concerned with how lives go overall, we should also 
consider how people fare at particular times, independently of how this affects their lives.   
Still, it is also important to avoid a monocular time-relative principle. Bou-Habib notes two 
further distributive considerations that speak against such a view. Responsibility might play a 
role in distribution; it may be fair for shares of ∑ to deviate from an egalitarian distribution if 
individuals could have avoided those deviations by their own actions, and unfair to expect 
others to pay for the correction of such deviations. A pure time-relative view cannot 
accommodate the thought that exercises of responsibility at particular times should affect claims 
later on. 
People can also justly demand compensation for past inequity. Pure time-relative views cannot 
recognise the justice in compensating people for inequity that occurred at previous times. Time-
relative views also cannot explain the attraction of sharing necessary inequalities over time. 
Consider a situation where, at each of two times, someone must take on a considerable burden. 
Consider D3 and D4, where t-numbers are particular times: 
                                                     
21 This is not strictly true for all lifetime sufficientarians in all cases; if neither S nor R have a sufficient 
life, but S could have one if we benefit her now, those who aim to maximise the number of people with 
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In both cases, time-relative equalitarians can identify injustice in each segment (since both are 
unequal at particular times), where lifetime equalitarianism would see no problem in D4. But 
pure time-relative equalitarians cannot identify a further unfairness in D4, in the fact that S 
suffers a burden twice. Because they focus on particular times in isolation, they cannot 
recommend that S and R share the burden, as in D3. Even if both distributions are flawed, it is 
better that burdens are shared, even if that sharing takes places across different times. In D4, S 
can object that it is R’s turn to take on the burden. The idea of turn-taking thus seems a 
fundamental problem for a pure time-relative view.  
The other side of compensation is intrapersonal. Pure time-relative views cannot accommodate 
the fact that we sometimes take on burdens in order to accrue greater benefits later on, or enjoy 
benefits now in the knowledge that we must pay later. A time-relative principle sees the burden 
at a particular time, notes that there is no corresponding benefit at that moment, and corrects 
for it, even knowing that a fully compensating benefit has already occurred or will come later. It 
is arbitrary, and contrary to our psychological makeup, to ignore the sharing of burdens across 
time, both interpersonally and intrapersonally. States and other distributive institutions should 
aim people’s lives go well, not just to care about how people are at particular times. 
3.3 Rawlsian attempts to defend a pure lifetime theory 
One conclusion to draw from this is that we need two distinct principles – one to cover lifetime 
fairness, and the other time-relative fairness – and some sense of how they relate to one 
another. That is my view, and Chapters 4-6 undertake that task. But one might instead aim to 
address time-relative concerns without requiring a distinct principle, by showing how we can 
plausibly meet them even though they remain derivative on a lifetime principle. The remainder 
of Chapter 3 considers two such accounts, and explains why they fail: Daniels’ Prudential 
Lifespan Account (developed across 1985; 1988; 1996; 2008) and Lazenby’s (2011) view, 
developed from his criticisms of Daniels. Both offer some support for the Egalitarian 
Objection, since they conclude that (at least in some circumstances) it is right to set distinct 
efficiency tests for treatments that will predominantly extend the lives of elderly patients.  
Both Daniels’ and Lazenby’s arguments are detailed developments of a more generic Rawlsian 
view. This view says that we should decide what people have justice-related claims to across 
 t1 t2 
S 5 10 
R 10 5 
 t1 t2 
S 5 5 
R 10 10 
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their lifetimes by considering what they would prudentially choose in Rawls’ original position. 
The original position imagines citizens deliberating about the preferred structure of their society 
under a ‘veil of ignorance’, which obscures facts about themselves that would influence their 
decisions, but are not morally relevant; put simply, the thought is that what is fair is what people 
would choose for themselves if they thought that they might occupy any position in society. 
Fairness thus turns out to be a kind of rarefied prudence. The views I consider take this idea a 
step further; deliberators in the original position do not only consider the basic structure of 
society, but entitlements at different stages of one’s life. The thought that unites both views is 
that since a prudent agent under the veil of ignorance would prefer to prioritise healthcare 
access in her youth, we are morally justified in some circumstances in actually exercising such 
priority. The deliberators’ imagined preference is assumed to reflect something axiologically and 
morally relevant about the structure of a life: that the young have had less than the old by dint 
of their age.  
I agree that differences in lifetime chances are morally significant, although this does not 
support rationing by age, as I will argue further on. More relevantly for this chapter, the 
relevance of lifetime disparities is not the only feature of a distribution that deliberators would 
pick up on. I will argue that a rationally prudent distribution under the veil of ignorance ignores 
morally relevant time-relative features because we have obligations of justice to people who end 
up in ex ante unlikely positions, such as the very old. I will also suggest that unless we beg the 
question against a time-relative principle, deliberators behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
cannot rule out the possibility that they are already old. This fact changes how they would view 
the distribution, and reflects another factor of equal moral relevance: that we have justice-
relevant concerns about how things go for us at particular times that are not merely derivative 
on a concern that our lives go as well as possible.  
3.3.1 The Prudential Lifespan Account  
Daniels’ Prudential Lifespan Account (PLA) starts from the claim that disparities that exist 
between age groups differ from those that hold between other groups in society because most 
of us will belong to multiple age groups over our lives. As such, Daniels reconceives 
interpersonal age group distribution as an intrapersonal prudential decision (1996: 259) about 
how to distribute one’s fair share of holdings across a lifetime. So long as all individuals are 
subject to the same distributive pattern over their lifetimes, differences at particular times 
between people of different ages need not be inequitable. Since being worse off at particular 
times can be a prudent choice if it makes one’s life go better overall, it would in fact be against 
everyone’s interests to insist on equality at all times; this aligns with Bou-Habib’s compensation 
concern. Daniels thus makes time-relative concerns derivative on a concern with lifetimes. 
PLA acknowledges time-relative concerns by claiming that, while people may choose to make 
sacrifices at various times, the prudent individual would not allow herself to fall into hardship at 
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any particular time (1988: 78). In fact, Daniels has at some points made the stronger claim that a 
prudent individual would ensure for herself a normal ‘age-relative’ opportunity range at each 
stage of her life (1996: 214), which reflects what Bidadanure (2013: 26) calls the “age-specific 
needs principle”: the idea that all of us “must have sufficient resources throughout our lives to 
be able to do the things that we may want to do”. This intrapersonal distribution is constrained 
by an independent, general interpersonal distribution that assigns fair lifetime shares to each 
individual, on grounds independent from the intrapersonal question (1996: 263-264), because 
interpersonal conflicts other than those between age groups cannot be reduced to the 
intrapersonal. As Daniels says (ibid: 260), PLA is concerned with budgeting resources across a 
lifetime, while the general distributive principle provides the budget within which that takes 
place. A concern with particular times is derivative on the idea that a prudential agent who is 
concerned with her life going as well as possible will have particular views on intrapersonal 
distribution, so there is no need for a distinct time-relative principle.  
Although Daniels does not claim that rationing by age is always acceptable, he subjects health 
gains for those who have reached ‘old age’ to greater stringency; a particular health gain (e.g. 
extending a patient’s life for n years) for an elderly patient must be more cost-effective than the 
same gain for a younger patient. Resource expenditure is constrained by what a prudent 
individual would set aside for herself at a particular age from the position of having to plan for 
her whole life (more on this in a moment). From this perspective, we would prefer to improve 
our chances of reaching old age, at the cost of reducing our chances of extending old age (2008: 
178). If we must decide between these two kinds of claim we are justified in rationing healthcare 
expenditure on the basis of age in favour of younger patients with – and this has important 
implications for ageing enhancement – particular focus on reduction of services for elderly 
people, as opposed to all mature adults. If investment in ageing enhancement compromises our 
ability to fund equally or even somewhat less efficient  treatments for younger patients, and we 
could not fund both, we should not pursue it.22  
A concern one might raise about simply plugging age-based allocations into the Rawlsian 
machinery is that the structure of ageing appears to allow certain probabilistic assumptions that 
seem morally irrelevant. The hypothetical deliberators behind the veil of ignorance do not know 
how old they are, but they have general knowledge about how ageing works; they can, one 
might think, reason that it is extremely unlikely that they will survive to 100, and so gamble in 
allocating very few resources to that age. But that does not by itself justify us in restricting 
healthcare access for centenarians. Even if it is right to prefer the young to the old, it is surely 
not right to leave the very old with next to nothing; but a risk-friendly deliberator in Daniels’ 
                                                     
22 Of course, if extremely effective ageing enhancement became possible, it might no longer be prudent 
to have this preference. But if it is prudent given current healthcare technology, it would presumably also 
be so for the lower end of ageing enhancement effectiveness.  
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scheme might do just that on the assumption that his odds of reaching old age were quite low. 
This seems to suggest that our concern with particular times is at least somewhat distinct from a 
prudential concern with lifetimes.  
Daniels might insist that it would not be prudent to allocate so little even to a stage of one’s life 
that one might not reach. However, this view of prudence is not universal. Since some 
conceptions of the good may be oriented to specific life stages, there is no reason to assume 
that a prudent allocator would choose roughly equal shares across a life, even if they were 
guaranteed to reach 100. Some might sacrifice vast opportunities and even welfare at a 
particular age if it would improve things across their entire life. Others may be more risk-averse, 
preferring to minimise their risk at any one time even at an overall cost to their lifetime welfare.  
Daniels (2008: 175) now recognises this problem, and supplements the prudential allocation 
model with the idea of a fair deliberative process. Still, if some reasonable versions of prudence 
allow for hardship at some points in life, Daniels’ theory can only rule out allowing hardship for 
particular ages on the basis of reasons other than prudence. One such reason would be a 
distinct concern with time-relative distribution; but of course, that is precisely the view that the 
Rawlsian strategy aims to avoid.23 
In fact, Daniels tries to avoid the possibility of probabilistic gambling by having deliberators 
make what Lazenby calls the “complete lives assumption” (CLA), that they will live through all 
stages of life, starting from birth, and that everyone will have an equal lifespan. CLA ensures 
that deliberators have no probabilistic bias towards particular ages, which would make them 
prudentially preferable in a morally arbitrary way.24 Without such worries, perhaps it is more 
plausible that prudential deliberators would provide at least some minimum security for old age. 
CLA also grounds the idea that individuals of different ages can represent different stages of a 
single individual’s life for Rawlsian deliberators. If we know that we must all live through the 
same stages, it is clear how we might see ourselves in people who are currently at a different 
stage. 
But CLA is extremely problematic. First, Daniels faces a problem in defining a complete life, i.e. 
for how long deliberators should assume that they will live. Wherever we set the threshold, 
probabilistic calculations of the kind CLA is meant to avoid creep in above that threshold; if the 
complete life is eighty, those over eighty will be vulnerable to the problems outlined above. But 
if we set it sufficiently high to avoid this worry – say, as long as any human has ever been 
known to live – its status as a prudential calculation is questionable. The vast majority of us will 
not in fact live so long. This raises the question of why Daniels stipulates CLA in the first place; 
                                                     
23 McKerlie (1989b) makes a similar criticism.  
24 This is similar to Rawls’ stipulation (1996: 311) that deliberators in the original position should not 
know e.g. the religious makeup of their society since this information would allow them to make 
probabilistic gambles about their likely religion. 
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perhaps it is motivated by independent concern with people’s situations at particular times, and 
a recognition that Rawlsian prudence will not give us the ‘right’ result in that regard. But if this 
is the motivation, better surely to make it explicit, and have a distinct time-relative principle. 
Lazenby raises another problem. CLA is both a simplifying assumption, which must ultimately 
be abandoned to apply Daniels’ theory in practice, and a framing assumption that plays a 
fundamental role in shaping the theory and its conclusions. Simplifying assumptions are entirely 
legitimate tools that help us focus on particular aspects of a problem. But if the abandonment 
of an assumption fundamentally changes the nature of a problem, its role is not to simplify but 
to distort. As Lazenby (333) puts it “Daniels’ solution appears successful only because it has 
avoided the central problem it set out to answer”: intergenerational distribution.25 
Once we abandon CLA, it is no longer reasonable for deliberators to assume the intrapersonal 
view that grounds PLA. As Lazenby (332) puts it, CLA involves an idealisation not just of the 
society, but of the subject to whom the theory is meant to apply. Daniels’ theory relies on 
individuals seeing members of other age groups as representative of other stages of their own 
lives; when we set up distributive principles based on CLA, young people know that the same 
principles that currently take money from them via taxation to benefit elderly people will fund 
them in their old age, and elderly people can rationalise their limited access to healthcare by 
knowing they benefitted from such a disparity in their youth. Lifespan inequality makes at least 
the first part of this implausible. A young person cannot reasonably assume that allocations to 
an older generation are equivalent to allocating shares to herself in the future. Indeed, young 
people suffering from terminal illnesses know with certainty that the current elderly are not 
equivalent to their own futures. But that assumption provided the ground for transforming the 
interpersonal problem into an intrapersonal prudential issue. Relaxing CLA changes our 
conception of the subject to such a degree that decisions made under the initial conception 
cannot apply to practical decisions made under the latter conception.26 
So PLA fails on its own terms, and cannot justify a version of the Egalitarian Objection. It also 
fails to justify making time-relative concerns derivative from lifetime concerns, because it 
mischaracterises our prudential concern with particular times, and anyway fails to draw the 
                                                     
25 See also Bognar (2015: 258-259).  
26 Since Daniels (2008) has expanded the scope of what counts as a prudent distribution, one might think 
we could justify giving more to those who are likely to die young even after abandoning CLA, since some  
prudential distributions will allocate the bulk of an individual’s share to their youth. But a terminally ill 
young person’s allocation preferences derive not from a youth-oriented vision of the good, but from 
knowledge that they will not reach old age. Even if the revised PLA is extremely relaxed about what 
counts as a prudent distribution, it cannot justify individual allocation based on grounds that contradict 
CLA, which rules out giving someone a larger share in their youth ‘because they are terminally ill’. Yet this 
is precisely the reason that we should allocate more to some people in their youth.  
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necessary connection between prudential concern and justice. The next section considers 
whether a Rawlsian view can work without CLA; Lazenby’s response to the worries he raises is 
to embrace the kinds of prudential calculations that worry Daniels – and which CLA was 
supposed to avoid – on the grounds that they reflect something morally relevant: that those 
who will die young will be among the worst off in lifetime terms, and so deserve preferential 
treatment on a Rawlsian view. I will suggest that this mischaracterises both the likely outcome 
of Rawlsian deliberation and the moral relevance of age, and that it highlights weaknesses in the 
Rawlsian account in general when confronted with significantly different healthcare needs. 
3.3.2. Calculation, and asymmetric identification  
Lazenby claims that rather than trying to reduce intergenerational distribution to intrapersonal 
prudence we should simply apply Rawlsian theory to intergenerational distributions in the same 
way as we should distributive conflicts between other groups. Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ tells 
us to allow inequalities in lifetime holdings of primary goods (goods that one will want more of 
whatever one’s life plan) only if they benefit the worst off, or if they are necessary to protect a 
system of equal liberties for all citizens (1999: 65-66). Deliberators in Rawls’ original position – 
not knowing where they actually stand in society, or even how likely they are to occupy any 
particular standing because of the veil of ignorance which keeps such information from them – 
would prefer to play it safe and make their worst possible position as good as possible, within 
these limits.  
Applying these ideas to healthcare, thinks Lazenby, also recommends subjecting a higher 
efficiency threshold for life-extending medical care for the elderly, at least when this competes 
with life-extending care for the very young. Those who will die in their youth are among the 
worst off in lifetime terms; because they will live less long, they will typically have less of various 
morally relevant goods than others in lifetime terms. If inequalities must benefit the worst off, 
we should oppose ageing enhancement in favour of extending young lives wherever possible. 
This in turn implies the strong version of P7, that we should oppose inequalities in lifespans 
unless they benefit those who will die young, even if failure to pursue them benefits nobody.27 
But Lazenby does not acknowledge the fact that the difference principle, applied to healthcare, 
recommends a similar stance for many other kinds of medical treatment, so long as these do not 
benefit the worst off. Focusing on this fact highlights how much more problematic it is to 
introduce health needs to a Rawlsian scheme than either Daniels or Lazenby assumes. As Pogge 
(1989: 181) puts it, Rawls “simply leaves medical need aside” in his theory of distributive justice. 
                                                     
27 It is worth emphasising that Lazenby does not suggest that these individuals are among the worst off 
directly because of their poor health. This would be an illegitimate application of Rawls’ theory, for the 
difference principle applies only to “social and economic inequalities” (1999: 53). Lazenby’s point, rather, 
is that poor health here leads to the relevant inequalities in a lifetime sense because people who die young 
have less time to experience relevant goods. 
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And rather than leading to Lazenby’s suggestion, introducing medical need causes as significant 
a problem for Rawls’ theory as abandoning CLA does for Daniels’.  
Rawls’ discussion of inequality assumes that we will be able to significantly benefit the worst off 
(i.e. that their position can either be directly improved or compensated), such that the worst off 
are in principle capable of occupying other positions in society. But since the worst off include 
very young terminally ill patients,28 neither assumption is true. Even ignoring the pain and 
physical discomfort they suffer and focusing solely on social and economic goods (see fn27), 
the situations of some terminally ill people can only be marginally improved, if at all, and cannot 
be compensated for either. Allowing inequalities that do not benefit them need not alienate 
them from society, or reduce their competitive advantage; the most debilitating terminal 
illnesses already remove their sufferers to some degree from such concerns, particularly if they 
are very young. Rawls’ sense that inequalities that do not respect the difference principle would 
test “the strains of commitment” (159) of the worst off thus seems misplaced when we consider 
terminally ill people who simply do not operate within society in the competitive way that is 
Rawls’ paradigm. Even if it is justified for the worst off in Rawls’ imagined society to feel 
begrudged at inequalities that do not benefit them, it is inappropriate for the terminally ill to 
have the same reaction, and to regard as socially unjustified the good fortune of those who will 
live into adulthood. 
Lazenby’s extension of the difference principle would thus minimise inequalities in lifetime 
primary goods that do not improve the position of people whose position cannot be 
improved.29 Given the state of the worst off, this includes a great deal of our current spending. 
Some inequalities are such that attempts to eliminate them would undermine the basic ability of 
a society to function, or lead to a shortage of medical staff; perhaps the terminally ill would be 
even worse off in these cases, rendering these inequalities justified. Given the lexical priority of 
liberty, inequalities whose elimination would require infringement of basic liberties are also 
acceptable. But the degree to which the difference principle would tie the fortunes of everyone 
to the position of the terminally ill is still overly taxing,30 and Rawlsian deliberators would not 
choose it. If the very worst position they could occupy is both such that normal social 
considerations in favour of pure equality do not apply, and they can guess that their odds of 
such a position are quite low,31 they would not tether all their possible outcomes to such a 
                                                     
28 See Campbell (1994) for details both of progress in helping these patients, but also the extant 
limitations and additional ethical issues.  
29 Lazenby might suggest an alternative reading of the difference principle (see e.g. Van Parijs, 2003: 209), 
where if we cannot help the worst off we look to the next worst off (‘leximin’). This will not help, since 
the position of some terminally ill people can be improved very marginally, but at great cost.  
30 Arrow (1973: 251) makes a related criticism.  
31 They will have no precise odds, but since they are permitted to assume that they live in a functioning 
society, they can assume that most people are not terminally ill.  
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position. The existence of severe illness should thus prompt us to abandon the difference 
principle. This is not to say that there should be no preference towards those who will have 
worse lives overall; Chapter 5 defends just that stance. But we can show some preference 
without such an absolute preference towards the worst off. Gains to the lifetime worst off in 
health terms, while important, can be outweighed by gains to others. 
Of course, this leaves open the possibility that the mechanism of the original position is still 
appropriate – even if it no longer recommends the difference principle – and might still 
advocate more stringent conditions on accessing healthcare for elderly patients. Lazenby’s 
second reason for preferring to extend young lives appeals more to Daniels than to Rawls. 
Once we abandon CLA, Lazenby suggests that deliberators in the original position can – despite 
being behind the veil of ignorance which obscures facts about their age from them – reason 
from general facts about ageing to the conclusion that they are more likely to live through youth 
than old age, and make corresponding probabilistic adjustments to their prudential allocation, 
preferring younger ages.  
But this depends on an incomplete abandonment of CLA. CLA is made up of two components 
– that all individuals will live to the same age; and that all live through each stage of life – and 
Lazenby’s analysis works only if we abandon only the first. If we also drop the second, 
deliberators cannot assume that it is more likely they will be young than old. When the veil of 
ignorance lifts, a particular deliberator may find that she is already old. This would make her 
youth even more prudentially irrelevant to her than very old age would be if she turned out to be 
young; while young people may reach old age, old people will never again be young. Without 
the assumption that deliberators must live through all parts of whatever lifespan they have, they 
cannot assume that they are more likely to find themselves to be young rather than old when 
the veil of ignorance lifts.32 
                                                     
32 To further demonstrate this: If a deliberator S is fifteen, say, each further age (An) has some positive 
value in her prudential calculus. If S is eighty, many ages have no prudential value for her, since they have 
already passed: someone at A80 has no prudential reason to allocate resources to A15, so older ages are 
included in more prudential plans than are younger ages. It is still true that A80 has a lower priority for the 
fifteen year old than A15 does, since there is some chance that she will not survive to eighty. But it still has 
a greater priority than A15 has for the eighty year old, since there is no chance she will live through fifteen. 
With no knowledge of her actual age, S should in fact come up with a series of prudential allocations, one 
for each age she could be. Each age’s weight overall will be a function of the weights it gets in each plan. 
Since A15 receives zero weighting in most plans, it will be near the bottom of the rankings. A80 features in 
many more plans, but its weighting is quite low in many of them. The most favoured age will be one that 
appears in many plans but also is quite likely to be reached from many plans.  
Lazenby might think that because everyone who is eighty was once fifteen, but not all fifteen year olds 
will make eighty, there are more total people in A15 than A80, so we can assume an unequal probability, 
skewed towards younger ages, of ending up in any particular age group. But while more people will be 
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Still, Lazenby has another, somewhat independent argument for prioritising young people, 
which may justify only abandoning part of CLA. This would mean that deliberators should 
reason as if they will begin at the beginning of whatever lifespan they end up having, but not 
that they will live for the same length of time as everyone else. The ground for this assumption 
is Lazenby’s claim that although young people cannot plausibly identify their own old age in 
current elderly people (as Daniels assumes) because they may never be old, old people can 
identify their own youth in current young people, because they have necessarily been young.  
In many societies, there are significant changes across generations in the general level of wealth, 
and more specifically in health technologies. Further, increases in lifespan mean that the 
demographic structure of society changes, and the socio-economic context for transfers to 
young people in the past was very different from the current context. Young people a century 
ago would simply not have faced so much competition from elderly patients, but they would 
also not have benefitted from a wealth of medical advancement and social infrastructure that 
improve health outcomes and save lives. Just as Lazenby rightly points to the strain in young 
people seeing themselves in old people, there is a psychological strain on elderly people to see 
the current youth as merely benefitting from transfers in the same way, and the same context, as 
they did in their youth. This is not to say that we cannot use the fact that elderly people 
benefitted from a scheme of transfers as part of the justification for its continuation; but given a 
changing profile of claims and possibilities, this is not a sufficient justification alone. As such, it 
seems to me unlikely that Rawlsian deliberators would generate the conclusion that Lazenby 
assumes of a strong preference for transfers from the old to the young. Moreover, since he has 
abandoned the first part of CLA – that deliberators assume they will reach old age – it is unclear 
why Lazenby thinks he can justify even minimal provision against hardship for the very old. In 
this regard, he faces the same problem as Daniels does in explaining our concern with hardship 
at particular times in a way that is properly derivative of his lifetime principles.   
3.4 Summary  
I have outlined three egalitarian principles, suggesting that both the Egalitarian Objection and 
its opponents must consider further principles than strict equality. I also suggested that our 
egalitarian concerns push us to adopt distinct principles to cover lifetimes and particular times.  
                                                                                                                                                      
fifteen than eighty in all of history, this tells us nothing about the probabilities involved in a Rawlsian 
deliberator’s assessment. Deliberators are in a particular society, at a particular time. Our deliberator could 
be in a society which has been subject to significant demographic ageing, with more old people than 
young; so she cannot ‘work out’ her age based on these assumptions. Of course, if deliberators must 
assume the second part of CLA, they can assume it is more likely that they will be fifteen than eighty. As 
the following paragraphs suggest, however, this assumption is unmotivated.  
It should also be clear that this probabilistic assumption reflects nothing of moral relevance, and is 
precisely the kind of morally irrelevant calculation Rawls wants to avoid with the veil of ignorance. 
53 
 
I considered two accounts that challenge this latter claim, and which might motivate versions of 
the Egalitarian Objection on the grounds that such a policy would be chosen by hypothetical 
deliberators in a Rawlsian original position. I argued that flaws in these accounts in fact reveal 
significant problems in the Rawlsian position’s ability to accommodate questions of ill health, 
and so such justifications of the Egalitarian Objection ought to be rejected.  
I also considered these accounts’ attempts to make our time-relative concerns derivative on a 
pure lifetime principle, in opposition to the position I will advance in Chapters 4-6. Daniels’ 
Prudential Lifespan Account had various flaws, most pressingly its inability to drop idealisations 
about agents that make it inapplicable to reality. Lazenby’s response to Daniels also relies on an 
overly simplified view of individuals. The best way to explain our concern with particular times 
is not only insofar as they contribute to our having the best life overall. A theory that sees 
lifetimes merely as a succession of moments ignores a fundamental aspect of how we exist as 
psychological agents. But so does a view that makes our concern with particular times reliant on 
our desire to have as good a life as possible. We care about particular moments for their own 
sake, and no less fundamentally than we care about our lives as a whole. This is sufficient 
motivation, in the absence of plausible alternatives, to adopt a mixed strategy when thinking 
















Chapter 4: The Egalitarian Objection – The time-relative principle 








Chapters 4 and 5 argue respectively for the time-relative and lifetime components of SP against 
alternatives, while Chapter 6 discusses how those components relate to one another, and the 
implications for ageing enhancement. This chapter considers time-relative equality (Section 4.1); 
priority (4.2); and sufficiency (4.3), advocating the latter.33 My argument for a sufficientarian 
                                                     
33 Perhaps different distributive principles are appropriate for different goods. While I will discuss a range 
of goods and argue that they are covered by time-relative sufficientarianism, I do not address all possible 
goods. But if we have a plausible account that covers a central range of cases, a claim that some other 
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over a prioritarian time-relative principle relies on the idea that our distributive principles should 
respond to competing factors of hardship, responsibility and compensation, and that 
sufficientarians can best balance those concerns. Section 4.3.1 defends the primacy of hardship 
in our concerns, while Section 4.3.2 considers some further objections to the view, and outlines 
the idea of a threshold in greater detail.   
4.1 Equality  
A problem that is in my view fatal to time-relative equalitarianism emerges when we consider 
the length of the relevant stretches of time to which time-relative concerns attach. Recall that 
the motivation for adopting a distinct time-relative view is that lifetime egalitarianism is 
concerned only with balancing things across lifetimes, with no concern for apparent inequities 
at particular times. But as McKerlie notes (1989a; 1997; 2013), choosing any particular extended 
length of time as an object of fundamental concern generates the same problem: it gives us no 
reason to consider inequities within that length of time. 
The only non-arbitrary option (aside from reverting back to a pure lifetime view) is that the 
relevant periods are ‘moments’, i.e. that the time-relative principle should apply at all points in 
time. And as McKerlie says (2013: 81), aiming for equality at all times seems overzealous. For 
welfarists, for instance, momentary equalitarianism says that people who are due to have 
somewhat painful dental appointments should have their appointments scheduled 
simultaneously, since this would reduce momentary welfare inequality. But there seems to be no 
reason whatever to “schedule suffering”. Similar problems affect resourcists and opportunists; 
there is no reason to ensure that people have precisely the same opportunities or resources at all 
particular times. This implausibility does not affect the other two time-relative views, because 
they are only derivatively comparative. Hence, small changes in one person’s behaviour or 
situation need not have meddlesome implications for others. We can have stronger reasons to 
help those who are worse off, or who have less than enough, at any particular moment, without 
having to co-ordinate collective behaviour.  
Opponents of a time-relative principle might insist that even if time-relative prioritarianism and 
sufficientarianism do not demand scheduling, a focus on moments is still overly precise. 
Consider S, who is very well off for her whole life except for one moment, when she is very 
badly off, perhaps in a moment of intense agony. They might object that we do not have any 
stronger reason to benefit her during this one moment, given how good her life has been 
otherwise. I reject this view; S’s claims to benefits are stronger with respect to that moment 
because, as I will argue, claims that stem from one’s condition at particular times are 
                                                                                                                                                      
goods are covered by a distinctive principle hold the burden of proof. Since all I need is that central cases 
include goods relating to health, especially the allocation of healthcare, I will not try to anticipate all 
possible cases.  
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independent of claims that stem from lifetime considerations. Note that this does not mean that 
S must be compensated at a later point in time. We are not concerned from a time-relative 
perspective with the moment of agony insofar as it makes S’s life worse, only insofar as it 
affects that time.34 Once the moment has passed, we can forget about it, except insofar as it 
contributes either to the lifetime distribution (considered separately by our lifetime principle), or 
to future moments. Our time-relative intervention is confined to a certain mechanism, e.g. pain 
relief rather than compensation. And the fact that S has a stronger claim at that time than at 
others does not mean we must do everything it takes to help her. There may be practical 
constraints that mean we typically ignore such brief agonies. But if we are able to provide 
appropriate aid to S in her moment of agony, we ought to do so. As such, I suggest that the 
focus on moments only provides a significant problem for equalitarians.  
4.2 Priority  
Time-relative prioritarianism says that being worse off at particular times gives people stronger 
claims at those times. An immediate concern is that this appears to prevent responsibility or 
intrapersonal compensation across times affecting the strength of claims. If S willingly forgoes a 
benefit at time t1 in order to access a greater benefit at t2, straightforward time-relative 
prioritarianism claims that, even though S’s position at t1 is incurred voluntarily, and she will be 
fully compensated, we have a stronger reason to benefit her. Yet one of the central reasons for 
recognising a lifetime rule in addition to a time-relative rule is the thought that people should be 
able to make cross-temporal sacrifices without affecting our obligations. At the very least, time-
relative prioritarians need to say when responsibility and compensation make a difference.  
An obvious response is to have the prioritarian principle apply in all cases except those 
involving compensation and culpability. This condones severe hardship in many cases, since it 
would punish not only those who are worse off, but also those who are very badly off, if they 
are responsible. I will defend the idea that hardship should often overrule responsibility, and 
sometimes even compensation, in section 4.4. But for now I simply note that if this is correct, 
time-relative prioritarians face a tension. Prioritarians could exclude this possibility by claiming 
that very different claims apply above and below the threshold that divides being merely worse 
off from being badly off. But this, as I have defined the positions, is a form of time-relative 
sufficientarianism. 
                                                     
34 There might be additional reasons that would recommend compensation. If the moment of agony was 
caused culpably by another agent, that agent might owe compensation even if there was no further effect 
on S’s life. So I do not suggest that unjust culpable actions can be forgotten if we cannot help at the time, 




While prioritarianism has the strength of people’s claims track their absolute state in a 
continuous fashion, sufficientarianism says that people have distinctly strong claims when they 
do not have enough. If S does not have enough at a particular time, straightforward time-
relative sufficientarianism tells us that she has a discontinuously stronger claim even if she made 
the choice freely. Sufficientarians can also apply prioritarian reasoning above the threshold (or 
between thresholds, if they are multiple). But sufficientarianism need not say that claims 
become stronger whenever someone becomes at all worse off. What makes sufficientarianism 
distinctive is its application of different claims above and below the threshold; this must at least 
include the strength of claims, but may also include other factors like the role of responsibility. 
If S makes a culpable decision that lowers her current levels of ∑, but does not bring her below 
the threshold – e.g. incurring a moderate injury whilst engaging in a risky sport, or losing some 
money in a risky investment – responsibility may either nullify her claim, or reduce its intensity 
in comparison with others’ claims depending on the size and type of harm. But this will not 
happen if that decision brings S below sufficiency – e.g. incurring a life-threatening injury, or 
losing her home.  
So time-relative prioritarianism fails, and sufficientarianism succeeds, in accommodating both 
the view that people can make lifetime distributive decisions without affecting their claims at 
particular times, and that there should be some level below which people have special claims 
even if they are responsible for their decision. This assumes, of course, that we really should 
have such a distinctive concern with hardship. Section 4.3.1 defends this claim, while Section 
4.3.2 considers some further concerns about time-relative sufficientarianism.  
4.3.1 Justifying a concern with hardship 
I have said that time-relative sufficientarianism is more plausible than time-relative 
prioritarianism because it allows responsibility and compensation to play a role in the strength 
of people’s claims, but also for hardship to set a point at which they do not, or at least at which 
their role is weakened. But this order of priority needs justification; one might insist instead that 
although hardship is important, responsibility and compensation trump it. This would remove 
sufficientarianism’s theoretical advantage over prioritarianism.  
This may seem to have only limited application to the debate on ageing enhancement. After all, 
one might think that since we do not choose to age, this is not a hardship with which 
compensation or responsibility clash. But responsibility may be invoked because the degree to 
which ageing increases our likelihood of death at a particular time, and its physical effects on us, 
are mediated by lifestyle choices. Compensation comes in when we think about the idea of 
prudent savings, as stressed by Daniels; one might insist that rather than providing ageing 
enhancement through the state, people should be left to save up for it, and if they cannot afford 
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it then this is not our collective problem. And it is anyway an important theoretical step in the 
defence of time-relative sufficientarianism. 
If people know that they will be bailed out whatever their culpability, risky behaviour becomes 
more likely, and as a society we face unconstrained costs.35 If people make imprudent decisions 
in their youth that significantly increase their needs or reduce their means in old age, perhaps we 
are justified in refusing to honour our normal commitments, either on the grounds that people’s 
irresponsible behaviour can void their right on the basis of desert, or to avoid the moral hazard 
of people knowing that there will be minimal consequences to self-destructive behaviour. This 
section aims to defend the claim that we ought to intervene in such decisions.  
There are two ways to do this. We can allow individuals to make free choices, and then alter the 
subsequent distribution to meet any hardship they incur; or we can prevent individuals from 
making some decisions in the first place. Each has a reason to recommend it that corresponds 
to an unattractive feature of the other. Preventing bad decisions is preferable because rescuing 
people can be costly to the rest of us; better to prevent the need for rescue in the first place. But 
as Bou-Habib points out, blocking choices for an agent’s own good is paternalistic; intervening 
after the fact allows us to respect the autonomous decisions people make to a greater degree, 
especially since some gambles will turn out well or not go as badly as we might have assumed.  
This dilemma seems to apply just as much to choices that make people badly off as to those 
that merely make them worse off. Bou-Habib insists that constraining choices even to prevent 
very bad situations is unjustifiably paternalistic, and instead justifies prior intervention on the 
basis of the “intrinsic value” of autonomy (op cit: 300). I will not engage with this positive 
account here. Rather, I will offer reasons to think that paternalism is more attractive than Bou-
Habib supposes, especially when dealing with absolute insufficiency. This provides a sufficient 
range of cases in which hardship trumps responsibility, enough to motivate the particular role of 
thresholds that gives sufficientarianism an advantage over prioritarianism. Moreover, the cases I 
will discuss are predominantly those where hardship occurs in old age due to decisions made 
earlier in life, and so have distinctive relevance for the provision of life-extending healthcare. 
I will consider two kinds of case. First, there are individuals with explicitly youth-oriented views 
of the good. They assume that it is far better to enjoy life while one is young than to save 
prudently for old age, and so would accept perhaps even radical sacrifices in their future to live 
                                                     
35 Cohen (1989) suggests that this is only a problem for welfarists. If people have the same opportunities 
then any further differences in welfare are down to them. But this solution really just rules in favour of 
responsibility over hardship; Cohen (922) acknowledges that if one fails to develop an appropriate power 
when one has the opportunity, one’s future opportunities are affected. As such, the move to opportunity 
has added nothing, for a failure to develop one’s powers early on also results in a dearth of opportunity 




extremely well now. Second, there are those who make future-affecting decisions that are 
imprudent by their own lights. They respectively represent a clash of hardship with 
compensation and responsibility.  
The latter figure does not now endorse a vision of the good that accepts hardship in old age for 
the sake of his youth; he wants it all. Intervening in this person’s decisions before they are 
realised would be ‘weakly’ paternalistic, i.e. would pursue their good by their own lights, but in a 
more coherent way than they are able. We can invoke a combination of the person’s self-
perceived good and our desire not to face an overly costly intervention later on to justify some 
weakly paternalistic interventions in current decisions.  
There are obvious restrictions on such a policy. Since people are resistant to their choices being 
constrained, coercion or manipulation may be necessary to make people conform, and in many 
cases the considerable cost of these approaches will outweigh the benefit of paternalism. There 
is also distinct personal value for most people in directing their own lives, even if the directions 
they take do not seem best to the rest of us; self-direction is a part of their ideal life. Moreover, 
in many cases it will not be clear that it is the individual who has gone wrong epistemically or 
rationally, rather than those who would interfere for their own good. And finally, a state that 
interferes overly with its citizens’ choices for their own good expresses – perhaps 
unintentionally – a lack of respect for their ability to run their own lives competently. But if the 
cost by someone’s own lights is great enough, there is no justification for an absolute 
prohibition on such weak paternalism. 
If we collectively fail to intervene when we ought to, and a gamble goes wrong, we share at least 
some of the culpability for the outcome. This justifies intervention after an imprudent decision 
has gone wrong. That is not to say that the individual is not also responsible. Apportioning 
culpability precisely is impracticable; but the threshold of intolerable hardship is a minimum to 
which the rest of us should collectively commit in rectification. Moreover, in some cases of 
poor decision-making the individual risks losing the capacity to redeem their mistake, due to 
injury or significant loss of resources. The justification for leaving an individual to pick up the 
pieces of her own mistakes in most cases is that it is unfair on the rest of us to foot the bill for 
something we had no hand in. But this justification is weakened when we consider these 
extreme circumstances, for such a principle would allow an individual mistake to dictate the 
poor standards of the rest of someone’s life.  
It is true that in this situation we are being asked to foot the bill for a choice we did not make, 
and would not have made. But here the rest of us approach a problem that we are able to solve 
collectively and that an individual may be simply unable to solve by himself. Even if agent-
responsibility is an important principle of justice, we ought to assign remedial responsibility on 
the basis of ability when the person who is agent-responsible for their poor situation is unable 
to exercise that responsibility. As such, I suggest that interventions both before and after 
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imprudent decisions is justified in some cases, and that hardship (whether or not it is autonomy-
affecting) sets a reasonable minimal threshold for deciding among such cases.   
The former kinds of case are more problematic; prospective intervention here would involve 
preventing someone’s free choice on the grounds of their own good, but according to values 
that they do not (currently) share. People with youth-oriented views of the good might prefer 
that society funds their youthful enjoyment at no cost to their old age, but if that is not an 
option they will accept hardship when old for greater benefit when young. For such people, we 
must either endorse ‘strong’ paternalism – i.e. intervening against their current judgement of 
their good – or allow them to suffer a hardship later on that we would normally consider 
ourselves to have a duty to prevent. 
Opponents of strong paternalism may cite the view that we should allow people to reap the 
benefits and suffer the losses of decisions they have taken when those consequences were, or 
reasonably should have been, foreseen. This justifies allowing people to suffer the results of 
failed gambles. If someone saw a risk as worthwhile when they gambled, they must be prepared 
to live with the result if the gamble fails. I have already suggested that this idea does not support 
anti-paternalist arguments as strongly as one might suppose. But the case of gambles which 
affect an agent long after she has made the decision – such as those which affect old age but 
which are made earlier – provides additional considerations in favour of strong paternalism. 
While we feel the repercussions of many failed gambles immediately, the gambles considered 
here are long term and people may fail to identify with their decision or the values underlying it 
when the burden is felt.  
Failure to identify with a decision does not merely involve regretting it. If I willingly take on a 
gamble because I expect it to pay off, I may in hindsight regret my decision if it does not. But 
this involves transplanting my current knowledge into my past decision, seeing it as mistaken in 
retrospect. Failure to identify involves not just seeing a decision as a miscalculation, but as based 
on values that are no longer mine. And not identifying with my past decision does not mean I 
do not see myself as the same agent who made the decision. I can fully acknowledge that it was 
I that made the decision, in the grip of a youth-oriented conception of the good, which is now 
costing me dearly in my old age. I may even have made that decision in full knowledge that I 
would lose that youth-oriented conception. But I now see the decision itself as based on values 
that are mistaken, and no longer my own. In such cases, the usual link between a person’s 
decision and the results of that decision that supports allowing people to suffer the results of 
their choices is at least weakened, if not entirely severed. 
A further objection to paternalism relies on agents’ privileged epistemic access (e.g. Mill, op cit: 
148; Tännsjö, 1999: 16)) to their own preferences, ambitions and values; it seems arrogant for us 
to assume that we know what is better for a competent agent, given her own self-knowledge. 
However, this epistemic privilege is again weaker for decisions whose effects resonate far in the 
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future. Some people who have a youth-oriented conception of the good when they are young 
will not hold that view, at least not as radically, when they get older. The epistemic privilege that 
opposes paternalism is introspective; agents are taken to be more capable (although by no 
means infallible) of finding out what it is they really want or value. But such introspection is a 
far less reliable way to find out about one’s future values. One can only introspect on one’s 
present values, and make guesses from there.  
Anti-paternalists may note that even if temporal distance reduces the degree of epistemic 
privilege, it does not remove it altogether. Individuals’ preferences and values at different times 
bear relation to each other; we do not change at random. Nor does the passage of time increase 
the ability of others to know what is good for you. This is true, but misses the point. Once we 
remove the privilege of direct introspection, the agent is effectively working on the same 
empirical basis as the rest of us with regard to her distant future. So others might be able to 
make better estimates than the agent herself of what her view of the good may be, e.g. noting 
that many people who start out with youth-centred visions of the good in their youth go on to 
change their minds when they are older. This is not to claim strong epistemic authority about 
others’ minds; it simply suggests that there is more scope for including others’ views, even on 
quite a subjectivist picture of value and welfare, when the agent is concerned with her own 
distant future.  
Another consideration against paternalism is the idea that a person’s “own mode of laying out 
his existence is best, not because it is best in itself but because it is his own mode” (Mill, op cit: 
141). This seems plausible for the most part. But confronted with someone who is entirely 
disconnected from a decision that she took, I do not think we can really say that we are 
promoting her ability to choose her own mode of existence by insisting that she suffers the 
consequences fully. We may say something like this because we continue to respect that ‘mode’ 
that she favoured all those years ago. But if she no longer favours such a view, and indeed 
repudiates it, it seems odd to suppose that our respect for an individual’s seeking her own mode 
of existence should prioritise a particular viewpoint simply because it came earlier in time. 
Rather, our respect for her own mode of existence should at least consider her current views. 
So the presumption that we must be bound by our autonomous decisions should not hold as 
strongly when we cease to identify with the values behind those decisions when the effects of 
the decisions are felt. The justification for such a practice presupposes that the values 
underlying a decision carry over to the time when the effects are felt; in such cases, I bind 
myself according to values that I continue to endorse. But if it is unlikely that I will endorse 
those values when I feel the effects, I am not being fair in so binding myself.  
The argument thus far does not justify strong paternalism; it might instead support post hoc 
intervention when negative effects are actually realised. After all, at least some of the 
considerations against paternalism – such as its being potentially expressive of a certain kind of 
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social disrespect for the agent – still stand. I have said we will have reason in the future to 
rescue someone from the negative outcomes of youthful decisions from which they are now 
disconnected. But we are still sometimes justified in pursuing the option that is less costly to 
ourselves, depending on how that affects the agent herself. Foreseeing that we will find 
ourselves with strong reasons to help an individual if they should fail to identify with their risky 
decision in the future, we are justified in taking the overall less costly step of pre-emptive 
intervention.  
We thus have justification to paternalistically block certain decisions that will lead to significant 
hardship with which an individual is likely to fail to identify, and which she will be unable to set 
aside, even if they now clearly endorse this trade-off. This need not mean that such individuals 
should be forced to set aside anything like an equal share for their old age; but elderly people 
should not be completely trapped by their youthful decisions, even if the consequences were 
fully anticipated and endorsed at the time. Again, the time-relative sufficientarian conception of 
tolerability offers a plausible minimum to commit to. 
This principle is also subject to restrictions; we are not entitled to step in and prevent all 
decisions that someone might merely regret when they are older, for there are costs to 
paternalistic intervention. The state is not entitled to force people to choose the best life, or 
even to ensure that their worst option that they risk be as good as possible; it is only entitled to 
prevent the very worst possibilities from being realised.  
This justification for strong paternalism is that in cases where the effect is felt far into the 
future, there is a risk of an important disconnection between the individual’s values when they 
act and when they suffer the costs. This is far more likely to occur when costs are at a temporal 
distance to a decision, but it is possible that it will happen in other cases. It does not apply in 
cases where the individual both foresees the cost, and is likely to identify with the decision once 
the cost is incurred. In such cases, it may be justified to leave someone to suffer hardship. Still, 
the cases I have outlined are enough to support my claim that sufficientarianism is preferable to 
prioritarianism because the introduction of a threshold allows us to favour responsibility and 
compensation in some cases, and hardship in others. I have framed the discussion as though 
this is a very neat division, where all cases of people dropping below sufficiency trump 
responsibility and compensation. But the broader argument still works even if the threshold 
marks only some such cases. The overall account will of course be more complex, but that is 
not in itself a flaw in sufficientarianism. This argument also suggests that there is no simple anti-
paternalist case for making access to life-extending healthcare in old age dependent on having 
saved up sufficient funds on a private basis. 
The worry that began this section is that we might not be able to justify the stark difference I 
have assumed between allowing people to become worse off through their own culpable action, 
or in ways that compensate them in their view, and allowing them to become absolutely badly 
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off. Levels of sufficiency mark the point at which a three-way trade-off changes balance. 
Whenever someone is in a position that raises a potential claim of justice, through their own 
fault, we have three options; we either leave them to it, save them after the fact, or prevent 
them from getting into that position in the first place. When the first option is less costly to 
them than either a) the second option is to us or b) the third option is to them, we should let 
responsibility reign. When people are badly off, rather than merely worse off, the first option is 
often far more costly to them than intervention is to us; and paternalistic prevention may 
sometimes be the least costly option to everyone. However, we need not assume that we are 
entitled to pre-emptively step in whenever a choice will be bad for someone in their distant 
future. If the cost to the individual is particularly bad, but the costs of paternalism are also high 
(e.g. paternalism would only be effective in the form of costly and intrusive monitoring), then 
the third option, stepping in post facto, becomes the least costly option overall. This means that 
hardship often takes priority over responsibility. If, as I have argued, sufficientarians are best 
equipped to explain this priority, this idea provides support for sufficientarianism.  
The case of compensation is more complex. I have suggested that compensation may 
sometimes trump what we consider to be hardship. Sufficiency provides a useful threshold for 
deciding between various cases. Again, this vindicates sufficientarianism, even if things are not 
as simple as with responsibility.   
4.3.2 Is sufficiency enough?   
This section considers some objections to time-relative sufficientarianism, and explains why 
they are either not compelling objections, or not necessarily applicable to sufficientarianism.  
The first objection is that sufficientarians must sometimes prefer smaller gains for the better off 
to larger gains for the worse off, entirely against the egalitarian spirit (e.g. Roemer, 2004: 279; 
Casal, op cit: 315-316). If S is very near the sufficientarian threshold, and sufficientarians aim to 
maximise the number of people above the threshold, they prefer to help S over it with a small 
gain rather than offer a greater gain to someone who is too far below the threshold to breach it. 
For resourcists, this may not be implausible, depending on the threshold; giving all of our 
medicine to the very worst off patient, who is likely to die anyway, is bad triage. Such cases do 
not help opportunists or welfarists, since it is clear that the dying patient gains very little in 
those terms. But more importantly, sufficientarians need not be maximisers, and certainly need 
not have breaching the threshold as their only concern. The minimum they must insist is that 
the strength, and perhaps nature, of claims is discontinuous above and below thresholds. So this 
objection does not apply to all forms of sufficientarianism.  
The second worry is that sufficientarians allow unjust inequalities above the threshold, since 
they only care about people having enough. Again, this concern applies only to a specific type of 
sufficientarianism, i.e. one that holds Casal’s negative thesis with regard to all thresholds. If 
sufficientarians are only committed to the importance of a threshold in defining a difference in 
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claims, they need not commit to the irrelevance of claims above the threshold. Moreover, time-
relative sufficientarians can often prefer benefitting people who are currently above the threshold 
on grounds of stability; those near the threshold are more likely to fall below it at some future 
stage. For instance, we might invest in preventive healthcare measures even in people who are 
currently in reasonable health because they are vulnerable to ill health. Since time-relative 
sufficientarianism is concerned with the future as well as the present, this is a legitimate reason 
to prefer benefitting someone above the threshold.  
Another way to reduce the force of this complaint is to note the importance of positional goods 
(see Frankfurt, op cit: 23). Although sufficientarianism is fundamentally concerned with 
absolute rather than relative positions, absolute positions are fundamentally affected by what 
others have. Goods that have a strong social component are most plausible for setting a 
positional threshold. This is both because what counts as ‘enough’ for some goods may depend 
on what others have, and because not having a certain level of some goods compared to others 
can have significant effects on self-esteem, and hence both directly on welfare and, as I will 
discuss later in this section, whether one finds one’s position tolerable and/or worthwhile. 
Axelsen and Nielsen (Forthcoming) claim that certain political freedoms fall under both these 
categories (see also Brighouse and Swift, 2006), and we might think that certain forms of respect 
or political status might be so strongly positional as to require formal equality. At least for these 
goods, inequality places those at the bottom beneath the sufficiency threshold, because the 
value of an absolute level of these goods varies according to one’s relative position with regard 
to that good. So even sufficientarians who insist that there are no fundamental reasons to care 
about distributions above the threshold may see derivative reasons for so caring. But this does 
not mean that all goods ought to be governed by equality; as outlined in Section 4.1, for 
instance, some inequalities in welfare at particular times have little to no impact on self-esteem, 
and the value of these goods is not positional. Health is a key example. The value of our health 
is not predominantly affected by how healthy others are, so it is not a positional good. And the 
value of health is not relative. We do not typically care about our health compared with the 
health of others.  
Sufficientarians who are indifferent to some inequalities can offer a further response. If there 
are multiple thresholds, one might oppose some inequalities above a lower threshold, but not 
above an upper threshold. As I suggested in Chapter 3, Frankfurt – often singled out for 
holding Casal’s negative thesis, and so being indifferent to inequalities above sufficiency – 
seems to hold this view; he is concerned when discussing an upper threshold of ‘contentment’ 
with the idea that inequalities may no longer matter; but this idea does not appear when he 
addresses clearly lower boundaries such as subsistence (see also Huseby, 2009).  
A third worry is that sufficientarians are wasteful, preferring small benefits for those below the 
threshold to benefits of any size, for any number of people, above the threshold. This assumes 
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that sufficientarians have a lexical preference for those below the threshold, so that a small gain 
for one person below the threshold always trumps large gains for innumerable people above the 
threshold. But again, sufficientarians need not defend this position. All sufficientarians need say 
is that claims from people below the threshold are discontinuously stronger than those from 
people above. Sufficientarians must sometimes prefer smaller gains to larger, but neither benefit 
size36 nor numbers need be irrelevant.  
A fourth concern is more pressing: that there is no principled way of setting a threshold. It is 
not enough simply to stipulate a threshold; we need to explain why dropping below that point 
makes the important difference to the strength of one’s claims. Shields (2005) suggests that we 
can avoid arbitrariness by appealing to the idea of satiability. Some claims are satiable, in that 
once S has secured a certain amount of ∑ on the basis of a satiable claim, she cannot appeal on 
the basis of that claim for any more. If S needs treatment for an infection, there is a level of 
resources that will complete that task. She may have further claims to a different benefit, but 
she must appeal to a “different profile of reasons” (113); she has no further claim on that basis. 
Sufficientarians thus only need to identify satiable claims on the basis of which we can deem 
that people have a sufficient level of ∑ for the strength of their claims to change significantly. 
This account receives some support from the fact that many everyday and academic discussions 
of distributive justice centre on just such satiable claims. People have claims against material 
deprivation, to the opportunity to make some fundamental choices in life, and against 
stigmatising differences in status. They have claims to being spared or relieved from severe 
physical pain and mental distress. These claims are often satiable at times; once we have given 
someone a certain amount of opportunity or access to influence over the decisions that affect 
her life, it is possible that she no longer suffers stigmatising differences in power in the context 
of those decisions (although satisfying this claim in one respect need not satisfy it fully). Once 
we have given someone pain relief, he no longer suffers pain at a particular time. Giving any 
more might improve people’s situations in other ways, but it would not make them less 
stigmatised or deprived, or in less pain if their pain has been relieved; if further intervention 
would benefit the person in question at all, it would be by improving things in other ways. 
                                                     
36 Some sufficientarians claim that no amount of ‘trivial’ benefits for the well off can ever trump 
significant benefits for the badly off: Crisp (754) says we should never prefer giving chocolates to the 
well-off over relieving suffering for the badly off, no matter how large or small the respective groups (see 
also Voorhoeve, 2014). Widerquist (2010) criticises such suggestions because, “trivial costs and benefits 
necessarily add up to significant costs and benefits”. For instance lowering the speed limit by 1mph is 
trivial compared with the number of lives saved. But if we follow this logic through, we will ban driving 
altogether, which is a significant cost. However, sufficientarians may claim that we should never prefer 
trivial benefits until they amount to significant benefits. Widerquist assumes falsely that if a 1mph drop 
from the current speed limit is trivial, it must be trivial in all circumstances. But Crisp does not claim that 
the benefits must be equally significant, only that they both be significant for weighting to be permissible.  
66 
 
However, an appeal to satiability is not enough to ground a properly sufficientarian threshold. 
After all, many kinds of claims are satiable, including buying one’s own island, or having 
sufficient political influence to have a private police detail guarding one’s house. But it would be 
extremely counterintuitive to set even a high sufficiency threshold at these points. I have 
suggested several examples where a small difference in ∑ seems to make a large difference to 
people’s situations, justifying the discontinuous strength of their claims. These claims are 
satiable, but they are also the kinds of things that we tend to think people really need, unlike 
access to a private island. So sufficientarians need to constrain their account to reflect this 
difference.  
Moreover, it must be that the sufficientarian threshold which marks a point at which people’s 
claims become discontinuously strong does not also mark a point where there is a discontinuous 
drop in ∑; if they did, there would be a non-egalitarian – e.g. utilitarian – justification for the 
additional strength of those claims, on the grounds that benefitting the person below the 
threshold would simply be better overall. The final pound I receive in saving up for my island, 
despite being a small increase in my resources, makes a big difference to my opportunities, and 
indeed to my welfare. Critics of sufficientarianism might argue from this fact that we should be 
welfarists, and that a sufficientarian stance for resourcism and opportunism only looks plausible 
because small additions of resources or opportunity can have a large impact on welfare. So now 
we should worry that the appeal to satiability does not point out a plausibly sufficientarian 
threshold, and that its appeal only survives because small differences in one currency make a 
large difference in another, more fundamental currency.  
My response to these two related concerns follows Frankfurt in grounding the sufficientarian 
threshold in particular attitudes we take – or would take, were attitudes elicited – towards our 
absolute positions, including towards our level of welfare. Frankfurt applies this idea to 
resources, appealing to the idea of contentment. Contentment means not that one’s position 
cannot be improved, but that improvement is a possibility about which one is not particularly 
concerned. On Frankfurt’s view, people have discontinuously stronger claims when they are not 
content than when they are content.  
One worry about this is that it will be unclear when people have breached the threshold, so that 
sufficientarianism fails to define a threshold in “a principled manner that provides determinate 
and plausible guidance for distributive decision makers” (Casal, op cit: 313). But this concern is 
misplaced. Distributive principles tell us what determines our moral and political 
responsibilities. Of course, we also need to generate action guidance; but there is no reason to 
suppose that the principle that determines our fundamental moral commitments must be 
capable of being used, verbatim, to guide action. If we face problems in determining when people 
have passed a subjective threshold, we may have to use estimates, based on assumptions about 
typical behaviours, reactions and needs. But this still uses the sufficientarian principle as 
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fundamentally determining our action; it simply does so indirectly. In this regard it is no 
different to principles that tell us to treat people differently if they act carelessly or intentionally, 
or a rule that says we should give pain relief to patients only if they are actually in pain.  
Contentment may be a plausible upper threshold.  But it cannot work as a lower threshold; in 
that role, it fails to capture what is distinctive about sufficientarianism, which is a concern with 
the absolutely badly off. I also suggested that a considerable strength of sufficientarianism is in 
marking a point at which individuals’ responsibility for being worse off should no longer 
automatically negate or weaken their claims. Having contentment mark our lower threshold 
would mean that responsibility stops playing a role as soon as someone feels discontent. That 
would imply that we are only responsible for decisions that turn out very well, which is no 
responsibility at all.  
Huseby (op cit) suggests subsistence as a lower threshold. This is problematic if subsistence is 
concerned only with bare survival, since this implies that our fundamental moral commitments 
bear no reference to the psychological states of those who have claims on us. One can 
physically survive, and yet be in a very bad way psychologically. It seems unlikely that we have 
discontinuously strong claims merely to be kept alive. Callahan, whose position I discussed in 
Chapter 1, gets at least this much right; it should not be an aim of social policy to keep us 
biologically functioning after the point when we have ceased to see any value in living. And it is 
hard to make much sense of what one would have a claim to; if someone personally saw no 
value in living, why would they make that claim at all?37 Moreover, an appeal to subsistence 
ignores the claims of the dying; those whose lives we cannot save, and who will die soon, still 
have claims of justice to pain-relief, emotional support, and so on. An appeal to subsistence is 
doubly inadequate.  
We should not necessarily assume that we will identify our threshold by an appeal to just one 
feature of our existence. I will focus on two such features, both subjective attitudes like 
contentment; these are tolerability, and the sense that one’s existence is worthwhile. It is 
possible that there are others, but these seem to me to be central instances. We have much 
stronger reasons to intervene when people find their situation intolerable than when people are 
in a tolerable position, even if the latter are still not content. Suggesting tolerability as a lower 
boundary need not imply that there is nothing important about subsistence. For one thing, there 
are degrees of intolerability, and those who cannot even subsist are typically at the lower end of 
this scale; so if we allow some degree of differentiation below our lower threshold, we can 
                                                     
37 Perhaps there are cases where others might make a claim of subsistence on a person’s behalf, despite 
that person having no subjective attitudes towards their position e.g. in the case of brain death. Rejecting 
subsistence as a threshold implies that in cases where a person has no chance of moving beyond mere 




recognise stronger (but not discontinuously stronger) claims on the basis of subsistence. But 
this does not undermine an insistence on tolerability altogether; for this threshold marks a sense 
that merely keeping someone alive is not enough. We fail seriously if we save someone’s life but 
knowingly and avoidably allow them to exist in an intolerable state.  
Frankfurt (38) explicitly rejects an appeal to tolerability. But he seems at this stage of discussion 
to be concerned with an idea of sufficiency at which people’s claims cease (the negative thesis), 
rather than merely get weaker, and it does seem clear as he says that our obligations to help 
others do not cease when they are “living on the brink”. Nonetheless, even if we recognise an 
upper threshold such as Frankfurt’s idea of contentment, it is too simplistic to group together 
all those who are not content with their lives. This is why I have suggested that the most 
charitable characterisation of Frankfurt’s position is as suggesting multiple thresholds.  
Toleration is, like contentment, an attitude taken towards one’s situation. It is neither merely a 
psychological state that contributes to welfare, like happiness, nor an external description of a 
particular level of welfare. It is true that finding a situation intolerable may cause additional 
distress, and hence lead to further declines in welfare. But finding something intolerable is not 
the distress itself. Frankfurt discusses contentment in similar terms, saying that to be content 
need not imply that one would not be happier with more, but that one feels no sense of urgency 
to acquire more. The attitude of tolerability may contain what Frankfurt says is absent in 
contentment: a sense of activity and urgency in trying to better one’s situation, but without the 
sense of despair that what one has simply is not enough. Lacking the attitude of toleration may 
exhibit itself equally actively, but it may also be a passive kind of despair; we need not think that 
just because someone has resigned themselves to their situation, they find it tolerable. Frankfurt 
applies this idea of attitudes solely to resources, but it is also potentially applicable to one’s 
opportunities or as a second-order attitude to one’s emotional state or mood. 
Claims deriving from the idea of tolerability can come in two strands. People have a positive 
claim to relief from intolerable states. If someone is in an intolerable position, our most obvious 
obligation is to end that suffering. However, we should also recognise a positive claim to be 
enabled to have (or at least given the means for) a tolerable existence. Superficially, these claims 
may seem to be equivalent. But their difference is particularly pertinent in discussing life-
extending healthcare such as ageing enhancement, since it would strictly speaking satisfy the 
negative requirement to allow somebody to die. If we have a positive obligation to extend 
people’s lives, we need a positive requirement to supplement the negative principle. 
I said that a plausible lower threshold may respond to multiple features. One worry about 
appealing to tolerability alone is that people may adapt to very bad situations by coming to find 
them tolerable, simply because that is what it takes to get by. Of course, sufficientarians who 
deny Casal’s negative thesis can still insist that such people have very strong claims; but we 
might think that a sufficientarian theory should insist that they have discontinuously strong 
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claims, despite now finding their situation tolerable. The second attitude I consider is that of 
finding one’s life worthwhile. Even if one comes to find tolerable a quite terrible situation, one 
may not conceive of it in a more positive sense as a worthwhile way to live. To find things 
worthwhile, while not an attitude of disinterest to improvements like contentment, is a more 
positive attitude than toleration since it involves a sense that one’s situation is satisfactory or 
worth being in.  
Introducing two features for a low threshold clearly complicates things. I will now briefly 
describe the relationship between these two ideas.38 The view of one’s existence as worthwhile 
applies to moments, but is likely to be informed by knowledge about what has recently 
occurred, and what is coming next. It thus also seems possible to find things worthwhile, but 
not tolerable. This occurs when one is undergoing short-lived suffering – say, a short period of 
agony – but in the knowledge that it will pass. People have discontinuously strong claims when 
in such a state, even though they find their existence worthwhile, because their pain is 
intolerable. People also have discontinuously strong claims when they find their state tolerable, 
but not worthwhile. There is more than one way not to have enough. 
This goes at least some way to solving the problems raised at the beginning of this section. An 
appeal to attitudes, which can be directed to one’s level of welfare among other things, 
undercuts the argument that sufficientarianism only looks appealing for resourcists or 
opportunists because they implicitly appeal to a non-sufficientarian welfarism. And an appeal to 
these attitudes can differentiate between different kinds of satiable claims. Such an account has 
apparent implications for ageing enhancement and the Egalitarian Objection; death is the end of 
worthwhile existence, while physical ageing can bring about intolerable states, at least in terms 
of welfare and opportunity.39 If there are distinct egalitarian claims against those states at 
                                                     
38 These twin concerns may also face various additional constraints when it comes to state action. 
Frankfurt notes that a person might be content in his sense, and yet feel significant lack in her life 
because, for instance, she has not found love. There is certainly something to the idea that not all sources 
of intolerability or a sense that one’s life is not worthwhile are within the remit of the state or other 
institutions. S may feel that his life is not worthwhile because he has not yet started a family. Yet we have 
no obligation to find him a romantic partner. On the other hand, if his inability to find a romantic partner 
is due to his having to work all hours to afford somewhere to live, leaving him with no free time, we 
should have something to say about that. I am not sure quite what marks the distinction between sources 
of intolerability or lack of worth that command and do not command the attention of formal justice. But 
I doubt that Frankfurt is right to suggest it is merely a lack of money, since social and institutional barriers 
can have an equally fundamental effect on one’s situation.  
39 Things are more complicated for resourcists. While it makes sense to talk about people having equal 
resources, and about having more or less resources in an absolute sense (as prioritarians would) without 
any further reference, it seems to me to make little sense to talk of having sufficient resources without 
some object of sufficiency; we have to answer the question ‘sufficient for what?’. And we will inevitably 
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particular times, then it seems as though elderly patients have claims, on egalitarian grounds, to 
ageing enhancement. Of course, this is hardly the end of the matter, since there may be 
alternative considerations from our lifetime principle, or from the relation of the two principles, 
that undercut that apparent commitment.  
4.4 Summary 
I have argued that our time-relative concerns should be sufficientarian. Time-relative 
egalitarianism is implausibly restrictive, and sufficientarianism better captures the relationship 
between our competing concerns with responsibility, compensation and hardship than 
prioritarianism. This position requires some degree of paternalism, but I argued that this is 
defensible once properly spelled out, especially because of distinctive features of the kinds of 
cases in which I am interested.  
A concern with time-relative sufficiency gives us some reason to doubt the idea that we should 
automatically prefer interventions for young patients because elderly people have had more total 
lifetime ∑. Such a view seems reflected in Kappel and Sandøe’s (1992: 314) claim that extending 
the lives of an elderly rather than a young person is equivalent to giving money to the wealthy. 
Understanding the distinction between lifetime and time-relative egalitarian claims helps show a 
significant flaw in that analogy. It would certainly be worrying ceteris paribus if we were giving 
cash handouts to the wealthy and not the poor. But this impropriety can be explained by 
considering the respective individuals’ current holdings. A better analogy would be with giving 
money to someone was previously rich, and so has a greater total of lifetime holdings, but is no 
longer so.40 I have not yet discussed the relationship between the lifetime and time-relative 
principles (and will do so in Chapter 6), so for all I have said so far this could be unjust. But it is 
both less obviously unjust than preferring the currently wealthy, and more obviously analogous 
to the state of elderly people who need medical interventions.  
Before I can consider the relationship between the two principles, however, I need to outline 
what the lifetime principle ought to be. In the following chapter I do so, arguing that time-
relative prioritarianism is the only feasible option. 
                                                                                                                                                      
end up referencing either some component of welfare, or some opportunity, in this answer. In such a 
case, we would not have some distribution of resources as our fundamental aim (though of course it may 
be one of our primary distribuanda, since it is rather difficult to redistribute welfare). So, time-relative 
sufficientarians should probably not advocate resourcism. Still, I will continue to discuss resourcism in 
the following section for two reasons. First, there may be some way for time-relative sufficientarians to 
care fundamentally about resources that I have not noticed. More importantly, our lifetime and time-
relative principles may have different currencies, especially if they apply different distributive principles. 
40 Harris (1994: 76-77), whose arguments the original article critiques, also suggests that the analogy is 




Chapter 5: The Egalitarian Objection – The lifetime principle 
Chapter 4 defended time-relative sufficientarianism. Chapter 5 addresses the lifetime principle 
that complements it. I defend a form of lifetime prioritarianism, since the advantages 
sufficientarianism holds at the time-relative level are not present across lifetimes, and the 
strategy for identifying a threshold does not transfer to the lifetime setting. This chapter also 
addresses further versions of the Egalitarian Objection, based on alternative lifetime principles. 
In arguing for prioritarianism, I offer reasons to reject these versions of the objection.  
As in Chapter 4, I begin by considering each version of the lifetime principle in turn, beginning 
with equality in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 considers lifetime sufficientarianism and suggests some 
problems that its time-relative variant avoids. Section 5.2.1 outlines the lifetime sufficientarian 
‘fair innings’ argument, which must rely on one of two views that potentially ground versions of 
the Egalitarian Objection: a statistical view of a fair share of life (5.2.2), or a normative view of a 
‘complete life’ (5.2.3), and argues that neither of these views is convincing. Section 5.2.4 
considers a new worry for time-relative sufficientarianism based on this discussion. Section 5.3 
defends lifetime prioritarianism, including explaining why it does not face the same problems as 
its time-relative version (5.3.1). 
5.1 Equality  
Lifetime equalitarianism aims for people to have equal ∑ over their lifetimes. This would give 
some support to the Egalitarian Objection; extending the lives of elderly people would in many 
cases increase lifetime inequality. Lifetime equalitarianism says we should avoid this even if we 
could not otherwise benefit young people, so it would oppose many cases of ageing 
enhancement even if the foregone benefit to elderly patients could not be redistributed. This 
section outlines a relevant worry about this form of equalitarianism – the ‘levelling down’ 
objection – considers an updated equalitarianism that avoids levelling down, and offers a worry 
for this new position. 
As with the Rawlsian views considered in Chapter 3, the goal of equalising lifetime welfare or 
opportunity faces a challenge from individuals who will unavoidably have very meagre lives, 
either because of a short lifespan, or because of an irremediable condition that gives them very 
poor, non-compensable quality of life. The only way to obtain equality when we cannot 
sufficiently improve the position of the worst off is to ‘level down’ everyone else (Parfit, 1997: 
211) by making them worse off and denying them additional benefits. This is not true for 
resourcist equalitarians who take resources in their everyday sense of goods external to agents, 
since they will simply give the worst off the same level of resources as everyone else. But such 
resourcists struggle to accommodate the fact of disability, since they give the same amount of 
external resources to someone who struggles to ‘convert’ resources into welfare and other 
goods, which seems contrary to egalitarian aspirations. Resourcist positions that respond to this 
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issue by categorising internal capacities as resources – such that a person with a disability has an 
intrinsic resource deficit that we should compensate (e.g. Dworkin, 1981: 300) – face the 
levelling down problem again. 
Some equalitarians embrace levelling down. Temkin (op cit) argues that cases where we strongly 
object to levelling down – e.g. Parfit’s example of responding to the fact that some are blind by 
blinding everyone else – are those where the value of equality is outweighed by other values. 
And there may be more compelling examples that offer a fairer assessment of equalitarianism: 
Casal (op cit: 307) suggests that if a hospital provided every patient with “enough medicine, 
food, comfort and so forth”, it would still be objectionable to house a few patients on a luxury 
ward that is inaccessible to the rest. If we think it would be better to not spend the money on 
anyone than to offer selective luxury, we may be committed to some kind of levelling down.41 
The degree of levelling down needed to achieve genuine lifetime equality is immense, given the 
unavoidably poor situations of some individuals. Achieving equality for those with the very 
worst lives would require everyone else to subject ourselves to severe misery. Of course, 
pluralistic equalitarians can oppose this move for non-egalitarian reasons; and if the argument in 
Chapter 4 is correct, time-relative sufficientarianism could place limits on how low we are 
allowed to bring people in the name of equality. But not only is it on balance wrong to torture 
people so that they will suffer as others have; we have absolutely no reason to do it, and nor do 
the worst off have any claim that we do. If there is no weight to levelling down in such cases, an 
alternative is that those cases where levelling down looks more appealing, such as Casal’s 
hospital case, have other reasons on their side than the value of strict equality. For instance, 
patients who are not selected for VIP treatment might feel as though this is a comment on their 
relative worth; public institutions such as hospitals have procedural reasons to treat people as 
equals in some regards, even when there is no fundamental claim to distributive equality.  
A particular version of the levelling down problem concerns lifespan increases. Lifetime 
equalitarianism insists that members of one generation should have the same total lifetime ∑ as 
the previous generation, even if they will have longer lives. As lifespans increase, equalitarianism 
requires that less is made available for each particular year, in the name of lifetime equality; 
someone who lives eighty years with a positive welfare level of w has greater lifetime welfare 
than someone who lives fifty years at w, so to equalise lifetime chances, the former person’s 
welfare level would have to be proportionately lower than w to compensate.  
One might try to mitigate this issue by restricting comparisons to overlapping generations. 
While it seems implausible that we should aim for lifetime equality with our distant ancestors, 
perhaps it is less troubling to say that we should aim for lifetime equality with co-existent 
generations. However, this route does not solve the problem because generations overlap. 
                                                     
41 Casal does not offer this example in support of levelling down, but the extension seems natural.  
73 
 
Assume that we are constrained to equality of ∑ with the current generation of elderly people. 
In turn, they were obligated to have equally good lives as their grandparents’ generation, and so 
on. Our starting point is linked inextricably to much earlier generations.  
However, some versions of equalitarianism avoid levelling down. Persson’s ‘relational 
prioritarianism’ (2008), does not say that equality is independently valuable (such that it could 
make an otherwise bad distribution good), but that benefits are more valuable the worse off 
recipients are relative to others. This compares with what Persson calls ‘absolute’ prioritarianism 
(i.e. what I have simply called prioritarianism), the view that benefits are worth more the worse 
off recipients are in non-comparative terms. In the language of claims, Persson’s view says that 
nobody has a claim to make others worse off if it will not benefit anyone; people have stronger 
claims when they are worse off than others, as opposed to when they are worse off absolutely. 
I agree that relational qualities of distributions have some normative relevance. People often 
have a distinct claim to a ‘fair share’ of whatever benefits are available, or burdens necessary. 
When some completable work needs doing, or we are sharing out some discrete benefit of 
which we all deserve a share, it is plausible that our prima facie attitude should be one of equality. 
It is unfair if the same person always does the work from which we all benefit, even if the work 
is not particularly onerous to them. So people may have stronger claims to a benefit simply by 
virtue of being worse off than others, and in a way that is somewhat independent of how 
absolutely bad their position is.    
However, relational prioritarianism is at the very least an incomplete account of our 
fundamental concern in distributing goods. Our fundamental concern in distributing should be 
to improve people’s actual situations, even if we also have some concern for fair division.42 As 
well as being concerned with getting their fair share, people have significant concern with how 
things are for them in absolute terms. And while states may well have a role in ensuring 
structural fairness in the distribution of benefits and burdens, they should also be concerned 
with how people’s lives actually go. By itself, relational prioritarianism cannot recognise 
important considerations that emerge from absolute conditions. In the distributions below, pure 
relational prioritarianism says that it is just as important to benefit S in D6 as in D5 (where 
numbers represent welfare and zero represents the threshold of a life worth living):  
 S R 
D5 -10 40 
D6 20 70 
                                                     
42 For instance, we can best explain the common view (e.g. Hume, 1751: Section III, Part I) that justice is 
not applicable in conditions where there is more than enough for all by an appeal to the absolute 
conditions of people’s lives in such a state.  
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But while S has a much stronger claim than R in both cases, this is more pressing in D5 because 
she is absolutely worse off than she is in D6. That is, while S certainly has a claim to her ‘fair 
share’ in both cases, we commit a far worse injustice when we deny it to her in D5.  
This disparity is seen even in more parochial contexts. If we are sharing a heavy burden, we 
each have a strong claim that the other does half the work (assuming equal capacity); it is unfair 
if one of us does most of the work. If the burden is light, it is still unfair, ceteris paribus, if the 
share is unequal. But it is a less significant injustice, since although washing dishes is tedious it 
does not bother either of us all that much. If this is right, then the force of relational claims is at 
least sometimes moderated by the force of absolute claims.  
Relational prioritarians may claim that the reverse is also true; given scarcity, we can only make 
sense of claims of justice given an assessment of how badly off you are relative others. But this 
is false; there can be legitimate claims that are nonetheless legitimately not satisfied due to 
resource constraints. So we can say that S’s claim in D5 is stronger than R’s in D5, but stronger 
still than R’s in D6. The practical results may be the same (i.e. we benefit S in both cases), but 
this should not obscure the theoretical difference; the strength of S’s absolute claim is not 
moderated by her relative position, but the likelihood of its being one of the claims that is judged 
sufficiently strong to be met is reduced or increased. So while absolute priority has a moderating 
effect on the fundamental strength of relative claims, the reverse is not true. While relative 
claims matter, absolute claims have fundamental importance. 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2007) suggest that absolute prioritarians must insist that the additional 
moral value to benefits for the absolutely worse off applies even to individuals in isolation. But, 
they claim, it is clear that very different considerations apply to such individuals. If we imagine 
an individual who is stranded on a desert island, absolute prioritarianism tells us that if she faces 
a choice between a risky act that promises high reward, and a safer act with more meagre 
promise, she is morally obligated not to take the risk because if the risk goes wrong then there 
will be moral disvalue to her being in a worse situation than before. This is so even when she 
reasonably prefers to take the risk because it maximises expected benefit. But, they say, the 
castaway clearly has no such reason to avoid the risky option; the moral value of being badly off 
is thus fundamentally comparative. This also looks like a worry for sufficientarians.  
This is only a problem for absolute prioritarians if they accept that there is additional moral 
value to benefits for the absolutely worse off. If we think that moral value is something to 
which we ought to respond, we can incur impersonal moral commitments to make our own 
situation better. Even though the only person affected by the castaway’s decision is herself, and 
her expected benefit is maximised by risky action, the additional moral value – on this 
understanding – of avoiding absolutely bad states compels her to take the action with less 
expected benefit. But the way I have framed the issue, as being about our claims on one 
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another,43 has no such implication. Since the islander has nobody on whom she can make 
claims, and nobody to make claims of her, issues of justice do not arise.  
I have suggested that Persson’s version of lifetime equalitarianism is persuasive to the extent 
that considerations of relative position may have some independent moral force. However, I 
insisted that our concern with individuals’ absolute positions is fundamental; as such, even if 
lifetime equalitarianism has some plausibility, our fundamental position should be a non-
comparative one like sufficientarianism or prioritarianism. Moreover, lifetime equalitarianism is 
only plausible in a way that overlaps with many of the concerns faced by non-comparative 
views; even if we think that our concern with people being worse off is partly responsive to 
relative positions, this need not compete with a prioritarian or sufficientarian view in the way 
that levelling-down equalitarianism does.  
5.2 Sufficiency 
While my discussion of time-relative sufficiency in Section 4.3 focused on the lower threshold, 
this section predominantly concerns the idea of an upper lifetime threshold. The reason for this 
is that while the defence of time-relative sufficiency relied partly on its providing a lower 
constraint for more general prioritarian reasoning, lifetime sufficiency is invoked – at least in the 
context of the Egalitarian Objection – to provide a ceiling on individuals’ claims to benefits. I 
will briefly discuss the idea of a lower lifetime threshold in Section 5.3 but my focus here 
follows the use to which the principle is put in relevant discussion.   
Lifetime sufficientarians claim to identify some total amount of lifetime good above which we 
either have no claims on the basis of justice, or above which our claims are discontinuously 
weaker. Depending on where this threshold is placed, ageing enhancement may be deemed 
unjust if many potential recipients have lived a sufficient life, and the necessary resources could 
be spent on helping others (e.g. young people) achieve a sufficient life.  
I defended time-relative sufficientarianism in Section 4.3 by appealing, with some 
developments, to Shields’ notion of satiability. But the existence of satiable claims at particular 
times does not entail the existence of satiable claims over lifetimes. Lifetime sufficientarians may 
suggest taking the kinds of claims I appealed to in discussing time-relative sufficiency, and 
extending them across a lifetime. So, there might be a level of ∑ necessary for a ‘lifetime’ free 
from significant pain, deprivation or stigmatisation. Similarly, perhaps there is a total level of 
welfare or opportunity sufficient for a tolerable life, and another level sufficient for a 
worthwhile life. However, to make this a satiable claim, the idea of a lifetime cannot be open-
ended, since otherwise these lifetime claims would require infinite resources. Establishing 
satiability in a lifetime context thus requires some independent sense of a complete or sufficient 
                                                     
43 See also Andrew Williams (2012).  
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life, such that once one has lived for a certain amount of time, one has had enough. It is to such 
accounts, and how they might ground the Egalitarian Objection, that I now turn.  
5.2.1 Fair innings   
One option is to appeal to the metaphor of a fair innings. When you have lived a fair innings, 
your lifespan is such that while it would be good for you to carry on, there is no great tragedy in 
your dying at this stage.44 If a fair innings comes after a determinate length of time, it could 
provide the kind of threshold that lifetime sufficientarians require. It seems clear that if a fair 
innings approach is to be properly egalitarian, it cannot be based on numerical age alone, since 
lives of the same length can be of radically different quality. Indeed, not only is age not strongly 
positively correlated with lifetime welfare or opportunity; there may even be a negative 
correlation for welfare among the worst off. Since on some views we can have periods of 
negative welfare, it is possible for someone’s total lifetime welfare to decrease as they age, if 
their situation is bad enough. 
Moreover, an appeal to fair innings fails to support the Egalitarian Objection insofar as it relies 
on the fact that ageing enhancement’s beneficiaries will predominantly be elderly in numerical 
terms, because we should not use numerical age as a criterion for egalitarian distribution.45 If we 
take two people of the same age but with radically different quality of life, there is no 
normatively relevant good of which they have equal shares.46 So an appeal to fair innings must 
rest on some other good than age – although it might be correlated with age – such as lifetime 
welfare, opportunity or resource use. Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 consider two ways of setting a fair 
innings threshold in such a way as to justify discontinuously weaker claims for those who have 
breached such a limit.  
                                                     
44 Harris (1985: 91) offers a useful outline of the intuitive force of the fair innings argument.  
45 There may be pragmatic justification in certain contexts for using age as a proxy for lifetime shares of 
∑, not among the old but among the very young. As the discussion in Chapter 3 of Lazenby’s position 
makes clear, for very young children even the most privileged have had little in the way of lifetime welfare 
or opportunity, so if they are facing a life-threatening illness, we can guarantee that early death would 
place them well below a fair innings. Whether or not this priority should be discontinuous depends on the 
viability of a lower lifetime threshold, discussed in Section 5.3. But it should be clear that age is here used 
as a proxy for some other good, and not as our measure of a fair innings itself. Moreover, it sets the 
claims of the young against all adults, not only the elderly.  
46 Bognar (2015) suggests that we should be prioritarians about life years per se, noting public support for 
age rationing when offered hypothetical cases. However, the responses he cites may assume that 
numerical age tracks e.g. lifetime opportunity; people might respond differently if the older individual 
were revealed to have had a much worse life or less opportunity. Moreover, he does not explain what is 




5.2.2 Lifetime good  
One might pick a number of years and claim that, so long as they are of a good enough quality, 
they constitute a complete life. However, it is not clear why we should choose any particular 
length or quality of life. Crisp (op cit: 762) cites his intuition that 80 high-quality years of life is 
“more than enough...for any being”; but it seems uncanny that Crisp’s intuition aligns with the 
average life-expectancy of the UK in the year he was writing, according to the World Bank. It is 
arbitrary to choose a number without any explanation of why that in particular is a fair innings, 
and seems far more likely that Crisp’s intuitions reflect his own circumstances rather than 
anything intrinsically special about living for eighty years.  
On the other hand, perhaps tying fair innings to current average life-expectancy within a 
particular reference class is well motivated because a sufficient life simply is the average life 
expectancy for a relevant reference class. Although Alan Williams does not directly defend the 
view that we should rely on a statistical average in his seminal discussions of fair innings (1997; 
2001), he regards it as the most plausible position, and adopts it as a default. Williams appeals to 
the idea of ‘quality-adjusted’ life-years (QALYs) in calculating the fair innings (1997: 121), where 
the value of an additional year of life is negatively weighted according to the health burdens 
experienced in that year.47 On Williams’ view, we prefer patients who are projected not to 
achieve the average quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth for a population over those 
projected to reach it; obviously when two patients are competing for life-saving interventions, 
this can be reduced to those who are currently under the average QALE, and those over (since 
if the former are refused the intervention, they are guaranteed not to reach the average QALE). 
Quality-adjustment is currently used in some healthcare efficiency assessments: the expected 
future benefit of an intervention is weighted according to whether the additional years gained 
through treatment will contain various ailments or disabilities that reduce their quality; such 
additional years are valued less than fully healthy years. The key difference between this and 
Williams’ approach is that while consideration of forward-looking QALYs prefers those who 
will live well in the future, Williams’ proposal prefers those who have done badly until now, 
and/or are projected to do so in the future.48 
Williams (1997: 129) says that the efficiency level (i.e. cost per additional QALY achieved for a 
patient) required to justify an intervention should be higher for those who are expected to reach 
a fair innings than for those who are not. An absolute preference for those projected to fall 
                                                     
47 Presumably we could in principle add weightings for other, non-health burdens, on the grounds that 
there is no reason to have egalitarian allocations of healthcare only balance out health-related inequities; I 
discuss some issues with this extension further on.  
48 One immediate issue with Williams’ proposal in distributive contexts is that they ignore the point raised 
at the beginning of this section that people may plausibly suffer periods of negative welfare. QALYs are 
always positive, so can never detract from one’s total; but presumably this issue is fixable.  
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below the threshold would have us pour resources into extending the life of someone just 
below the QALE threshold at the cost of much greater gains for multiple people just above it; 
Williams’ proposal is made more plausible by insisting on weighted rather than absolute 
preference. It also means that the position does not rule out ageing enhancement altogether; if it 
were sufficiently efficient, then it would pass the more stringent measures attached to life-
extension for elderly patients.  
The proposal may also rule out widespread use of ageing enhancement. Many elderly people 
have already breached Williams’ fair innings, so only qualify for very efficient interventions. 
Whether this includes ageing enhancement will clearly depend on the details, but it nonetheless 
subjects ageing enhancement to more stringent efficiency tests in many cases than other 
treatments. Ageing enhancement for elderly people who have lived sufficiently poor-quality 
lives is not subject to stricter efficiency rules than life-extending treatment for any other age 
group. So QALY-based fair innings cannot rule out ageing enhancement altogether; it merely 
may restrict it to a subset of older people. One might thus undercut a major argument in favour 
of ageing enhancement (e.g. Olshansky et al, op cit; de Grey, passim; Bostrom, 2005), that the 
sheer number of people who would benefit from ageing enhancement sanctions its research as a 
high priority. If the number of permissible beneficiaries is far lower than proponents of ageing 
enhancement suggest, then perhaps it should not be a high spending priority.  
I will now suggest some concerns about Williams’ statistical approach. First, there is an 
epistemic concern that applies to any distributive rule which depends on an assessment of 
lifetimes about making access to such complex assessments a requirement of actual distribution. 
This problem is partly dissipated in a modern state that keeps health records from cradle to 
grave, but it is not absent. The worry is that in the face of a vast bureaucratic task, we will fall 
back on using numerical age as a proxy, subjecting elderly people as a class to considerations 
that, even if Williams’ view is right, are only justified for some of them. On the other hand, 
there may be more reliable proxies, such as poverty or particular disease burdens. It also seems 
likely that similar issues will arise for many egalitarian theories. Just as there will be a tendency 
for misreporting if claims are based in part on past experience, basing on claims on mental 
states such as tolerability, as I have suggested, creates similar worries. The appropriate response, 
open to Williams as well, is that while the notion of tolerability (or lifetime QALYs) is what 
grounds moral claims, it is not necessarily available as a foolproof guide to action. There is no 
requirement that the normative ground for a distributive theory act as its explicit rule of 
distribution; but the rule of distribution should be our best attempt to approximate the moral 
principle.  
Still, when such generalisations are used in the way that Williams suggests, this pragmatic 
problem becomes ethically troubling. On Williams’ view, being part of a group that on average 
is expected to breach the threshold means that you are subjected to more stringent efficiency 
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tests. If an individual has a significantly lower share of lifetime QALYs than their group average, 
this will mean that they are denied an intervention to which they are in principle entitled, since it 
lies between the more and less stringent efficiency standards. A lifetime prioritarian view would 
not face this problem, since although it might make mistakes about particular individuals’ 
lifetimes, those mistakes will not create a discontinuity in access to treatment. Such an issue may 
also affect time-relative sufficientarians, given their reliance on discontinuities; if we must rely 
on generalisations about what people find tolerable or worthwhile in policy formation, we may 
wrongly categorise some people as being above a threshold. But this is mitigated, in a way that is 
not available to lifetime sufficientarians, by the fact that we can correct general policy by relying 
on individuals’ self-reporting; in general, we should place credence on individuals’ claims that 
they are currently experiencing intolerable pain, for instance, since they have some epistemic 
privilege in this regard. No such solution is available lifetime sufficientarians, since agents do 
not have privileged epistemic access about whether their life has been, or will be, above average 
within a reference class.  
An appeal to population averages is also of questionable normative relevance. The fair innings 
isolates a point at which access to healthcare is restricted. But when statisticians make 
projections of life-expectancy at birth they must make assumptions about healthcare provision. 
So when we say that the average life expectancy at birth for a group is, say, seventy, we are 
already making various assumptions about the health services people will receive, including at 
age seventy and over. But we risk circularity in using these assumptions to generate conclusions 
about the health services to which people are entitled. If radical ageing enhancement were 
available, for instance, we would face a choice whether to include access to it in life expectancy 
projections. Inclusion raises life expectancy substantially; this means that people are entitled to 
live to ages that only radical enhancement could enable. Exclusion means people are entitled 
only to current life expectancies, so enhancement is classed as a luxury for most. Both results 
are circular, since they assume that people will (not) have access to the particular technology 
when justifying its inclusion (exclusion).  
As with time-relative sufficientarian principles, the central question for fair innings policies is 
where and on what basis to set the threshold. The fair innings under consideration is set by a 
society’s average QALE at birth. Williams acknowledges that there are various ways of 
understanding this idea, but maintains that the fair innings “depends for its moral force...upon 
the existence of some commonly held reference point within each community” (1999: 50). But 
even if we assume that such a reference point holds within modern communities – which is 
doubtful – without some sense of the reasoning behind a particular method of setting an 
average it is hard to see why it should hold moral force.  
There are also ambiguities in just how we should frame the average QALE. Statistical averages 
change over time. The very oldest in a society may be part of a birth cohort that had a lower 
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average QALE at birth than today’s average; but those who have survived have exceeded 
expectations. A statistical fair innings must decide among various options for setting the 
average, and specifically for synthesising the distinct averages of various generations.  
One option is to calculate the total average of QALEs at birth of all people living in a society. 
Since life-expectancy at birth can change over time, this will at least involve assessing multiple 
generations. But this is problematic. Imagine that we have just two birth cohorts of equal size, 
the older of which had a QALE at birth of fifty, and the younger eighty. The average for the 
younger cohort is higher than the total average, since the latter is dragged down by the older 
group’s average of fifty. This would mean that most people in the younger generation would 
expect to live beyond their society’s fair innings, and so lose entitlement to certain kinds of 
treatment. But why should they accept this result? After all, the individuals whose historical 
average is dragging down the overall threshold have already exceeded that very threshold 
(remember that it is their generation’s average life expectancy at birth with which we are 
concerned, which must include all the members of that generation who died young). What 
current moral relevance has the fact that their life expectancy at birth was fifty, when they have 
all exceeded that expectation? 
Alternatively, we might have different fair innings for each birth cohort, indexed to their own 
life expectancy at birth. This use of cohort averages is also problematic. An individual born into 
a birth cohort (S) with high rates of infant mortality, for instance, faces a lower threshold than 
someone born into a cohort (R) with high infant survival, even when those two cohorts co-exist 
in a society. Members of S who live past infancy are therefore extremely likely to pass their 
relative threshold. Yet their threshold is lower than R’s, even if members of S who survive 
infancy are more likely to make it to old age than members of R. Members of S will thus be 
subject to greater stringency at an age where members of R are not, even though that age is 
nothing exceptional for S, but is for R.  
A final approach is to stick with a single average, but defer to current QALEs, abandoning the 
‘at birth’ component of Williams’ formulation. Williams worries this will “delay the point at 
which anyone gets penalised for having more than their fair share, which means redistributing 
resources away from those less likely to survive” (1999: 124). In other words, adopting an 
average that depends on anything other than life expectancy at birth undermines the purpose of 
the fair innings as a rationing tool.49  
If we are concerned with moving resources towards those with lower projected QALEs, then 
we should adopt a sliding scale applicable to all projected QALY differences, rather than a 
sufficientarian threshold. The point of setting a threshold is to establish some point at which 
                                                     
49 Williams (1997: 124) also recognises an argument in favour of this strategy, that as living standards rise, 
“it is only right that the higher life expectancy now enjoyed by subsequent ‘cohorts’ should be shared 
with the earlier ones”.   
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lifetime QALYs make a discontinuous difference to entitlement. Within this framework, a 
higher threshold ‘than expected’ is not a reason to reject a method of setting the threshold. 
What is fair is, on this understanding, constituted by our calculated average; so we have no further 
basis on which to claim it is unfair, or the ‘wrong’ result, if this is the best way of calculating the 
average. 
At this point, however, we must consider the reasoning behind the use of population averages 
to establish a fair innings. I have assumed thus far that statistical averages are indeed a 
reasonable way to judge a fair innings. But it is not really clear why that should be. Perhaps it is 
unfair for some to have more than average because it is unequal. But this does not explain why 
there should be a discontinuous allocation principle, since it is also true that it is unequal that 
some are further below the average than others. An appeal to averages gives us an apparently 
neat, non-arbitrary level at which to set our threshold; but it fails in the other requirement of a 
sufficientarian theory, which is to tell us why breaching that threshold weakens individuals’ 
claims. What is troubling about the results described above is that we might get two people who 
have lived very similar lives, but where because of statistical accident one is said to have had a 
fair innings, and the other not. Tying the fair innings to the statistical average does not place 
enough weight on how people’s lives have actually gone. 
On the other hand, the justification of using population averages might depend on a more 
fundamental normative view of sufficiency. On this view, our appeal to population averages is 
heuristic, since those who pass the threshold are most certain to have achieved a normative fair 
innings. Passing the average QALE is merely a signal that one is likely to have led a sufficient 
life, not constitutive of having done so. The key question is not whether one has had a fair 
innings, but whether one has lived a ‘complete’ life.  
5.2.3 Projects  
Many people judge how their life is going in part by reference to the progress or completion of 
some central project(s). Some may feel that past achievement makes the prospect of their death 
less bad because they have lived a full or complete life; perhaps we can establish a 
sufficientarian threshold at this point.  
Such a view must establish how achievements complete a life. McMahan (2002: 139) suggests 
that we could see whether people would hypothetically trade some amount of additional life for 
their achievements so far. Although he does not intend it as such, one might think this could 
ground a sufficientarian threshold. Unwillingness to trade might suggest that a person judges 
their achievements as completing their life, while willingness to trade suggests their life is not yet 
complete. The problem is that this view locates the idea of a complete life in finding something 
that one would not willingly give up. But this captures the idea of necessity rather than 
sufficiency. It might be true that I see certain projects – such as particular relationships – as so 
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constitutive of my identity or as having such value that I would not give them up for any 
additional time, while not seeing them as sufficient sources of value to complete my life.  
An alternative is to insist on a more objective measure of which projects constitute a complete 
life. This inevitably faces similar problems to those faced by Callahan’s theory of meaning, as 
discussed in Chapter 1; a view which insists that people’s lives are complete, such that it is less 
problematic if they die, must cope with the fact that some people will simply reject this 
assessment of their life. So the project view must establish that most people either see or should 
see the completeness of their life in terms of the completion of projects. Neither of these claims 
is true. While some people clearly do have such a ‘completist’ stance on life, others do not, 
seeing the central value of life in terms of ongoing engagement in particular activities and 
relationships (I will call this the engagement view). Unless the project account can explain why 
these latter individuals are mistaken, or how they fit into the idea of a complete life, the 
completist stance looks like an attempt to stretch a parochial outlook beyond its bounds. 
The distinction between the completist and engagement views requires explanation, for which it 
is useful to first draw parallels with two related distinctions. The first is Strawson’s (2004) 
critique of “Narrativity”: the view that our lives both should and necessarily do involve a 
‘personal narrative’ that shapes, and perhaps even constitutes, our identity. A central plank of 
Strawson’s criticism is a rejection of the view that we must see our lives as a unified whole. 
Many of those who espouse Narrative thinking claim that we ought to see important 
connections between different parts of our lives. While there can be sub-narratives aimed at 
different ends depending on the stage of one’s life, there should also be a grand narrative aimed 
at an end that will give a overall shape to one’s life.  
Strawson reports his own sense that his life is not unified in this way, and insists that this is not 
a failing on his part. He claims that although he is aware of being the same individual as appears 
in his memories of the past, his own sense of self is “episodic”, such that “one does not figure 
oneself, considered as a self, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there 
in the (further) future”. He accepts that he is metaphysically the same person as the one who 
appears in his memories; but he has no sense of a narrative link between those two aspects of 
himself.50  
I share Strawson’s sense of disunity. I know that on some metaphysical theories of identity, 
perhaps even the most plausible, I am the same person as my much younger self; yet I do not 
see myself as ‘narratively linked’ with that individual. Although I do engage in projects at 
particular times, and some of them may be integral to my sense of myself, it is not temporally 
                                                     
50 There may be a weaker sense of narrativity along the lines that our self-conception is partly constructed 
by quasi-fictional ways of thinking about ourselves. One could have a ‘narrative’ identity in this sense 
without the ideas of connectedness and continuity between disparate parts of life that Strawson criticises, 
and which is central to my discussion.  
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extended in the way that the Narrative theory sees it. Those who live ‘episodically’ do not see 
their lives as constituted by life-spanning projects since they have little affinity with themselves 
in the distant past. They can see the value in projects as things which take time and 
commitment to finish. But they are unlikely to identify the completion of particular projects as 
making their life complete. This is not to say that they are indifferent to their future; for since 
Strawsonians may be both metaphysically and psychologically connected with themselves in the 
future, they may well have sufficient reason to care deeply about what happens to them, 
including to the extent of making sacrifices in the present. What they lack is the sense of 
narrative connection between these disparate parts, of the parts all coming together to make a 
coherent whole, or of there being significant importance to the connections between different 
parts of their life.  
Strawson also criticises the ‘ethical’ Narrativity thesis, the view that even if we do not then we 
ought to think of our lives as a Narrative, citing MacIntyre and Campbell as central proponents. 
MacIntyre suggests that “To ask ‘What is good for me?’ is to ask how best I might live out 
[narrative] unity and bring it to completion” while the unity of a life is “the unity of a narrative 
quest...[and] the only criteria for success or failure are the criteria for success or failure in a 
narrated or to-be-narrated quest”. Similarly, Campbell reports a concern, supposedly universal, 
with “what I have made of my life”. Strawson (437) find himself “bewildered” by this idea.  
Again, I share Strawson’s puzzlement. I am not concerned with what I might make of “my life” 
considered in the unified sense that Campbell and MacIntyre suggest. I am concerned with what 
I am making of myself right now, and what I might make of myself in the near future. But those 
might be very different things; and it is simply not clear why, to the extent that I do take on 
projects, it is better to be concerned with projects in Campbell’s and MacIntyre’s lifetime sense 
than in the Strawsonian sense. While Strawsonians might accept some value, perhaps even 
central value, in the completion of individual projects, they reject the Narrative view of life itself 
as a kind of grand project, which is in principle completable.   
A second distinction with useful links to the completist-engagement distinction is found in 
Overall’s (2005) discussion of the “career” and “seriatim” selves. The former is a person who 
“sets himself a course of progressive achievement...and whose orderly life testifies to his self 
discipline and individual effort”, whereas for the seriatim self, different periods “feature central 
lessons, tasks, pleasures, experiences or bonds...[which the individual appreciates] for their 
distinctiveness rather than their continuity” (173-181). The completist view seems more in line 
with Overall’s career self, who sees end-goals as defining of life, while the engagement view is 
more in line with the seriatim self, who lives more in the moment. And again, it is not the case 
that the seriatim cannot take pleasure in projects or achievements; but she does not take 
achievements in a completist sense to be the defining purpose of one’s life. 
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My distinction is not identical with Strawson’s or Overall’s. Overall’s characterisation of the 
career self is as someone who is not content to have a ‘final’ project; rather, he takes up further 
and further projects, each propelling him on. So the career self is not a completist in lifetime 
terms, although one can imagine a career self who is also a completist. Strawson’s distinction 
involves questions of personal identity that are not at the heart of the distinction I want to 
make. And while the Narrative view as Strawson characterises it typically is completist, he 
objects more centrally to other aspects of it. 
While completists view the central value in life as constituted by the achievement of certain end-
states – which may in turn lend itself to the idea that life itself is something that can and should 
be completed – the engagement view prioritises continued engagement in activities and 
relationships. Engagement differs in an important way from the completist understanding; there 
need not be a point at which one is finished with an engagement to make it fully realised. Indeed, 
it is part of the point of some forms of engagement that they resist completion. Think, for 
instance, of what could be a paradigmatically completist achievement, becoming a parent. This 
is an important event in a life, and might form part of the completist view of life. The 
engagement view focuses less on the particular event of becoming, and more on a continuing, 
evolving relationship with one’s children, ground shared with Overall’s seriatim individual. 
While the completist view is clearly able to value such engagement, it seems to value it 
derivatively as aiming towards an important end, such as ‘raising one’s children well’. Assume 
that one ceases to raise one’s children when they turn eighteen. The completist view seems to 
see this as the end at which all that engagement was aimed. The engagement view sees this point 
as significant, if at all, as a marker of a change in the way one engages with one’s child (e.g. one 
might move from a carer to a peer).   
The engagement view can certainly make sense both of the value of engaging in individual 
projects, and of the idea that it is better to have had more experience of valuable relationships 
and activities than less. The engagement view sees the harm of death in one sense as removing 
us from valuable processes that we are engaged in. But it can also accept that having had more 
time to enjoy life is better for an individual; it is not the claim that there is no normative 
difference between a short and a long life. But the engagement view does not sit easily with the 
idea of a complete life; for at least some of the processes that are central to life’s value are 
precisely not to be completed. Rather, the engagement view seems more naturally to pair with 
lifetime equalitarianism or prioritarianism; we can accept that there are requirements of justice 
relating to one’s (relative or absolute) lifetime experiences, without thinking that there is some 
threshold that marks the complete life, and so marks a point at which one’s claims become 
discontinuously weaker based on lifetime experience.  
Without the notion of completeness that grounds the fair innings threshold, the lifetime 
sufficientarian view has little appeal; we are left either with an arbitrary threshold or with 
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abandoning the idea of a lifetime threshold altogether, moving towards lifetime priority (the 
latter of which I defend in Section 5.3). Once we have abandoned the idea of a determinate 
threshold, the kinds of arguments that Williams offers, among others, suggest that any pair of 
competing individuals should be judged according to which has had greater valuable 
engagement. A lifetime prioritarian acknowledges that rationing has to occur, and insists on 
some level of preference for those who have had less overall; a sufficientarian view also takes 
that perspective but, in utilising an upper threshold, insists that it is distinctively bad to die 
before it, whereas the deaths of those above the threshold cannot be too bad, since they have 
had enough anyway. This stance denies the enormity (an enormity that is not lessened by the 
fact that it is commonplace, or necessary) of a decision to allow someone to die by claiming that 
it is distinctively unproblematic for certain people to die, regardless of how they feel about it.   
5.2.4 A subjective lifetime threshold? 
Chapter 4 argued that time-relative sufficientarianism should be based on an underlying 
normative appeal to subjective attitudes such as tolerability and worthwhileness, even if we must 
for pragmatic reasons rely on certain generalisations at the level of policy. Perhaps lifetime 
sufficientarians could make a similarly subjective move, and claim that someone’s life is 
complete simply when they judge it to be so. This would avoid the issue of fundamental 
disagreement associated with other lifetime sufficientarian views.  
However, there is a problem with relying on such subjective assessments when it comes to 
lifetimes that does not affect a time-relative application. Individuals’ subjective assessments of 
particular times – and indeed periods of time such as an entire life – often change depending on 
when the assessment takes place. Given this conflict, we need to decide which assessment to 
consider normatively authoritative. For assessments of particular times, there is an obvious 
choice: we should look to the individual’s view at the time in question. What is relevant is 
whether her experience is, for instance, actually tolerable to her then, not whether she deems it 
tolerable at some other time.  
But it is less clear if there is a single, obvious perspective for the normatively authoritative 
assessment of lifetimes. It may seem that the obvious choice is to rely on the individual’s 
assessment at the point at which we deciding whether she has lived a complete life i.e. when she 
requires life-extending treatment. But this is problematic. A judgement about whether one’s life 
is complete will depend fundamentally on one’s assessments of particular periods. And people’s 
attitudes to particular periods or events in their pasts can change radically, not only due to 
imperfect memory and psychological bias (see e.g. Kahnemann, 2011) but also in a 
fundamentally normative way.  
Consider a particular act that an individual S committed in her youth. At the time, she regards it 
as deeply shameful, and resolves that her life will be incomplete unless she atones for it. In her 
old age, however, her normative profile has changed sufficiently that not only is she not 
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ashamed, but is in fact proud of her behaviour. So her life is complete according to her elderly 
assessment, but deeply incomplete according to her youth. The question is why we should 
accept as authoritative the elderly person’s assessment. What we want to know is whether they 
have had a complete life, not whether they consider themselves to have had a complete life. And 
I suggest that, if neither view is authoritative, there is no fact of the matter about whether S’s 
life is complete. This is not a mere problem of measurement; it is not that one might make a 
mistake in assessing how one’s life has gone. Rather, it is that there is no reason to regard even a 
clear-minded assessment as authoritative. We are considering a lifetime principle; that principle 
should be concerned with how a life actually went, not how it seems to have gone in retrospect.  
In assessing how a life has actually gone, we might aggregate or sum the particular momentary 
assessments to get a lifetime assessment, relying on an agent’s assessments at the time rather 
than in retrospect. But while this helps prioritarians and equalitarians, it is little use for lifetime 
sufficientarians. Prioritarians and equalitarians are interested in (respectively, absolute and 
comparative) totals; on an aggregative assessment, we can say in principle what the total amount 
of worthwhile or tolerable time in someone’s life was. But a sufficientarian view requires a 
further, normative assessment of whether that total is itself sufficient. If this depends on a 
further subjective assessment by the individual of whether they regard that total as worthwhile 
or tolerable, or whether they are content with it, this reintroduces the above problem. Why 
should their assessment now be regarded as authoritative?  
One response is, because it is now that we are asking people whether they are ready to die. But 
that makes it puzzling why we should rely on the idea of lifetime sufficiency at all, rather than 
directly on the question of the individual’s desire to live or readiness to die.51 That may be 
informed by a current sense that one has had a sufficient life; but that is a fundamentally 
different normative basis from the claim that there actually is some principled subjective 
determinant of a sufficient life.  
More practically, such a subjective lifetime principle raises the possibility that some individuals 
would never achieve a fair innings because they will never judge their lives to be complete. This 
raises a corresponding worry for time-relative sufficientarianism which I did not consider in the 
previous chapter. If people have stronger claims when they are below a subjective threshold at 
particular times, isn’t there a danger of some people’s thresholds of tolerability or 
worthwhileness being so high that they place unreasonable demands on the rest of us? Just as 
lifetime sufficientarians will get only limited rationing capacity from a strongly subjective 
                                                     
51 This should not involve reliance on patients’ stated willingness to die as an explicit rationing tool, simply 
because stated willingness can come from other reasons than actual readiness, such as a feeling that one is 
a burden. And perhaps if genuine readiness to die is otherwise impossible to measure, such a principle is 
unlikely to be translatable into policy.  
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lifetime threshold, aren’t time-relative sufficientarians opening themselves up to effectively 
endless commitments? 
It is possible that some individuals will have genuinely high thresholds for tolerability or worth. 
A time-relative sufficientarian must find a way to acknowledge these claims without allowing 
such individuals to dictate allocations to their own benefit at the cost of many others. This is 
perhaps especially worrying because of the phenomenon of elastic preferences. We tend to 
adapt to new situations in two ways. We often adjust to a drop in living standards by coming to 
find what we previously deemed intolerable to be tolerable. But the reverse also seems to be 
true; when our standard of living increases, our notion of what is normal, and even tolerable, 
often rises with it. Locating special claims in the notion of tolerability might thus seem likely to 
reinforce unfair inequalities in living standards on the ground that the better off will find 
intolerable situations that the worse off will not.  
It is open to time-relative sufficientarians to rest some significance on the length of time that 
someone will spend below the threshold; so even if someone finds a drop in living standards 
temporarily intolerable or worthless, this will not strengthen her claim to the same degree as a 
drop to standards that the rest of us might regard as permanently so. Nonetheless, this response 
does acknowledge some stronger claims on the part of this person. But sufficientarians should 
also be quite strict with their notions of subjective tolerability and worth. Feeling squeamish or 
unhappy about your situation is not the same as finding it intolerable. Finding that one’s life is 
not as one had hoped is not equivalent to considering it not worthwhile. Put in these terms, the 
phenomenon of elastic preferences looks less threatening; many people who claim to find just 
any reduction of high living standards intolerable or worthless are being insincere, or 
exaggerating. 
Moreover, time-relative sufficientarians need not necessarily feel embarrassed about seeing a 
stronger reason to help someone who finds intolerable or non-worthwhile a situation the rest of 
us do not. Sufficientarians may need to bite a bullet and accept that someone who genuinely 
finds their situation intolerable does have a stronger claim on our help than someone who does 
not, even if the former appears to have a better life than the latter.52 Since the view does not 
commit us to an absolute obligation to help, such claims can still be outweighed by 
considerations of efficiency, for instance.  
Subjective lifetime sufficientarians might make a similar move, and claim that although 
individuals’ assessments of whether their life is complete are fundamentally important, we are 
entitled for reasons of efficiency to deny treatment to some individuals who do not feel that 
they have achieved a complete life. And of course that is true; when we cannot help everyone, 
we sometimes need to deny legitimate claims. But the fundamental difference between the 
                                                     
52 Note that this aid need not involve restoring someone to their previous lifestyle, but could instead 
involve helping them to adjust to their new situation with which they are struggling to cope.  
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lifetime and time-relative views in this regard is that while the notions of tolerability and 
worthwhileness apply to everyone, even if they make these judgements at different points, the 
very metric inherent in the lifetime sufficientarian view – the complete life – seems not to apply 
for many people. So while time-relative sufficientarians face a (considerable) problem of 
efficiency in applying their principle, complete life theorists are attempting to implement a 
normative vision on individuals to whom it does not apply. The idea of a complete life, while it 
appeals to some, seems inapplicable to many people: as Harris (2002a: 19) puts it, “Apart from 
convenience it is difficult to see how fair innings conceptions of the value of life or the 
entitlement to live could be imposed on those who don’t accept them”.  
5.3 Priority 
Neither a statistical, normative, nor subjective view of lifetime sufficiency is plausible. Since I 
have argued that lifetime equalitarianism cannot represent our fundamental concerns even at its 
most plausible, lifetime prioritarianism is the only option left if we are to adhere to any form of 
lifetime egalitarianism. Of course, I also think that there are positive arguments in favour of this 
view. The appeal of lifetime prioritarianism is very similar to the appeal of time-relative 
prioritarianism; if one aim of a social system of benefits is to try to make things go as well as 
possible for individuals, given their competing concerns, then those whose lives are absolutely 
worse have a prima facie stronger claim on benefits. The central reason for abandoning time-
relative priority for time-relative sufficiency is that priority alone struggles to reconcile distinct 
claims of hardship, responsibility and intrapersonal compensation. But I will argue that the 
lifetime view can accommodate this tension. 
Lifetime prioritarians claim that individuals’ claims become stronger as their overall lives are 
absolutely worse. This relationship proceeds in a continuous manner, unlike the discontinuities 
associated with sufficientarianism. The strength of someone’s claim is based on their absolute 
position; but of course, even though prioritarianism is not fundamentally concerned with 
relative positions, conditions of scarcity mean that we must compare absolute claims and assess 
their relative strengths. Under such conditions – which are the conditions of society – those 
whose lives will be absolutely worse overall can appeal to the idea that it is their turn to benefit 
in a competition with those whose lives will be absolutely better overall. Since the latter will 
have better lives overall, more of their claims have been met; so those with absolutely worse 
lives have stronger claims on the basis that it is their turn to benefit, even if the good will be of 
equal benefit to either person.  
Lifetime prioritarianism applies even if everyone is very well off. This idea may seem a mark 
against the theory; surely, sufficientarians might insist, there comes a point when people’s lives 
are good enough, and we have no reason whatsoever to help them. But even if one’s life is very 
good, it could usually be better, simply by adding more of the same good i.e. by extending it. 
And I see no reason to reject someone’s claim to their life being made better in this way except 
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insofar as others have stronger claims. It may be that some people reach a point where their 
lives cannot be made better, either because they are ‘saturated’ by existence (as Elina was in 
Chapter 1), or because they are simply in an irremediable health position. But then 
prioritarianism also faces no problem, because people cannot have claims on benefits that do 
not exist; and if we cannot benefit someone, then no benefit exists to which they have a claim. 
Prioritarianism also need not suggest that there is anything particularly pressing about the claims 
of the well off. While equalitarianism must insist that there is something morally amiss about 
the position of the relatively worst off, even if they are absolutely very well off, prioritarianism 
simply insists that those who are absolutely worst off in a particular distribution have stronger 
claims than those who are best off; but the claims of even the worst off in a utopia could be 
weaker than the claims of all but the very best off in the actual world. In fact, it may be that 
these claims are so weak that they are outweighed by factors that are not sufficient to outweigh 
most distributive claims in the actual world, e.g. the efficiency costs of working out who is 
among the worst off; the property claims of the best off; or simply the effort of whomever has 
to engage in distribution. Lifetime prioritarianism need not claim that we must benefit even the 
very well off whenever we can.  
Having rejected time-relative prioritarianism in Chapter 4 due to a tension between hardship on 
one hand, and compensation and responsibility on the other, one might worry that the same 
reasons should lead us to reject the principle on a lifetime basis. However, I will now suggest 
that, just as the switch from the time-relative to the lifetime scope weakened the plausibility of 
sufficientarianism, the same switch allows prioritarianism to surmount the problems it faces at 
the time-relative level. 
5.3.1 How lifetime prioritarianism accommodates the tension 
If S sacrifices her position at a particular time in return for being better off later, part of what 
makes it seem odd to grant her a stronger claim is that her sacrifice makes her life overall better. 
This is the crux of Bou-Habib’s compensation condition. People balance benefits and harms 
across time; if we interfere to make sure that they are not any worse off after making sacrifices, 
we would either have to ban such compensating trade-offs, leaving the connection between our 
view of justice and individuals’ views of their own good rather suspect; or we would have to 
commit to funding all gambles and pragmatically rational trade-offs, an unsustainable policy that 
generates numerous moral hazards. 
The plausibility of the compensation condition depends in part on the ability to appeal to a 
‘bigger picture’; while S is worse off now, she will (or at least can reasonably expect to) be better 
off overall. One way to differentiate time-relative and lifetime prioritarianism is to insist that 
lifetime assessments lack such a broader context, since a lifetime is the broadest (personal) 
context there is. We defer to the fact that S’s life improves to justify not intervening in the 
sacrifices she makes at particular times; but it may seem that there is no broader perspective that 
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gets better for S when her life goes worse overall. If so, compensatory tradeoffs would be 
impossible in a lifetime sense, and so one of the central complications to a prioritarian view 
would not trouble lifetime prioritarianism. 
But this argument misses an important fact, that people can reasonably sacrifice some lifetime 
value for extra value at particular times. Indeed, the situation seems roughly parallel; in one case 
S sacrifices current gain for a greater future good, and in the other she sacrifices a greater future 
good (thus worsening her life overall) for the benefit of gaining now. Some have suggested that 
the latter decision is clearly irrational since it violates the ‘objective’ principle of having equal 
concern for all points in one’s life (e.g. de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014: 126-127). As I have 
suggested, I suspect that our relationship with different parts of our lives is more complicated 
than such temporal neutrality supposes. But even if the neutralist view is correct, temporal 
neutralists must acknowledge that the future is subject to greater uncertainty than the present; 
so some discounting of future benefits is rational. More importantly, the irrationality of a 
decision is not sufficient to generate an obligation to intervene in every such case. The 
compensation condition relies on our sense that people should be allowed to make the trade-
offs that appear reasonable to them; there is no stipulation that those trade-offs must conform 
strictly to rationality. So the above attempt to draw a distinction between lifetime and time-
relative prioritarianism will not work. 
However, there is still a relevant distinction between the two principles, with regard to the 
relationship between compensation, insufficiency and responsibility. Lifetime prioritarians can 
claim that when a change in S’s circumstances has the effect of making her life worse, she 
acquires a stronger claim against us unless the reduction is down to S’s exercise of her 
responsibility, or intra-personal compensation. This makes room for both of these notions 
within a prioritarian framework. I rejected a similar response for time-relative prioritarians 
because it ignores significant hardship. But this problem does not arise for lifetime 
prioritarianism. For unlike time-relative prioritarianism, lifetime prioritarianism can itself be 
constrained by time-relative sufficiency. Lifetime prioritarians can say that when S’s life gets 
worse due to exercises of personal responsibility, she does not acquire the usual stronger claims 
unless those reductions bring S below time-relative sufficiency. This allows for responsibility and 
compensation, but without the problematic implications surrounding hardship which affect 
time-relative prioritarianism.  
Could time-relative prioritarians make an analogous move, and appeal to lifetime 
sufficientarianism? My discussion of lifetime sufficiency in Section 5.2 focused on the idea of an 
upper threshold, but lifetime sufficientarians might also insist on a lower threshold. At least in 
some cases, a lower lifetime threshold avoids some of the problems associated with this view. 
To take an extreme instance, it seems unproblematic to suggest that an individual who has had 
no tolerable moments in her life, and dies very young, has not had a sufficient life. We do not 
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need to appeal to the idea of a complete life, or statistical averages, to make sense of this. So, 
time-relative prioritarians might argue that they can respect a concern with hardship. This view 
would say that when people are worse off at particular times, they have stronger claims to 
benefits unless they are responsible for their position, or will be compensated at another time. 
This would apply even if they were very badly off at that time. However, if their decisions 
meant that they would live an insufficient life, then our concern with hardship should intervene, 
and we should prevent their decision or compensate them sufficiently to make their life 
tolerable again.   
However, while this view is more plausible than the argument for an upper lifetime threshold, it 
still faces at least one problem associated with that view. I claimed that the lifetime 
sufficientarian faces a problem in choosing a particular point from which to assess a life. This 
applies to the assessment of whether that life is tolerable just as much as it does to the issue of 
whether it is complete. While there may be some extremely intuitive cases – e.g. an individual 
who has no tolerable moments in her life can be assumed to regard her life as intolerable from 
every vantage point – other cases face the same theoretical problem.  
Even if this worry is surmountable, a view constraining time-relative priority with lifetime 
sufficiency seems to miss the point of a concern with hardship. While our concern with the fact 
that some people suffer extremely bad lives can be reduced to a concern that they suffer from 
time-relative insufficiency at so many times, a concern with a lower lifetime threshold seems to 
miss many relevant instances of hardship. Imagine a person nearing the end of her life. She may 
have had a very good life, sufficient to regard it as on balance tolerable. If in her final years she 
suffers tremendous hardship, a view that is concerned with insufficiency only in a lifetime sense 
misses something of great moral importance, which is her current hardship. So even if there are 
no theoretical impediments to a view that constrains time-relative priority with a lower lifetime 
boundary, it does not seem to me to capture the concerns that motivate having a separate time-
relative principle in the first place. On the other hand, the opposite view that constrains lifetime 
priority with an appeal to sufficiency at times captures those concerns very well.   
5.4 Summary 
This chapter considered various options for a lifetime distributive principle. I rejected one 
version of lifetime equalitarianism on the grounds that it recommends levelling down. I 
accepted that people do have some claims of justice on the basis of relative position, as 
suggested by Persson’s ‘relative priority’ version of equalitarianism, but insisted that our 
fundamental concern should be with absolute positions. I then considered three ways of 
justifying lifetime sufficientarianism, each of which grounded a distinct form of the Egalitarian 
Objection. The first rested on the idea of statistical averages, but failed to explain why an above 
average life should be considered sufficient. The second relied on a normative idea of projects; I 
suggested several problems for this position, the most fundamental of which is that it relies on a 
92 
 
view of a complete life that seems alien to some people. The third set lifetime sufficiency by 
appeal to subjective assessment; this view faced significant problems that a time-relative version 
of that appeal does not. Finally, I suggested that lifetime prioritarianism can avoid the problems 
associated with time-relative prioritarianism; it does so by working in tandem with time-relative 
sufficientarianism, which justifies my choice of SP as a distributive scheme covering both 
lifetime and time-relative claims.  
While I have considered the implications of both lifetime equalitarianism and sufficientarianism 
for the Egalitarian Objection, I have explicitly avoided doing so in this chapter for lifetime 
prioritarianism. This is because, having now taken a position on both the time-relative and 
lifetime rules, it makes more sense to consider them together, and how they relate, when 























Chapter 6: The Egalitarian Objection – Interaction of principles 
I have advocated concern for sufficiency at times, and priority for those whose lives go worse 
overall. This chapter considers how these principles relate. One option is to treat lifetime 
priority as fundamental, always preferring those with worse lives, but with time-relative 
sufficiency deciding between equally bad lifetimes. This ignores hardship too readily; many who 
suffer insufficiency at particular times are not among the worst off in lifetime terms. Making 
lifetime priority lexically more important than time-relative sufficiency effectively consigns the 
latter to irrelevance. Alternatively, we might take time-relative sufficiency as fundamental, and 
use lifetime priority as a tie-breaker. We would have particularly strong obligations to help those 
who were currently badly off, but if we could not help everyone in that situation, we prefer 
those with worse lives overall. Huesch (2012) suggests a resourcist version of this view, while 
Overall (2009: 335) seems to favour an opportunist version, although her view is complicated 
by a concern with reparative justice, which I discuss in Section 6.4. A tie-breaking view needn’t 
rule out ageing enhancement in principle, but might severely restrict it in practice if beneficiaries 
will primarily be among the best off in lifetime terms, and we could typically divert resources to 
life-extending interventions for those with worse lives.  
Section 6.1 considers a version of the Egalitarian Objection based on this prioritarian tie-break 
view and the idea of fair turns. I acknowledge that this is a plausible way to combine these 
principles, but suggest that the use of lifetime priority as a tiebreaker among the very badly off is 
problematic. Section 6.2 considers one explanation of this, Daniels’ claim that healthcare is 
‘special’, but rejects it as being unable to accommodate the role of social determinants of health. 
However, Section 6.3 argues that we can explain why it is inappropriate to use lifetime 
tiebreakers in particular cases of ‘rescue’. Section 6.3.1 fills in the idea of rescue in the light of 
several recent criticisms of that concept. Section 6.3.2 outlines a different role for lifetime 
priority based on more general allocation, and considers some prioritarian concerns based on 
financial access to ageing enhancement that might undermine the justification for the state 
investing in it, while Section 6.3.3 considers how the state should react to private investment 
and use. Finally, Section 6.4 considers how we should incorporate healthcare distributions in 
responding to existing and past injustice.  
6.1 Fair turns  
Huesch contrasts the fair innings with a “fair turn at the bat”, which involves giving people 
equal levels of medical resources whether or not those resources give someone a ‘reasonable’ 
lifespan. The idea of turns has obvious connections with my account, outlined in Section 5.4, of 
how prioritarians can approach comparative claims. This principle is focused solely on 
healthcare-related resource consumption (Huesch addresses organ transplants, but intends the 
idea to apply more widely) when considering access to future healthcare resources. Huesch 
acknowledges that this may seem unfair, since many people who have high consumption of 
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medical resources do so because of material, social or physical disadvantage, but considers this a 
first step toward a broader rationing based on resource consumption in general. This is a 
mistake because his principle would exacerbate existing inequity, and hence take us further from 
a fair distribution; if we implement prioritarian rationing, it must have a broader scope than 
medical consumption, reflecting as comprehensive a lifetime assessment as possible.   
It is important at this point to note two broad distinctions that emerge in the allocation of 
resources, particularly relevant in healthcare. One is the distinction between micro-allocations – 
deciding whom among individual competitors should receive some treatment, e.g. a new heart 
when only one is currently available – and macro-allocations, which cover broader spending 
decisions and funding programmes.53 The former must take place within context of the latter.  
The other distinction is that between divisible and indivisible resources. Some resources are 
obviously indivisible; even if two individuals are equally good candidates for an organ, we 
cannot usefully split it in two. But a seemingly clear example of a divisible resource, money, is 
not so simple. While money can be divided in very fine-grained ways, this cannot always be true 
in spending decisions. If two people compete for the funding of their treatment, and the money 
allocated by a macro-allocation is not sufficient to cover both of them, splitting the money 
between them would be almost as unhelpful as offering them half an organ each. Money is 
more obviously divisible (though not infinitely so) in the context of macro-allocations. Deciding 
that one group of patients or condition has a stronger claim than another does not necessitate 
that they get all the relevant financial resources; saying that group R has a stronger claim than 
group S does not entail that all members of R should be treated before all members of S. 
I will initially assume that the fair turn view would implement turns in both micro- and macro-
allocations, and for both divisible and indivisible resources. This has two possible implications 
for ageing enhancement. First, if beneficiaries of ageing enhancement are likely to be among the 
best off, this view might oppose macro-funding of enhancement since many potential 
beneficiaries have had their turn. Second, even if we ignored this macro-level possibility, a 
strong insistence on turns would mean ageing enhancement was unavailable for the best off at 
the micro-level, since worse off patients would always have a stronger claim, and so availability 
would be restricted to a subset of the population.  
I will argue that, contrary to this view, the idea of fair turns should not prompt us to use lifetime 
priority as an automatic tie-breaker in cases where competitors risk ‘irremediable insufficiency’, 
which includes those covered by ageing enhancement. However, this does not mean that 
lifetime priority has no role to play; at the micro-level, it is theoretically permissible to allow 
lifetime priority to affect patients’ weighted chances of accessing scarce resources, although this 
faces practical difficulties; in the case of divisible resources, such cases can allow lifetime priority 
                                                     
53 This is somewhat simplified, since macro-allocations also cover decisions about the overall health 
budget in relation to other expenditure as well.  
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to affect proportional spending at the macro level i.e. to allocate greater priority to health 
spending on groups whose lifetime positions are worse, which may include the very young.   
Rejecting the role of lifetime priority as a tiebreaker in some cases does not mean rejecting it as 
a tiebreaker in all cases. Lifetime priority is certainly relevant when people are above time-
relative sufficiency, and might be used as a tiebreaker in these cases for indivisible goods; when 
two people are at the same level at a particular time, we should automatically prefer to allocate a 
benefit to the one with the worse life, where possible. However, things are different in at least 
some cases where people are below the lower sufficiency threshold, or at risk of becoming so. 
These are circumstances when we ought not to use lifetime priority as a tiebreaker. Section 6.2 
considers an initial approach to the idea that at least some time-relative allocations should be 
immune from lifetime considerations. This is Daniels’ view that our allocation of healthcare – 
and more recently other health determinants – is ‘special’. My own account in Section 6.3 takes 
its cue from where Daniels’ account goes wrong.  
6.2 Is healthcare special?  
Daniels (1981: 146; 2007: 18) claims that we are, and ought to be, less tolerant of inequalities in 
healthcare than in other goods, and that this implies that healthcare is in some way ‘special’ 
because of the relationship between health and basic opportunity. Segall (2007: 346) suggests 
that, for Daniels, this idea extends to rejecting the exclusion of those who have had good lives 
on egalitarian grounds, as a tie-breaking prioritarian view might do, and implies that healthcare 
distribution should be isolated to some degree from distribution of other goods.  
This position looks unstable. If healthcare is special because of its effects on health and hence 
opportunity, other factors that affect health and so have similar effects on opportunity are 
special too. The ‘social determinants of health’ (SDH) are such factors: we now recognise the 
broad array of determinants that can affect health, including wealth, housing, education, 
sanitation, and social status. As Wilson (2009) notes, Daniels might extend ‘special’ status to 
SDH; but while we plausibly value healthcare only for its impact on health, SDH comprise most 
of the goods in which we have prior interest from the perspective of distributive justice, for 
reasons independent of their impact on health.  
Wilson assumes that isolating SDH and healthcare would involve isolating them collectively from 
our mainstream distribution, but not from one another. This is a plausible reading of Daniels; 
the reason for isolation is the effect of SDH on a single factor, health, because of its 
fundamental relation to opportunity. ‘Collective isolation’ would allow interactions between 
determinants of health, but not interactions between these determinants and our more general 
distribution.  
However, if we isolate everything that falls under SDH from our ‘general’ theory, the latter 
hardly deserves to be called general any more. Once we have stripped out everything that has 
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some effect on health, little is left. If almost everything is ‘special’, the term seems to have lost 
its meaning. Wilson also demonstrates that on this collective isolation theory we could not allow 
transfers between different SDH on the basis of anything other than their impact on health. 
Allowing transfers on other grounds, such as fairness, would bring our SDH distribution back 
into contact with the general distribution. Yet egalitarians typically want to compensate for a 
lack of some social goods quite independently of their effect on health; even if we agree with 
Daniels that health is special, it is surely not that special. Finally, because income is a SDH, 
collective isolation rejects a stance that motivated the specialness thesis in the first place, at least 
for Daniels: that access to healthcare should not depend on wealth, for rich or poor. Since 
wealth is a SDH, a policy of collective isolation should allow transfers in healthcare to balance 
out inequities in wealth, to the extent that the latter affect health. The flipside of isolating so 
much from the general theory, on this reading, is that relatively little gets truly isolated.  
Daniels might instead claim that we should isolate SDH and healthcare even from one another. 
This would reintroduce the idea that lifetime resource consumption should not reduce 
entitlement to healthcare. But such a stark isolation introduces an even worse version of one of 
Wilson’s objections, for now we cannot even allow interactions between SDH when it would 
improve people’s health. We would have to distribute each determinant, including healthcare, 
on the basis of its individual impact on health, even if allowing interactions would improve 
collective health, or lead to a fairer distribution in Daniels’ preferred opportunity terms. 
Daniels has responded to these worries, saying that all he means by the specialness claim is that 
healthcare makes a “significant contribution to something of central importance” i.e. 
opportunity (2009: 37-38). Specialness explains why we feel the need “to meet health needs 
more equally than we do preferences for many other goods”. But this sounds rather like the 
claim that the distribution of healthcare should be isolated from other distributive 
considerations, which is what was problematic to begin with. Daniels agrees that calling SDH 
special as well risks “trivialising the claim about special importance”. But he does not address 
the further issue of whether this impugns our practice of meeting healthcare needs ‘more 
equally’. If that ‘more equally’ does not imply that we should consider health needs in (perhaps 
partial) isolation from other claims, I am not clear what it does mean. But if it does mean that, 
then the refusal to isolate SDH, while acknowledging that they also play a similar role to 
healthcare in determining opportunity, is unjustified.  
The only way we can avoid this arbitrariness is by finding a feature of healthcare that is not 
shared by SDH. I do not think that such a feature is generically available. The next section 
instead suggests that we can explain the appeal of our sense that we should not exclude people 
on the basis of lifetime considerations from some forms of healthcare, namely those that 
constitute rescue. However, this category clearly applies to some interventions in SDH as well, 
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and so does not challenge Wilson’s claim that we cannot maintain a neat line between 
‘healthcare’ and other interventions or goods.   
6.3 Rescue and turns 
I suggested in Section 5.3 that deciding between competing claims according to lifetime 
prioritarianism can be understood in part by reference to the idea of turns. Huesch’s proposal 
clearly makes use of this idea, suggesting that in the context of resource scarcity, those who 
have already received some medical resources have had their fair turn. The version of SP under 
consideration, then, operates a two stage process. Time-relative sufficientarianism considers 
whose claims are of particular urgency; lifetime priority then acts as a tie-break by appealing to 
turns among those people. If competitors have similar claims based on their time-relative 
position – both will die without intervention, say – prioritarian turn-based claims are decisive. 
But using lifetime priority as a tie-breaker is inappropriate in an important subset of cases. In 
many cases where an appeal to turns seems appropriate, even in cases where the costs of its not 
being your turn are significant, the individual who is not selected for a benefit nonetheless 
retains the possibility of benefitting later on, or of their position improving in some other way. 
In other words, their position remains remediable. I will suggest that when people compete to 
avoid dropping irremediably below sufficiency, the application of turns, at least as an automatic 
tie-breaker, is no longer appropriate. If the idea of turns is a plausible feature of distributive 
justice then, I will argue, we should isolate the allocation of some interventions that rescue people 
from irremediably falling below sufficiency from such turn-taking considerations. Such cases 
involve a potentially final chance for someone to avoid falling below an important threshold. 
An insistence on turns even in such cases fails to recognise the finality of the situation that 
competing individuals find themselves in when they require rescue. Death is a clear example of 
this kind of case, but access to palliative relief from considerable pain also fits this model. 
Why is it inappropriate to apply prioritarian tie-breakers in such cases? Consider some 
indivisible set of lifesaving resources for which S and R are competing. Both have equal time-
relative claims for aid, but S has had less in lifetime terms, either because she has a worse quality 
of life, or because she has had the same quality of life but is younger. Using lifetime priority as a 
tiebreaker automatically allocates the resources to S. When it comes to divisible resources, 
things may seem different; tie-breaking does not recommend giving all resources to S, only what 
she requires so she can avoid insufficiency. So it may seem that a tie-breaking allocation permits 
us to give (some of) the remainder to R, and perhaps this will be enough to save him too. But 
this is misleading. When S is treated, R’s claim becomes stronger than S’s on the grounds of 
sufficiency; even if S still has the worse life, her time-relative status now fails to qualify her for 
consideration.  
But to justify benefitting R under a tie-break system, we would need some reason to restrict R’s 
competition to S alone. In some cases this is well motivated. When the relevant resources – 
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such as organs – are not durable, once S benefits from them we may help R or nobody. In such 
cases, we have a principled reason of efficiency to restrict our competition to S and R. But many 
resources, including money, are durable; so R’s claim must also compete with the claims of 
those who will face insufficiency in the future, and will be worse off than R is now in a lifetime 
sense. If lifetime priority is an absolute tiebreaker, we have little reason to offer resources to R 
under a tie-breaking principle if they can later be used to help someone who is worse off in a 
lifetime sense. The only possible reason we could have involves an appeal to the comparative 
certainty of R’s need; he is right in front of us, and we can definitely help him. But given the 
prevalence of healthcare needs in the world, this consideration is sufficiently weak that we can 
ignore it; there is almost certain to be someone in the future whom we can help, and who has a 
stronger lifetime claim than R does. As such, using lifetime priority as a tie-breaker effectively 
excludes the best off from a great deal of public healthcare treatment entirely, since they will 
always compete with someone, perhaps in the future, who has an equal time-relative claim, but a 
greater lifetime claim. 
A prioritarian tie-break view assumes that since S and R have equal claims from one perspective 
(time-relative sufficiency), these claims simply cancel one another out; fair distribution thus 
depends entirely on their claims in another area (lifetime priority). Since S’s claim is stronger 
than R’s in the latter respect, she automatically wins if we aggregate their claims. But this 
completely ignores R’s time-relative claim,54 even though it is based on a morally considerable 
feature of his situation. A fully aggregative view of claims negates the moral importance of 
significant claims when they are equal.  
An alternative, non-aggregative view sees the various claims that an individual might make as 
distinct, and not fully commensurable. It denies that whenever people are tied on the basis of 
some morally important claim to a good, we may or must turn to some other claim – on the 
basis of which they are unequal – to comprehensively decide the matter. As Munoz-Dardé 
(2005: 200) puts it “two reasons may sometimes combine, but reasons do not become 
conclusive by juxtaposition”.  
Claims based on lifetime priority do not speak to the same kinds of concern as those based on 
irremediable insufficiency. From the lifetime perspective, ageing enhancement can be seen 
primarily as extending life, i.e. adding years to a running total. And perhaps from this 
perspective it makes sense to say that stronger claims go to those who have had less of the 
relevant good (which is not, I have suggested, the number of years one lives itself, but may be 
somewhat correlated with that measure). Many opponents of the Egalitarian Objection seem to 
                                                     
54 Taurek (1977) makes a related claim with regard to whether the number of lives to be saved should 
count; he suggests that we should give an equal chance to groups that compete for benefits no matter 




view ageing enhancement solely from a lifetime perspective i.e. as a bonus addition of years 
onto an already lengthy life. But this is not the only perspective from which we should view 
ageing enhancement, for it also averts irremediable insufficiency at particular times.55 From this 
perspective, ageing enhancement protects a morally distinct core of interests which, once lost, 
cannot be regained. It is true that each of us will eventually lose this core, for we will all die 
some day; but from a time-relative perspective, our concern is with particular times. Just 
because I must die in the future, that does not mean that I do not have a strong, morally 
relevant interest in not dying now.   
So, having lifetime priority decide matters as a tie-breaker ignores the distinctive strength of R’s 
sufficientarian claim. However, this does not mean that we should only consider time-relative 
claims; this would face the reverse problem, ignoring S’s stronger lifetime claim that reflects 
something morally important. Ideally, then, allocations would respect both time-relative and 
lifetime claims, even in cases where only one individual can benefit. One option is to give higher 
weighted chances to be selected for a benefit to those who have stronger prioritarian claims, 
including those with lower prioritarian claims, but with a lower weighting; this allows some role 
for lifetime priority, but also recognises the importance of time-relative sufficiency by giving all 
those with a time-relative claim a chance to benefit.56  
The thought behind this is that if people have equal claims, they should receive an equal chance; 
so a move to unequal, but still sizeable claims should prompt us not to act as if one person’s 
claim has been eliminated entirely, as appealing to prioritarian tie-breakers would, but to move 
to unequal chances. For instance, if flipping a fair coin would in principle be a fair way to decide 
between two patients with equal claims – giving them a 50:50 chance – then for two patients 
with equal time-relative claims, but unequal lifetime claims, we would move to a weighted 
lottery that gave both patients some weight due to their time-relative claims, but greater weight 
to S proportional to the greater strength of her lifetime claim. 
There are practical issues of efficiency in executing a weighted lottery every time a patient 
conflict arises for indivisible resources, particularly in emergency situations. It is more feasible 
to allocate greater weight for patients on the basis of lifetime priority for treatments that are 
allocated by waiting lists – a category which could include ageing enhancement if it is widely 
                                                     
55 This is not to say that a time-relative stance is unaffected by longer-term considerations. If we are to 
avoid bias towards the present, then we will prefer interventions at stages that protect sufficiency at 
multiple times. An effective anti-ageing intervention might be one such intervention, but this may also 
imply some preference for interventions at particular stages of childhood since, as Powers and Fader 
(2006: 186) point out, “Without a sufficient level of health in childhood, systematic constraints on well-
being that are inescapable are locked in at an early age.”  
56 For a related proposal on how group size should count, see Kavka (1979: 293); Timmerman (2004); 
Saunders (2009).   
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adopted – as one of a number of features that determine priority. However, there are still 
problems with applying weighting to micro-allocations even in these more congenial 
circumstances, many of which are related to those brought against Williams’ use of lifetime 
QALYs considered in Chapter 5. I raised the issue of excessive epistemic and bureaucratic 
demand on institutions in assessing entire lifetimes of welfare or opportunity for individuals. If 
we move from QALYs – which adjust life years only by reference to particular health 
conditions – to a more general assessment of all life experience, this problem increases 
enormously. I also raised the worry that in practice, such a policy might end up relying on 
numerical age as a heuristic, undermining the purpose of quality-adjustment. As I said, there 
may be more reliable general indicators of lifetime quality, such as poverty, though this would 
be a move from having individual lifetime priority decide one’s claims, to a reliance on more 
general indicators that may not correlate with lifetime priority in some cases.  
There are also concerns about the political and social effects of such a distributive system. At 
least in the UK, the presence of a national health service that assesses patients largely on the 
basis of need at the micro-level is of considerable social importance, being expressive of the 
equal regard of the state for its citizens, while public support for such important institutions 
may be partly dependent on their universal credentials. Even if there are good reasons of 
distributive justice to offer preferential access to the worse off, there may be reasons relating to 
other public goods, such as equal respect, to avoid such an explicit policy at the level of 
individual patients. On the other hand, the worst off might rightly complain that equality of 
consideration at one stage despite considerable inequality elsewhere is only superficially 
respectful of their status as citizens. A corresponding worry is that relying on patients being able 
to demonstrate at the individual level that they are badly off in lifetime terms in order to gain 
priority access to treatment can be stigmatising (see e.g. Wolff, 1998; Anderson, 1999); quizzing 
patients on intimate details of their lives, or even categorising them as having had bad lives, may 
be humiliating and degrading even if it is not intended as such.  
None of these concerns speaks conclusively against some prioritarian weighting in micro-
allocations and it may be that some degree of micro-level weighting according to lifetime 
priority is appropriate when it comes to access to ageing enhancement; but they reduce the 
degree to which we can implement an ideal prioritarian weighting at the micro level. In any case, 
such non-absolute weighting does not support the Egalitarian Objection for two reasons. First, 
as I argued in my discussion of Williams, it does not consider numerical age as such as a 
reasonable ground for rationing, even as a proxy for other goods. Second, even if there were a 
strong link between age and lifetime priority, the system considered here does not rule out 
interventions that predominantly benefit the better off although it may, as I discuss in Section 
6.3.2, reduce the priority of state involvement in such interventions. 
101 
 
Even if we cannot successfully apply prioritarian weighting at the micro-level, due to a 
combination of practical constraints and competing normative concerns, an alternative way to 
include a concern for lifetime priority is in weighted macro-allocations between different 
groups. Here, we are not only deciding whom within a patient group should have (priority) 
access to ageing enhancement, but how far up or down our list of priorities ageing enhancement 
should come, depending on the likely profile of its beneficiaries. If we must rely on general 
characteristics such as poverty due to epistemic constraints, perhaps it is best to apply that 
reliance at a level of greater generality i.e. the population level.  
When we are deciding how to allocate funds across the entirety of our healthcare budget, giving 
some weight to proportionality suggests that we ought to give what might otherwise appear to 
be a disproportionate level of resources to conditions that predominantly affect the worse off, 
or to target funding at health initiatives for groups who are less well off in lifetime terms, or in 
geographic areas containing those groups. This allows some considerable role for lifetime 
priority, without that ‘swamping’ the role of time-relative sufficiency as an absolute tiebreak 
would, and without explicitly picking out particular individuals for lower priority. Even if some 
micro-allocations such as additional criteria for waiting lists could be framed in such a way to 
avoid this problem, by virtue of not targeting identifiable individuals, a focus on macro-
allocations seems at least a plausible minimal role for lifetime priority. Treatments that will 
predominantly benefit the best off in lifetime terms are a lower research and funding priority 
than they would be if considered solely on the basis of the number of lives saved, QALYs 
added to a population, or some other consideration of priority.57  
So I have rejected the use of lifetime priority as a tiebreaker at least in cases of irremediable 
insufficiency by reference to the idea of rescue, but suggested that in such cases lifetime priority 
should play a weighting function, at least at the macro level, but also possibly at the micro level 
in some cases. Section 6.3.1 considers some concerns about appealing to the idea of rescue in 
healthcare. Section 6.3.2 then considers how this discussion applies to ageing enhancement. 
6.3.1 Rescue 
The claim that rescue is special, such that cases of rescue ought not be subject to prioritarian 
tie-breaks, bears superficial similarity to Jonsen’s ‘rule of rescue’, which says that “Our moral 
response to the imminence of death demands that we rescue the doomed” (1986: 174). A 
common reading of this rule is that we should invest considerable resources in saving the lives 
of identifiable victims who are in immediate danger. The rule has come under considerable 
criticism. Garrett (2015) argues that it fails to consider the broader institutional context of 
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medical endeavours; Orr and Wolff (2014: Section 5) suggest that the rule ignores the future 
costs of unlimited endeavours to save lives right now, ignores harms other than death, and 
sacrifices unidentifiable ‘statistical’ deaths to empathy-laden identifiable victims; and Wilson 
(2012: 194) argues that the intuitive force of the rule relies on a morally arbitrary framing of the 
circumstances as exceptional when “getting sick and dying is the rule, not the exception”. 
Others (e.g. Rulli and Millum, 2014; Orr and Wolff, Sections 7-8) defend restricted versions of 
the rule. 
I agree that the rule of rescue is problematic, perhaps unsalvageably so. But even if we reject 
Jonsen’s rule, the idea of rescue nonetheless has an important place in distributive justice. His 
claim that we have an overwhelming moral duty to save every identifiable victim (and only 
identifiable victims) is far stronger than the view outlined in the previous section, that we 
should not use lifetime priority as a tie-breaker in rescue cases. This view need not ignore 
statistical harm, or harms other than death, and does not insist on an overwhelming duty of 
rescue; so it can fit with plausible claims about broader medical obligation.  
Wilson’s worry, that a focus on rescue relies on treating unavoidable facts of life as special, is 
more challenging; the focus on irremediable insufficiency does treat circumstances that occur 
constantly as special in some sense. Still, this objection has force only on a particular way of 
understanding the term ‘special’, which applies to the rule of rescue but not my discussion. In 
one sense, death and illness are clearly not special, since they are everyday and, in lifetime terms, 
unavoidable. The rule of rescue invokes the responses we have when we could rescue someone 
as private individuals – which for most of us is infrequent to non-existent – and tells us to apply 
them at an institutional level which lacks this rarity. Since the rule of rescue treats death as if it 
were special in the sense of being infrequent, it tells us to pile in an apparently disproportionate 
level of resources to rescue; but given the actual contexts of institutional medical decisions, this 
simply moves the problem to other places.  
However, there is another sense in which death and severe illness are special, despite being 
frequent. They are special because they are among the lowest points in our lives, and because 
they are often (always in the case of death) not remediable. This form of specialness need not 
compel us to do everything possible to avert them, especially given their ubiquity. But it can 
compel us to treat these states distinctly in our scheme of distributive justice. So my appeal to 
rescue is not vulnerable to the compelling concerns raised against the rule of rescue.  
Relying as it does on time-relative sufficientarianism, my appeal to rescue also looks beyond an 
undue concern with the present. This means that it can extend to ageing enhancement; although 
the effects of physical ageing are slow and cumulative, and so hardly constitute an emergency, 
and ageing enhancement would be most effective if it were implemented long before someone 
was at immediate risk of increased death due to senescence, ageing enhancement is still an 
intervention aimed at avoiding irremediable insufficiency, even if that decline will not occur 
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immediately if ageing enhancement is refused. Although we could postpone ageing 
enhancement, in the sense that nobody will die immediately if we deny them the intervention, 
there is nothing that can ultimately rescue us from the declines and increased risk of death 
caused by physical ageing except some form of ageing enhancement. An intervention can 
constitute rescue because it is the only plausible intervention against an irremediable 
insufficiency, whilst still being in a sense postponable. So ageing enhancement does plausibly 
constitute rescue, and an appeal to rescue need not be subject to the reasonable objections that 
have been raised against Jonsen’s demanding rule.58 
                                                     
58 One might worry that this position faces a problem equivalent to that which troubled Daniels with 
regard to SDH. SDH affect life expectancy and health not only for the very worst off but at all levels of 
social status; Marmot (2005: 275-6) suggests that “as you move from the top income down to the 
$30,000-50,000 range, mortality is multiplied about 1.6 times”. This effect operates at a group level (33-
35), so that changing a group’s level of SDH may have no effect on the health of some individuals in that 
group. But since such group differences are comprised of individual differences, we can still make 
generalised predictions that redistribution on a broad scale will decrease some well off individuals’ life 
expectancy.  
If a change in SDH reduces life expectancy, a refusal to do so could count as rescue, since it would avoid 
an irremediable insufficiency at a particular time. An example will show how problematic this is for 
egalitarians: we institute a progressive tax that redistributes wealth from the best off to the worst off. The 
worst off have a claim to that transfer insofar as they are below the sufficiency level, and have had worse 
lives overall. But now one of those better off individuals argues that he too has a claim against the transfer 
on the basis of time-relative sufficiency, because a significant change in his group’s income may affect his 
life expectancy. Since it is related to life-expectancy, he can claim it is an irremediable insufficiency; 
reversing the decision could ‘rescue’ him in the sense of delaying his death. So his claim to keep his 
money on those grounds competes on an equal footing with the claim of the worse off individuals. The 
obvious way to respond to this case would be to note that although both individuals are faced with an 
irremediable insufficiency at some point, the fact that one of them has had a significantly worse life 
automatically decides between them. But if we reject using lifetime considerations as a tie-breaker in cases 
of irremediable insufficiency, this option is not available.  
There is something wrong with this; even if reducing the wealthy person’s wealth will affect her life 
expectancy, the gains to the worst off obviously take precedence, given their current position. The 
challenge is to explain the difference between this kind of case and rescue cases involving healthcare 
discussed above. One explanation is that there are limits on the effects the state should consider when 
forming policy. While these limits do not distinguish SDH from healthcare in the neat way Daniels 
assumes, they may distinguish the effects that changes in SDH have on the better off from the effects of 
healthcare interventions on the same group.  
Marmot suggests that redistributing SDH such as wealth harms the best off partly because it undermines 
their higher status, increasing their levels of long-term stress, which in turn damages health. In turn, it will 
benefit the worse off, both directly by impacting their basic material conditions, but also by improving 
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6.3.2 Implications for ageing enhancement  
The Egalitarian Objection insists that the state should not research or implement – and perhaps 
should even ban – ageing enhancement because the necessary resources could instead fund 
healthcare interventions for younger patients. The above proposal does not support the 
Egalitarian Objection; it suggests a more limited, though still considerable, role for lifetime 
prioritarian concerns, which should be tempered by a recognition that elderly patients are not 
always among the best off in lifetime terms, and that the lifetime well off have claims on the 
grounds of time-relative sufficiency. 
However, if it is feasible to introduce lifetime prioritarian considerations at the micro-level (e.g. 
in terms of placing prospective patients on a waiting list) this implies that if states invest in 
research on ageing enhancement, it should be with a view to prioritising access for the worst 
off. If such micro-level interventions are not feasible, proportionality at least implies that if 
ageing enhancement will likely be unavailable to all but the wealthiest due to cost, it should be a 
considerably lower spending priority at the macro level; in principle, given resource constraints, 
potentially low enough not to qualify for state funding at all. On the other hand, state support 
for technologies that will initially only be available to the wealthy may be acceptable if we can 
reasonably predict that those technologies will become more widely available as costs come 
down, and that such investment is necessary to get them going in the first place. If there is 
promise of such a ‘trickle down’ effect, then it becomes relevant to the ethical situation that 
there is a “considerable burden of age-associated diseases” (Sethe and Magalhães, 2012: 181) in 
developing countries, and that many of the worst off in all countries suffer from ageing. 
                                                                                                                                                      
their relative status, reducing long-term stress (104-137). Both cases thus involve changes in status having 
some effect on health. But there is a significant moral difference between these cases. The state is 
obligated to address individuals’ low status due to its impact on health, but also because even if some 
status disparity is inevitable people have a right to participate as (roughly) equals within their social 
context. That is, there is an additional moral impetus behind addressing the social standing of those who 
have low social status.  
But there is no such moral impetus to protect the high status of the better off, particularly when that 
relative position depends on maintaining others’ lower positions, because there are independent moral 
reasons against maintaining significant status differences among individuals. To make a loose comparison: 
the distress of racists, even if it affects their health, is no reason to avoid trying to end slavery. Similarly, 
because we have strong moral reasons to resist stigmatising differences in status, the psychological effects 
of ‘lowering’ a person of high status to be more on a level with others gives us no reason to resist that 
change (though it might give us reason to help them in other ways). This is not to insist on a return to the 
strong distinction between SDH and healthcare at all levels – for the worse off, a lack of SDH has a 
direct effect on health due to material deprivation – but to note that they operate in different ways, with 
different morally import, at least among the better off. This means that even if we think lifetime priority 
should not automatically break ties, we need not oppose progressive redistribution of other social goods.  
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These factors are hard to predict, although some have tried. Ehni (2012: 229) suggests that, due 
to the complexity and heterogeneity of ageing, enhancement will have to be personalised at 
great cost, reducing its propensity to reduce in price, while Capitaine and Pennings (2012: 257) 
insist that because ageing enhancement will likely require multiple different interventions, “even 
if each...became cheaper over time, the ‘whole package’ would probably still not be affordable” 
either for many individuals or widespread state funding.  
Others claim ageing enhancement will eventually become widely accessible. Buchanan (2011: 
50-51) argues that because of the increased gains in productivity from enhancement of all kinds, 
states will be motivated to “impose some limits on inequalities in the distribution of these 
enhancements by ensuring that all have access to some ‘basic’ level of them”.59 However, 
governments in modern democracies are also motivated by short-term expenditure. If ageing 
enhancement would be prohibitively expensive on a national level, governments might suppose 
that they are already providing a ‘basic’ level in the form of current healthcare services.   
Perhaps costs will come down due to economic pressures. Sethe and de Magalhães (2012: 181) 
claim that high demand for ageing enhancement would drive competition among 
pharmaceutical companies which, combined with mass production, could bring down costs. But 
Balasegaram (2014) argues that pharmaceutical companies can often maximise profit by keeping 
prices high amongst a narrower market rather than pursuing lower prices and broader 
accessibility. She also argues that a reliance on technologies being opened up by economic 
competition is stymied by practices such as ‘evergreening’, where companies “have patents 
granted on even minor modifications on existing drugs”.  
Alternatively, some proponents claim ageing enhancement will in fact lead to net savings, 
because it will tackle the underlying cause of a host of age-related diseases, each of which incur 
significant costs currently (Olshansky et al, 2006: 31; Mackey, 2003: 194; Farrelley, 2010). 
Relatedly, Harris (2002: 25) suggests that radical ageing enhancement would delay the onset of 
age-related health problems; treating them later in the future might be economically efficient 
because economic growth will drive down costs in real terms. Capitaine and Pennings disagree, 
claiming that net savings arguments must assume that ageing enhancement will not extend the 
frailspan (i.e. the length of time we spend in poor health at the end of our life) proportionately 
with lifespan, but that we cannot know that this will happen; they also respond to Harris by 
noting that we cannot assume that healthcare costs will not go up in real terms. More 
worryingly, they claim that ageing enhancement would actually increase healthcare costs, because 
the main driver of such costs is technology and ageing enhancement will require lifelong use of 
intensive technology. Even if the ultimate savings in delayed illness outweigh the additional 
costs of enhancement, we may be unable to afford the initial lump investment required to 
implement ageing enhancement at a population level.  
                                                     
59 See also Olshansky et al (2006: 31).  
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If both pessimistic and optimistic predictions are feasible (which Capitaine and Pennings do not 
dispute), this does not undermine the case for research into ageing enhancement, though our 
prioritisation of such research may depend on whom we think more likely to be right. But 
Capitaine and Pennings are right to insist that there are a number of uncertain assumptions 
underlying the economic case for widely accessible ageing enhancement; this may reduce the 
sense that enhancement “should become one of our highest priorities” (Olshansky et al, 2006), 
because this claim is based on the economic and health gains of very wide access bringing down 
healthcare costs considerably. So while concerns about inequity do not suffice to undermine the 
idea that the state should invest in research on ageing enhancement, the plausibility of 
arguments suggesting that it may not be affordable for the state or many individuals may lessen 
its priority in public research terms; if those worries come to fruition following successful 
research, the state will have reason to downgrade the implementation of ageing enhancement as 
a spending priority.  
This introduces a further question about whether the state should allow such developments in a 
private capacity if they are judged to be unaffordable or inequitable for the public purse. Strict 
equalitarians might claim some grounds to ban even private research and use of ageing 
enhancement if it is not accessible to all. This would depend on the strong version of the 
Egalitarian Objection that I rejected in Chapters 4 and 5; a failure to benefit everyone does not 
mean we should benefit nobody, or prevent people from acquiring benefits privately. This is 
particularly plausible with regard to private investment; unlike egalitarian concerns about the use 
of public funds, we have prima facie commitments to allowing people to do what they want with 
their money. 
Sethe and de Magalhães (181) suggest that any egalitarian objections to ageing enhancement 
would impugn a vast range of ordinary practices where money we spend could instead be spent 
on healthcare for the worst off, and suggest that it is inconsistent to focus on ageing 
enhancement in this regard. Of course, one might insist that many of our ordinary practices are 
indeed impugned by this reasoning, and that our failure to do the right thing so far does not 
sanction continued failure. But their objection is one of priority; why on earth should we 
oppose life-extending interventions on the grounds that the (privately owned) resources could 
go towards treating conditions of the worst off, when we don’t make the same complaint about 
a host of other, less morally pressing spending decisions? As my commitment to the importance 
of time-relative sufficiency should suggest, I have sympathy with this line of thinking. While 
there is a morally pressing case for spending considerably more – including state-backed 
coercive measures to release more privately owned wealth – on the worse off, there are plenty 
of places to source this additional spending.  
This might point us towards a libertarian policy; while the state is entitled to take control of 
some private wealth for distributive purposes, the remainder should be entirely at the discretion 
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of owners, including private healthcare. The problem with this is that private spending on 
healthcare is not merely a failure by individuals to benefit others, but in fact at the collective level 
has harmful consequences that the state ought to regulate. The most striking of these is that 
described above by Balasegaram; significant demand from wealthy consumers distorts the 
international pharmaceutical market, moving research and investment away from conditions 
that disproportionately affect the worse off. Additionally, increased expenditure on private 
healthcare within individual states may draw expertise from public healthcare (see e.g. Dean, 
2015).  
Again, such prioritarian concerns do not warrant a ban on private ageing enhancement. But they 
might justify some coercive or motivating intervention by the state in the pharmaceutical 
market. There are various options here. On the motivational side, states could financially 
incentivise pharmaceutical companies to invest more in treatments for otherwise non-lucrative 
conditions e.g. through subsidies, tax breaks etc. While allowing pharmaceutical companies 
fairly free reign in their development, states could set up a distinct fund for making ageing 
enhancement more accessible, or for promoting other interventions that will benefit the worse 
off (an international version of this proposal exists in the Health Impact Fund). The fund could 
be financed by private donors and/or by increased taxation on an egalitarian justification. This 
avoids overt government control of industry, and recognises the potential benefit for the worse 
off from ageing enhancement, rather than simply giving up because, left unchecked, 
enhancement will likely be inegalitarian.  
Alternatively states might enter partnerships with pharmaceutical companies on the 
understanding that although much access would be private, some subsidisation might exist for 
the worse off; prioritarian weighting might thus have to decide whether such a deal was worth it 
depending on how much the state committed, and how much subsidisation pharmaceutical 
companies would give. The state might also offer to invest in research on the assumption that 
costs would eventually come down, making enhancement more widely affordable. Again, 
prioritarian weighting would determine whether this constituted a good deal. 
On the coercive side, we might consider a direct levy on production of and access to ageing 
enhancement. This may seem to fall foul of the earlier complaint that many other activities are 
much more obvious targets for prioritarian complaints. As I have said, I agree with the thrust of 
this objection, but there are two considerations that point the other way. First, there is an issue 
of political feasibility. Endless increases in taxation on income are politically hard to motivate, 
and a levy on access to a particular, new technology is simpler both because people have no 
settled idea about how much novel technologies should cost, and because such a levy can be 
integrated into the price; this is psychologically different from income tax, which is explicitly 
taken from the individual by the state, and taken from money that one has earned. Second, if 
private healthcare spending causes harm by distorting the pharmaceutical market, then it is 
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different in at least one way from other forms of spending in directly influencing the problem 
we are trying to solve. These thoughts are not conclusive, but the existence of other morally 
dubious spending decisions need not necessarily undermine a focus on ageing enhancement. 
A second concern with the strong libertarian position that people should be able to spend their 
money as they wish, including on private access to ageing enhancement, is that it ignores the 
fact that in many cases different levels of wealth, and the different opportunities to which they 
buy access, result from injustice. A purely libertarian policy, then, must at least be constrained 
by an account of how we ought to respond to injustice; this is the subject of Section 6.4.  
6.4 Responding to injustice  
It would be a deeply incomplete discussion of distributive justice that contained no 
consideration of injustice, and whether and how healthcare allocations should respond to it, if at 
all. We often fail to fulfil claims of justice, distributive or otherwise. Many also argue that social 
injustice is pervasive in our social structures, and that the best off in society do well because we 
have benefitted from and inherited unjust inclusion according to social categories such as race, 
class and gender, while many of the worst off do badly because of unjust exclusion along the 
same lines, and the inheritance of poverty and lack of opportunity. As well as these inherited 
benefits, members of privileged groups often benefit from current discrimination, and are said 
to be complicit in maintaining60 unjust social structures through our participation in and support 
of systems of unjust privilege from which we benefit (see e.g. McIntosh, 1998; Jensen, 2002; 
Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Feagin, 2006; Applebaum, 2010a, 2010b; DiAngelo, 2010). Kolers argues 
that even if few of us can be identified as “perpetrators” of structural injustice, “most everyone 
perpetuates” it (2014: 423). According to this view many among the best off are not innocent in 
terms of systemic injustice, because we benefit from and recreate it.  
There are also considerable differences in health-status, and specifically life-expectancy, between 
different countries and regions, and the maintenance of unjust practices seems implicated in 
these differences. For instance, our own successful healthcare system depends in large part on a 
‘brain drain’ from developing countries (see e.g. Mensah et al, 2005; Serour, 2009), which 
depends on the significant differences in wealth and opportunity between these regions. As 
Pogge (e.g. 2010) has it, citizens of developed democracies are partly responsible for the actions 
of their governments in upholding an international system that works to their favour at the cost 
of those living in developing countries. 
If such discussions are right then this has considerable implications for how we should think 
about ageing enhancement (among many other things). In such cases, those of us who are 
responsible for or even just passively benefit from structural injustice may bear a special kind of 
                                                     
60 Although Butt (2014) suggests that it may be sufficient that we benefit from injustice to incur 
obligations to rectify it.  
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responsibility or culpability that affects our claims on the basis of purely distributive justice. In 
particular, even if we reject the use of lifetime priority as an absolute tiebreaker in individual 
cases, it may be more plausible to grant absolute priority to people who have had worse lives 
overall because of injustice; not because they have had worse lives, but because the better off 
individuals with whom they compete are culpable with regard to the systemic biases.  
Segall (2013: 193-206) rejects the idea of prioritising victims of social injustice, insisting that 
there is no coherent difference to be drawn between social and natural disadvantage. Segall’s 
example of social injustice is the case of a person who is in need of healthcare because of 
racism; but his conception of racism focuses on discrete acts performed by socially isolated 
individuals (e.g. a racist attack, or an unfair policy imposed by racist individuals). On this view, it 
seems natural enough for the rest of us to declare ourselves not responsible for racial injustice. 
But the view I am considering sees this as an incomplete account of social injustice. If most well 
off individuals are complicit in maintaining systemic injustice, or at least benefitting from it, we 
are culpable for social injustice in a way that we are not culpable for natural disadvantage.61 At 
the very least, this suggests that there is an additional moral dimension to competition for scarce 
resources between victims and beneficiaries of systemic injustice, where their respective status 
gives us reason to prefer the former.62  
Overall (2005: 200-205; 2009: 337-338) offers the most explicit discussion of the relationship 
between reparative justice and ageing enhancement, insisting that we must give priority in access 
to enhancement to victims of systemic injustice, at the cost of beneficiaries (indeed, she cites 
such a role as a strong reason in favour of developing ageing enhancement). Regarding 
healthcare in general, Jones (1985) suggests that we should prioritise certain forms of medical 
treatment for victims of injustice when they compete directly with those who are culpable for 
injustice (389), in the same way as we ought to implement affirmative action with regard to 
other social goods. He argues that apparently fair allocations lose their veneer of impartiality 
when we consider the fact that some people have “illicitly enjoyed...benefits at the expense” of 
others. Treating individuals as if they were in an equal position in this case is discriminatory, 
since it fails to consider the morally relevant origin of their situation (392). Similarly, one might 
argue that a system that weights individual claims on the basis of lifetime priority misses 
something of considerable moral importance if the better off individual is partly culpable for 
this disparity.  
                                                     
61 Things are obviously complicated by the fact that victims of natural bad luck are often victims of 
discrimination.  
62 It is important to note that this is not a retributive justification. The thought is not that those who 
uphold unjust structures deserve to be denied healthcare as punishment; it is that if one competitor for a 
good has that need partly due to the culpable behaviour of the other competitor, it is fair to insist that the 
unavoidable burden fall on the latter. 
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The simplest relevant justification for affirmative action outside the context of healthcare is as a 
corrective to current barriers. For instance, people with names that are stereotypically non-white 
are less likely to be selected for job interviews despite identical CVs (see e.g. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2004; Wood et al, 2009). In this case, showing a preference at one point corrects 
an imbalance elsewhere. The parallel is inequality of access to healthcare, either because of 
social advantage or (perhaps unconscious) prejudice from those who control access (see e.g. 
Blanchard and Lurie, 2004; Green et al, 2007). An allocation that depends purely on apparently 
random allocation processes, or even on the judgements of medical staff, will systematically 
disadvantage some patients. The ideal response to this issue is to eliminate unjust biases. But 
this is unlikely to happen completely, and so we also need corrective responses; moreover, those 
who have already suffered health disadvantages due to discrimination have claims of reparation.  
A second justification for affirmative action is correction for past injustice by ameliorating its 
present effects. Jones argues that the greater incidence of poor health among black Americans is 
partly due to inherited as well as present racial injustice. Overall makes a similar suggestion, 
although where Jones appeals fundamentally to a direct effect on health to justify reparative 
justice in that area, Overall thinks it sufficient that individuals have suffered in any way from 
injustice; ageing enhancement is then a way to offer additional life to those who have lost 
various important opportunities due to injustice, not just those who suffer health burdens.63 
If we ought to show preference to victims of social injustice when they compete with 
beneficiaries, how should that translate into policy? As with broader distributive concerns, the 
use of macro allocations could involve allocating funding in an apparently disproportionate way 
to conditions that affect victims of injustice, or to targeted health programmes. If members of a 
group that suffers from systemic injustice die disproportionately before they have reached old 
age, this would again place ageing enhancement lower in our priorities, although it would not 
eliminate it altogether since, as Overall notes, many victims do reach old age, and might benefit 
somewhat from enhancement.  
There may also be greater justification for implementing additional weighting in micro-
allocations. I argued in Section 6.3 that because patients who have had better lives overall have a 
distinct claim based on time-relative insufficiency, we cannot use lifetime priority as an 
automatic tie-breaker. However, it is plausible that certain kinds of culpability might override 
this claim. For instance, Jones considers the possibility of a screening system for organ 
transplants where those who have culpably benefitted from racism are given lower priority 
                                                     
63 We might generally prefer to correct injustice using the good that victims were denied, since that is 
more respectful of individuals’ preferences and aims. But it would be inappropriate to, say, offer a job to 
a frail elderly person who was unjustly denied one many years ago; and if her health is threatened, health 
interventions may be the only appropriate form of compensation. So Overall is right not to suppose that 
justification for preferential treatment in healthcare necessarily requires that victims’ health was affected.  
111 
 
when competing with victims. His “paradigm case” is “an affluent southern [i.e. the ex-
Confederate states of the USA] white patient who has profited from and... endeavoured to 
perpetuate the repression of blacks” (389). Jones suggests a quota system based on the higher 
incidences of relevant medical conditions among American blacks. In principle, if the arguments 
considered earlier are correct, the scope of this competition might be significantly wider than 
such clear, paradigm cases.  
This still restricts the scope of those who bear the burdens of reparation to those who compete 
directly with victims of injustice in immediate allocations. But if we broaden our justification for 
priority from particular health disadvantages to all unjust disadvantages, as Overall does, we 
might abandon this restriction. If an individual is culpable for systemic injustice, why not insist 
that they should be given absolutely lower priority than all victims? Neither Jones nor Overall 
makes this suggestion, but it is worth considering briefly. Each victim of injustice might be seen 
as having a claim to preference over patients who are culpable for their unjust harm. Since 
ageing enhancement could in principle benefit everyone, beneficiaries of injustice would be in 
competition with all victims of injustice, ruling them out of treatment in practice, if not in 
principle. 
However, Jones and Overall are right to limit their discussion to a proportional weighting rather 
than a de facto exclusion of beneficiaries of injustice. First, while the broad culpability thesis 
suggests that beneficiaries of injustice are culpable for the harm caused to victims, each 
individual may only be weakly culpable for harm to any individual victim. No individual 
beneficiary’s behaviour sustains systemic injustice or unjust institutions. This is not to deny that 
our behaviour jointly sustains systemic injustice. But if we are considering pair-wise 
comparisons, it seems plausible that the degree of compensation an individual should be 
expected to bear should depend on their contribution to the harm that the compensated victim 
suffered. If it is true that we contribute to that harm, we do bear some culpability, sufficient to 
justify giving us a lower priority or weighting in an overall distribution scheme; but since we are 
only partly responsible, this is not sufficient to justify de facto exclusion.  
Second, the fact that compensation and redress are due does not mean that preferential 
treatment must be shown in every conceivable distributive setting. This ties in with a common 
criticism of mainstream affirmative action: that those who lose out are punished 
disproportionately to their responsibility (see e.g. Kershnar, 1997: 357) even if the broad 
culpability claim is true, because competitors for particular social goods are only a subset of the 
broader group that benefits from injustice. The thought is that even though I do benefit 
culpably from injustice, it is unfair to ask me to bear the full burden of correcting that injustice, 
because I am a minority among beneficiaries. This is particularly pressing when it comes to 
healthcare, where those who would lose out from direct competition would do so when they are 
among the most vulnerable, in a time-relative sense, of those who benefit from injustice. So if 
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we can compensate victims in a way that does not immediately threaten the most vulnerable 
beneficiaries, we should. If ageing enhancement is the kind of intervention that is most effective 
over the course of a lifetime, this suggests that most patients could be compensated by 
preferential treatment in other areas, because the point at which they would benefit most from 
ageing enhancement would be a stage of their life when they could benefit from other forms of 
affirmative action. That may still justify some priority access to healthcare – especially if we 
recall worries about disparity of access mentioned above – but that could plausibly be offered in 
terms of quotas, shorter waiting times for treatments, and so on, rather than de facto exclusion of 
beneficiaries of injustice. As Overall points out, this line of thought does not apply to victims 
who are very ill, for whom preferential access to medical treatment is the only possible 
compensation. Although advocates such as de Grey insist that ageing enhancement will be most 
effective if applied across the lifetime, it may have some effect even if applied only in old age 
itself; if so, there is justification in principle for an absolute preference for victims of injustice 
who will otherwise forego the compensation they are due.64  
Finally, when prioritisation ends up meaning that the individual whose claim is granted lower 
priority misses out on treatment entirely, it is typically because of a lack of resources which rules 
out responding to all claims; prioritisation is unnecessary but for scarcity. This involves a policy 
of micro-allocation (preferring individual victims of injustice over individual beneficiaries of 
injustice) within the context of macro allocations that set the healthcare budget, and the budget 
for a particular intervention within that. Our concern with ensuring that victims of injustice get 
priority access to treatment when no other compensation is feasible may well support this policy 
within a particular macro allocation. But we should also be concerned with ensuring that the 
cost of that compensation is spread fairly among those who are bound to pay it.  
Miller (2007: 83-109) suggests two principles of fair allocation of burdens for rectifying injustice: 
the ability to bear costs, and the degree of responsibility for or level of benefit from injustice. 
Those beneficiaries who are vulnerable because of illness and old age are among the least 
appropriate (within the group of beneficiaries of injustice) to bear responsibility according to 
the former criterion, even if they still fulfil the latter. The principles of distributive justice 
outlined in Chapters 3-5 and the beginning of this chapter suggest that when those who have 
benefitted from injustice can be divided into individuals who would be brought below a 
sufficientarian threshold by the burden of reparation, and those who would not, it is preferable 
                                                     
64 This presumably applies to other medical interventions where absolute preference would not lead to 
inefficiency or waste; although I am unsure whether the scope of competitors is limited to the kinds of 
extremely clear cases of perpetrating injustice that Jones suggests, or whether it is feasible to broaden the 
scope to the more unwitting maintenance and benefit discussed above. There are clear political barriers to 
implementing a more comprehensive system, which may be practically insurmountable. There are also 
considerable complications from the fact that beneficiaries of one injustice may be victims of others.   
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that the latter group should bear the burden. So while it is true that within a particular budget 
reparative claims may lean us toward showing preference to victims of injustice when they 
compete with culpable beneficiaries, where feasible we ought to prefer expanding access at the 
cost (via taxation) of culpable beneficiaries who are more able to bear the burden of 
responsibility. Of course, public opinion and economic constraints mean that we will not be 
able to increase taxation so much that we can treat everybody. But we must consider the 
broader framework of ‘scarcity’ that shapes reparative trade-offs.  
6.5 Summary 
I began this chapter by considering a way of deriving the Egalitarian Objection from distributive 
principles I have endorsed, by using lifetime priority as a tie-breaker in cases of equal time-
relative insufficiency. This position relies on the idea of turn taking, which I argued is 
inappropriate in circumstances where we must decide between individuals who will fall 
irremediably below a sufficiency threshold if they lose out in a distributive decision. Such cases 
should be isolated to some degree from broader distributive concerns. I then considered an 
initial justification for this isolation in the form of Daniels’ theory that healthcare is special, but 
followed Wilson in rejecting this as unable to accommodate social determinants of health. I 
offered my own view that conceives of such cases as instances of rescue.  
As such, I suggest that we are not justified in denying ageing enhancement to elderly people on 
distributive egalitarian grounds. Even though it is true that many of those who would benefit 
from ageing enhancement are among the better off in lifetime terms, it is not their age as such 
that determines this; moreover, ageing enhancement will prevent the better off from dropping 
irremediably below a sufficiency threshold at particular times. The foregoing argument suggests 
that in such cases, claims to time-relative sufficiency must be included in our concerns, so we 
cannot use lifetime priority as an automatic tie-breaker in such cases. However, I suggested that 
lifetime priority may play a role in weighted chances in determining priority for treatments that 
require waiting lists, and certainly should play a role in our broader distributive decisions; so the 
Egalitarian Objection does have some force, since it tells us that insofar as ageing enhancement 
will disproportionately benefit the lifetime best off, it should form a lower spending priority 
than claims about the number of lives or life-years saved might suggest. 
I also suggested that we must supplement this view with a theory of how to respond to 
injustice. I considered a position that lays considerable responsibility for various systemic 
injustices at the feet of those who benefit from them and maintain them through inaction and 
replication. If this is right, it should inform how we allocate various social goods, including 
healthcare. However, I suggested that even if in cases of unavoidable conflict we may be 
justified in preferring victims of injustice over perpetrators, there are often more appropriate 
compensation methods, while broader considerations of justice, including time-relative 
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sufficientarianism, tell us to look first to expanding access to the goods of competition at the 
cost of those beneficiaries of injustice who are best off in a time-relative sense. 
That ends my discussion of the Egalitarian Objection. I have argued that it does not constitute a 
compelling reason for states to avoid investing in ageing enhancement per se, but that it has 
implications for the level of priority that ageing enhancement should take in our all-things-
considered decisions, depending on issues of accessibility. However, these implications do not 
derive from a focus on age as such, but on particular issues with privilege-based access. I have 
also suggested some ways that we might move to moderate some of those egalitarian concerns, 
making ageing enhancement more ethically acceptable. The following, final two chapters 























Chapter 7: The Overpopulation Objection – Constraining 
reproduction 
The following two chapters consider a final objection to ageing enhancement: that it will result 
in morally problematic overpopulation. Section 7.1 outlines the Overpopulation Objection, and 
considers some initial attempts to defuse it, before turning to the most common response from 
proponents of ageing enhancement: that if population size genuinely is problematic, we should 
curb reproduction rather than reject enhancement. Some proponents write as if controlling 
reproduction can obviously be done in a way that is both ethically acceptable, and sufficiently 
effective to meet any increases cause by ageing enhancement (e.g. Bostrom, 2005: 12; Davis, 
2005; Bostrom and Roache, 2007; Blackford, 2009). But in many ways these two requirements 
pull against one another; this chapter outlines some tensions between them. Section 7.2 
introduces the idea of incentives, and suggests some ethical constraints on the kinds of 
incentives we can employ. Sections 7.3 and 7.3.1 consider non-financial incentives that tie 
access to ageing enhancement to certain reproductive behaviours, and outline some worries 
about them. Section 7.4 considers financial incentives in more detail, and suggests that although 
there are potentially acceptable ways to financially incentivise reductions in reproduction, there 
remain concerns about a striking a balance between efficacy and a respect for fundamental 
interests. However, Section 7.5 argues that similar concerns threaten the view that we ought to 
avoid ageing enhancement. Chapter 8 then considers an alternative approach, which focuses on 
consumption.   
The argument from the Overpopulation Objection is roughly this:65  
P9 There is some threshold T below which it is of particular moral importance that 
people do not fall.  
P10 If an act A will lead to T being unachievable for some number66 of people, and 
there is no morally permissible way to mitigate this effect, there are strong moral 
reasons not to pursue (or, more strongly, to restrict) A, so long as not pursuing A 
would avoid this outcome. 
P11 Ageing enhancement risks67 raising the total population to a level that cannot 
sustain T without intervention elsewhere.  
                                                     
65 The Overpopulation Objection is raised by, among others, Hackler (2004: 194); Pijenberg and Leget 
(2007); and Temkin (2008: 206). None of them present it as a formal argument, so again I present what I 
take to be the strongest version.   
66 It is unclear precisely how we should quantify this. Is bringing one person below T sufficient to render 
an act impermissible? Since overpopulation will harm many people, I will ignore this complication.  
67 I discuss the issue of risk in Section 8.4.  
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P12 No such feasible intervention is morally permissible, and not pursuing ageing 
enhancement will avoid unsustainable population levels.  
C2 There are strong moral reasons for governments not to support (or more strongly, 
to restrict) ageing enhancement.  
As should be clear from Chapter 4, I accept P9 if it is read as a sufficientarian statement. P10 
also seems plausible, although I will suggest in Section 7.5 that its last clause – that the argument 
applies only if a failure to pursue A would avoid the relevant harms – causes problems for the 
latter part of P12, and hence the argument’s conclusion. The bulk of this chapter considers a 
common response from proponents of ageing enhancement, which is to reject the first part of 
P12 by appeal to regulation of reproduction. If reproductive restrictions are justifiable, and can 
avoid overpopulation even given ageing enhancement, the objection fails. 
One issue I do not address is the putative obligation to consider the claims of non-existent 
individuals to be born. Although I will not defend this position, I deny any such obligation; I 
assume we are obligated only to consider interests that are either actual when we decide, or 
which will be actual after we act. Interests that remain merely possible before and after our act 
are morally irrelevant.68 If I am wrong then we must add the interests of possible people to the 
considerations against reproductive controls outlined in this chapter. But unless we are prepared 
to alter our current practices considerably, our moral obligations to bring people into existence 
cannot be very strong; as far as common-sense morality is concerned, their moral impetus can 
be outweighed by even very weak preferences not to have children. Absent any argument to the 
contrary, I assume avoiding death and senescence is also sufficiently weighty to counter any 
such obligation.  
7.1 Denying P11 
This section considers some initial attempts to neutralise the objection by rejecting P11. Ageing 
enhancement could contribute to population growth in two ways. The first is not specific to 
enhancement. Any reduction in a population’s mortality rate, absent a corresponding drop in 
the birth rate, will increase the population; and one goal of ageing enhancement is to reduce or 
at least delay deaths caused by ageing. The second way is more specific. Ageing enhancement 
could extend our retention of physical capacities, including reproductive capacities (although 
this is likely restricted to radical ageing enhancement). So ageing enhancement might allow 
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own view follows Roberts (2011), who claims that even if possible people are in some sense worse off for 
not existing, our obligations in a world w should only apply to people who exist at some time in w. If 
future people will in fact come into existence in the real world, then we have various obligations towards 




individuals to have children for a longer period, and hence a greater total number, also 
contributing to overpopulation. 
One might reject P11 on the grounds that only moderate ageing enhancement is feasible, and 
moderate enhancements will not extend reproductive capacity sufficiently to increase 
population significantly. This seems like a plausible response in some ways. Some worries about 
overpopulation seem to envisage recipients living forever; if this is unlikely, overpopulation is at 
least a less significant concern than such pictures assume. However, there are a couple of 
caveats to this response. First, I have elected not to simply dismiss the possibility of more 
radical ageing enhancement, so I will consider problems that could arise from this eventuality as 
well. Second, many people who are concerned by overpopulation suggest the planet is already 
overpopulated; even if modest ageing enhancement will not lead to a population explosion, it 
might still hinder attempts to reduce population numbers, or even slow growth.  
Some deny that even radical ageing enhancement will be problematic. Goldstein and Schlag 
(1999) argue that radical enhancement will not lead to overpopulation, because our reproductive 
choices will also change. They note two ways we might alter our reproductive habits given 
extended fertility. With ‘Telescoping’ we would reproduce in our twenties and thirties followed 
by a much longer post-reproductive period.69 ‘Stretching’ would involve proportional delays in 
reproduction (e.g. if lifespans doubled, so would the average age at which we reproduce). 
Goldstein and Schlag demonstrate that significant population growth will result from 
Telescoping, but not Stretching. They also claim we have reason to expect Stretching. But the 
reasons offered for this latter claim are unconvincing. They note that extending longevity in 
various non-human animals has produced corresponding increases in reproductive age, and 
mention various evolutionary theories connecting the two (743-745), while claiming that 
“delayed child-bearing is a rational response to longer life spans” (745). But as they 
acknowledge, human reproduction depends only partly on such influences. Even if ageing 
enhancement did trigger a biological delaying impulse, and was economically rational, that gives 
us little predictive power. Finally, they also note demographic evidence correlating lifespan with 
average reproductive age (745-746) and expect this to continue if we extend fertility at the same 
rate as longevity. But correlations between longer lives and reproductive ages that occur for 
increases of a few years may not replicate when increases are significantly larger, since such 
motivations may be only weakly salient for most people when they are temporally distant. 
Although there may be some evidence for a relationship between longevity and delayed 
reproduction, it does not seem strong enough for us to rely on Stretching as a solution to 
overpopulation for all kinds of ageing enhancement. Still, their argument indicates that delaying 
                                                     
69 Also possible is Telescoping+, where people space births similarly to current trends, but continue this 
spacing for a similar proportion of their lengthened life, so that they have proportionately more children. 
This would have a considerably greater effect on population growth.  
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reproduction is as important as preventing it in avoiding overpopulation. This also suggests a 
benchmark against which to measure alternatives: if a population control measure leads to 
Telescoping, it is likely to be of questionable effectiveness. 
Rather than denying that ageing enhancement will significantly increase the population, one 
might claim that the necessary changes in behaviour will occur voluntarily. De Grey (cited in 
Agar, 2010: 96-98) accepts that ageing enhancement will contribute to population growth, but 
thinks that recipients will recognise a moral obligation not to procreate. Similarly, Bostrom 
(2005: 12) insists that people will have to “learn to have children later and less frequently”. Call 
this proposal Choice. There are various ways to encourage and facilitate free choices to have 
fewer children, later in life. Hartmann (1995: 33) reflects a fairly broad, although not universal, 
consensus that “once people’s physical survival is ensured and children are no longer their only 
source of security...population growth rates fall voluntarily”. Provision of contraception; giving 
women control over their reproductive and sexual activity; educating women; reducing poverty: 
all these measures reduce national population size and, fortuitously, are aims we should have 
anyway. Moreover, Sedgh et al (2014: 301) conclude that as many as 40% of all global 
pregnancies in 2012 were “unintended”,70 suggesting that better contraception and access to 
reproductive control could voluntarily reduce numbers. 
Still, such optimism can only take us so far. Gerland et al (2014) cast (well-publicised)71 doubt 
on previous predictions that global population would peak at around nine million, instead 
suggesting an 80% likelihood of population levels hitting eleven million in the next century. 
Even if population growth will stabilise voluntarily under current conditions, the level of 
reproduction that is sustainable will be different under current circumstances than under ageing 
enhancement, since the birth rate which constitutes ‘replacement’ varies according to mortality 
rates. The central problem with Choice is that, absent some external restrictions, there is 
nothing to prevent most people from choosing both options; I do not share de Grey’s 
confidence in the power of moral obligation.  
An additional issue with reliance on voluntary curbing of reproduction is that, properly 
classified, ‘overpopulation’ is as much a problem in wealthy countries as the deprived countries 
where the patterns of reduced fertility that Hartmann and others describe occur. The term 
‘overpopulation’ superficially implies a narrow concern with the number of people in existence. 
In fact, it typically covers a range of concerns, including pollution and other environmental 
despoiling; irremediable loss of resources; climate change; competition for public services, and 
private benefits such as employment; lack of space for habitation, agriculture, etc. These issues 
are not all related to population numbers to the same degree, but are also deeply linked to 
                                                     
70 38% of these ended in birth, so even perfect control over reproduction would mean a (still sizeable) 
drop of 15.2%.    
71 e.g. Carrington (2014); Schiermeier (2014). Although see The Economist (2014a) for some perspective.  
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consumption. When a child born in the USA has a lifetime environmental impact ninety times 
greater than that of a child born in Bangladesh (Murtaugh and Schlax, 2008: 18), it is perverse to 
claim that global overpopulation is predominantly a problem of the developing world. A 
comprehensive definition of overpopulation should include consumption levels, revealing 
developed countries as the greatest contributors. But the data on voluntary population 
reduction, encouraging though it is, only covers a reduction from already large to smaller 
families in underdeveloped countries; so it is at least an open question whether voluntary 
incentives will be sufficient in wealthy states.  
De Grey (2004b) also suggests a moral argument: since we cannot say which of reproduction or 
ageing enhancement people will want to choose in the future, it is wrong to make that 
significant choice for them by refusing to research ageing enhancement. But this is undermined 
by the fact that future individuals’ decisions will not only affect themselves; if everyone in the 
future opts for both reproduction and ageing enhancement, the generation after theirs will have 
no choice but to suffer the consequences. So even if we accept the idea that it is wrong to force 
a choice on people paternalistically, restriction of choice is justified by anticipated harm to 
others. 
A final challenge to P11 comes from claims that we will develop ways to cope with increased 
populations without requiring significant behavioural changes. Caplan (2005: S72) says “Critics 
who worry about [ageing enhancement]... must demonstrate that human culture is not clever or 
flexible enough to learn how to cope with more life”. More (2005) claims we will soon be able 
to perform technological feats such as moving significant portions of production into space, 
and applying nanotechnology to engage in pollution-free industry. Such arguments aim to shift 
the burden of proof onto proponents of the Overpopulation Objection to show that we cannot 
handle enhancement. But technological panaceas are also far from inevitable. Even if we could 
reliably predict that developments will emerge eventually, there is no guarantee they would 
arrive before overpopulation had taken significant toll. It is cornucopians like More and Caplan 
bear the burden of proof to show that there are reasonable and timely ways to mitigate serious 
potential problems to replace – or to buy us time until we have developed – technological cure-
alls, or to present some basis for their confidence.   
If ageing enhancement does risk overpopulation, the next response is to suggest that there are 
morally preferable ways to deal with the problem than eschewing ageing enhancement. The 
remainder of the chapter considers the most popular alternative to sheer optimism: reducing 
reproduction systematically.  
7.2 Incentives and some ethical constraints  
Most advocates of the reproductive solution accept that coercive methods of control (e.g. 
forced abortions or sterilisation) are ethically impermissible. Instead, they appeal to the idea of 
incentives: bonuses for refraining from having more than a set number of children; maluses on 
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those who exceed a set limit; or penalties for those who exceed the limit. The broader literature 
on population control (e.g. Callahan, 1976; Isaacs, 1995: 365-366; Tremmel, 2010) suggests 
several ethical constraints on incentives:  
1. Incentives should not punish children  
Even if we can justifiably impose maluses or penalties on parents, the resulting children had no 
role in the reproductive decision, and so should not be significantly disadvantaged because of it. 
Due to the danger that some parents will force the burdens of a reduction in income or 
financial bonuses onto children states that impose financial incentives on procreation should 
provide services such as free education and free social and healthcare to offset this possibility, 
even though this may also reduce the effectiveness of incentives. We should also avoid penalties 
that directly deny children basic needs, or which place them at a significant disadvantage to their 
peers (e.g. denying free schooling when it is available to others).   
One might worry that this injunction does not fit well with our wider practices. We don’t 
typically consider the effect on children in the calculation of punishments or fines. In the 
English and Welsh courts, when S is fined no steps must be taken to ensure that the money will 
detract from personal spending rather than spending on a dependant. When R is given a prison 
sentence no consideration must be made of how this will affect her children. While there are 
some examples of dependant welfare being incorporated in sentencing guidelines (e.g. the Irish 
Fines Act (2010)), there is no obligation to take such considerations into account in many 
jurisdictions; in British contexts, it is largely left to judges’ discretion.72 But this should not 
undermine the inclusion of this condition. First, this evidence merely highlights a flaw in current 
practice; greater steps should be taken to protect dependants. Second, the sums being dealt with 
in most fines are likely smaller than the amounts necessary for successful reproductive 
incentives. The latter have the capacity to induce extraordinary hardship, so we should adjust 
our level of care appropriately.  
2. Incentives should avoid coercion  
At the very least, incentives should not place people in a position where they reasonably feel 
unable to choose reproduction because the resulting penalty or malus would significantly 
diminish their quality of life, or where the ‘bonus’ offered is in fact a good without which it is 
very hard to get by in the relevant society, effectively making the choice a kind of extortion. 
Tremmel suggests a ‘four-fifths rule’ for financial incentives, whereby the total amount forgone 
by someone who breaches the limit should not be more than 20% of their total income (154-
157), although it is not clear whether he means this to apply to everyone or only the worst off, 
for whom a greater percentage of earnings would have a significant detrimental effect (see 
                                                     
72 Thanks to Andrew Crosbie and Liz Campbell.  
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condition 4 below). Similarly, penalties should not take forms such as physical punishment, 
imprisonment, or social ostracism. 
3. Incentives should respect fundamental interests 
The fundamentality of certain interests is a feature that they acquire from a public policy 
perspective on the idea of sufficiency outlined in Chapter 4. Even from such a subjectivist 
position, where what matters or has value depends fundamentally on the attitudes of 
individuals, institutions and states must make some assumptions about which interests to aim 
for at the level of social policy. Certain interests are marked for special protection by the state 
even when they are not universally shared because they are very widely shared; they are robust 
across time for those who hold them; and they are typically fundamental from an individual 
perspective i.e. they are seen as non-eliminable and not fully compensable components of a 
worthwhile life for many people.  
Fundamental interests do not have absolute weight in all contests. If our fully respecting one 
person’s fundamental interest will threaten others’ fundamental interests, it is permissible to 
constrain the former. In such a case, the absolute protection of an individual’s interests would 
predictably undermine our ability to protect other important interests; such a policy would 
essentially privilege present interests over equally important future interests. This fetishises an 
instance of something valuable, at the cost of ignoring what is valuable about that thing in the 
first place. But fundamental interests do carry special weight in conflicts of interest, and policies 
that compromise them should be seen as especially costly in moral terms.  
Several interests involved in controlling one’s own reproductive behaviour are fundamental in 
this sense. Reproduction and parenthood are strong psychological and emotional drives for many 
people, and some judge biological parenthood a central constituent of a worthwhile life.73 There 
are also other interests involved in self-regulation of reproduction, including bodily integrity 
(understood here in Nussbaum’s sense (1999: 41) of “Being able to move freely from place to 
place; being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault, marital rape and 
domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of 
reproduction”) and bodily privacy, and individual control over important decisions. State-mandated 
restrictions on reproduction can also be distressing even if they are not forcibly coercive, and so 
threaten the interest in individual welfare. Since fundamental interests are not absolute, we cannot 
rule out any method of reproductive control on the grounds that they compromise one of these 
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is not currently an actual interest for a particular individual on a subjectivist view. Since an interest in 
parenthood is robust and widespread, and can emerge in previously indifferent individuals, the state has 




interests, particularly since there may be no option that protects all fundamental interests for 
everyone; but we can say that it is a significant disadvantage.  
4. Incentives must take account of existing wealth disparities  
Any fixed penalty that could motivate the wealthiest would be impossible for the very worst off 
to meet, whereas any sum that did not coerce the worst off – in accordance with condition 3 – 
would not trouble the richest at all. I have already noted that many concerns identified under 
‘overpopulation’ actually relate to consumption. Even within developed countries, consumption 
levels differ vastly; so any regressive scheme that affects the poor more than it does the wealthy 
is not only unfair, but is also a failure from a proper concern with overpopulation. The former 
complaint is particularly pertinent if ageing enhancement is accessible only to the well off, as 
considered in Chapter 6. It would be obviously unjust to implement reproductive controls that 
disproportionately restrict the worst off in order to counter the effects of a technology that only 
benefits the best off.   
In discussing incentives, I will consider two broad types. The first type, in Section 7.3, is non-
financial, and involves some kind of behavioural condition on access to ageing enhancement. 
The second, in Section 7.4, is financial. 
7.3 Non-financial incentives  
In this section, I consider an incentive that is specific to ageing enhancement: making access 
conditional on reproductive status. It is natural to see this as offering people a free choice 
between two desirable but ecologically costly activities. But this appearance of a simple rational 
trade-off is misleading; features of our reproductive lives mean that such conditional access to 
enhancement will either be ineffective or more coercive than proponents seem to suppose. 
Harris (2002a: 13) suggests that we could “restrict the entitlement to reproduce for those 
seeking [ageing enhancement]...making reversal of the life-extending therapy a condition of 
procreation or excessive procreation” (see also Bostrom and Roache, 2007: 7). Call this policy 
Reversal. At least some conceivable methods of ageing enhancement make this problematic. If 
ageing enhancement could come through a single treatment, we would either have to rely on 
voluntary or forced reversal. The former is de Grey’s Choice, with its attendant problems; the 
latter involves coercive invasive surgery, precisely what incentives aim to avoid. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, de Grey (2004a) suggests that the most likely mechanism for 
ageing enhancement will be an ‘engineering’ approach, which involves treating the body like a 
degrading machine in need of continual maintenance. The need for repeated intervention is 
supported even by those who are sceptical about de Grey’s predictions (e.g. Capitaine and 
Pennings; Ehni). The state could thus refuse repeated access in relevant circumstances, avoiding 
invasive intervention. So long as access to enhancement is controlled by the state (even if it is 
only available on a private basis), this is likely to be worth as much to a wealthy person as to the 
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least well off and so fulfils condition 4. Reversal also has no direct affect on existing children, 
since the cost is unavoidably borne by the individual, so it fulfils condition 1. Finally, Reversal 
seems to be the best of a bad selection of options with regard to choice; it does not force 
people to sacrifice parenthood when they don’t want ageing enhancement, or vice versa.  
Reversal thus has considerable appeal. But it also raises problems. First, Reversal faces tension 
from an argument offered by many proponents of ageing enhancement, including Harris: that it 
should simply be regarded as one form of health treatment among many. Harris (2004: 528-529) 
argues that, “so long as the life is of acceptable quality...we have a powerful, many would claim 
an overriding, moral imperative to save the life, because to fail to do so when we can would 
make us responsible for the resulting death”. He also claims that because all instances of saving 
a life are merely delays of death, ageing enhancement and other life saving interventions are 
prima facie morally equivalent. The conjunction of these positions implies that there is nothing 
intrinsic to ageing enhancement that justifies our treating it differently to other life-extending 
techniques. I agree; although I suggested in Chapter 6 that certain plausible circumstances under 
which ageing enhancement would be implemented might make it a relatively lower priority than 
some other interventions, nothing in that argument justified such a stark difference as making 
ageing enhancement, but no other treatment, subject to reproductive restrictions.  
So if someone who gets extra years through ageing enhancement is denied procreation, and 
ageing enhancement is morally equivalent to other forms of life saving, why not also deny 
procreation to someone who gets a kidney transplant, or heart surgery? They too contribute to 
population growth. Obviously one option is to accept this extension, and agree that various 
other life-extending interventions should be subject to restrictions on reproduction. This does 
lose one of the more apparently attractive options of Reversal, which is that it allowed those 
who did not desire ageing enhancement to procreate freely. But if we are morally obliged to put 
conditions on access to many other health interventions, this attractive feature is lost. That does 
not rule Reversal out, but it does mean that it is rather less obviously attractive than it first 
appeared.74 
One might argue that even though ageing enhancement is intrinsically similar to other 
treatments, it is extrinsically different precisely because it is not yet available, and so does not 
have a place in people’s secure expectations about what healthcare interventions they are 
entitled to. There may thus be less public opposition to restrictions on ageing enhancement 
than to restrictions on other life-extending interventions, and people do not currently rely on an 
expectation of ageing enhancement in the way that they rely on other kinds of medical 
developments. Simply because of the context in which it would emerge rather than any intrinsic 
quality, ageing enhancement would constitute a ‘tipping point’. Since we are operating in a 
                                                     
74 Harris is aware of these connections, and follows his suggestion with a critical discussion of 
“generational cleansing” i.e. denying all forms healthcare to people once they have reached a limit.  
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context where people accept ageing more than they do other potentially lethal illnesses, we may 
thus be justified in placing conditions on ageing enhancement that are not acceptable for other 
interventions. Potential beneficiaries of ageing enhancement are simply unfortunate that the 
intervention that would help them follows previous successes.  
Such a response clearly faces some challenges. Proponents would also have to oppose 
developments in other novel life-extending interventions. And this argument is less persuasive if 
certain empirical claims discussed in Section 6.3 are true, namely that ageing enhancement 
would contribute significantly to the alleviation of age-related diseases that the public are already 
psychologically committed to tackling. Although Capitaine and Pennings raised doubts about 
this claim, they compare ageing enhancement with a baseline of a healthcare system that uses far 
less technology; but if the public are committed to technological solutions to a range of 
conditions, ageing enhancement may come out well against a baseline of ever-increasing 
technology targeting multiple conditions, even if it does badly against a baseline of a low-
technology system.  
In any case, there are more pressing reasons to worry about Reversal, even if the tipping point 
argument is correct and we can isolate ageing enhancement as uniquely acceptable to place 
reproductive conditions on. The second problem with Reversal is that although it deals well 
with wealth disparities, it has implications due to the biological division of labour in sexual 
reproduction. It is easy to view the choice presented by Reversal as one that is faced by 
individual agents who face a trade-off between two preferences, and are presumably supposed 
to make a decision about which preference is stronger. But reproduction typically involves two 
people. Since women carry pregnancies and give birth, and men do not, women must have 
control over the decision of whether a pregnancy should proceed to birth, while men lack such 
decisive influence. This disparity is clearly right, but leads to problems for Reversal. 
In the ideal case, a couple decide that foregoing further ageing enhancement is a reasonable 
sacrifice for parenthood, and conceive. If they try to access ageing enhancement following this 
decision, they will be told they are no longer eligible, but no physical coercion is involved. They 
act analogously to a single rational agent: weighing collective preferences, coming to a 
considered decision, and acting accordingly. Yet this is not the only possible scenario. Here is 
another: Mark and Sunita have sex, and Sunita becomes pregnant unintentionally. Under current 
legal frameworks in many countries, Sunita can decide whether to carry the pregnancy to term 
without Mark’s consent.75 Mark may come under social pressure to take on some parental 
responsibilities and, depending on his income, a legal obligation to provide some financial 
support. Mark has no choice in this matter, although of course he had a choice whether to 
                                                     
75 Of course, in other areas women are not able to decide whether to have children, for both social and 
economic reasons. If enhancement should be made available to the worse off, as I argued in Chapter 6, 
this constitutes a further concern for the rational choice assumptions that support Reversal.  
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undertake the risk of pregnancy in the first place. Under Reversal, though, if Sunita decides to 
give birth Mark loses access to ageing enhancement. Again, he has no choice in this matter. 
Reversal, then, does not involve only voluntary decisions by individual agents, as it first 
appeared. Sunita’s interests in this regard may conflict with Mark’s interests, without either of 
them being able to affect this link.76  
Could we avoid this? We might offer Mark a veto, giving him as much chance as Sunita to 
decide the outcome. But this cannot work. It cannot be that both parties have a genuine veto, 
for the two options (abortion and birth) are diametrically opposed; vetoing one almost 
inevitably means the other. There may be moral and pragmatic reasons for Sunita to consider 
Mark’s wishes when deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy. But the only way to give Mark 
a veto would be to countenance forced abortion. Again, this takes us well beyond the intended 
scope of Reversal, involving an unacceptable form of reproductive coercion.77 
The second possibility is an ‘opt-out’ clause for unwilling fathers. Ideally, Sunita faces the 
rational choice between parenthood and ageing enhancement assumed by Reversal. Mark lacks 
such a choice, since his continued access to enhancement rests on Sunita’s decision. An opt-out 
would restore this choice to Mark. If he chooses ageing enhancement, he forfeits parental 
access rights and the specific responsibility regarding ageing enhancement. Overall (2012: 40-49) 
rejects the idea that fathers should be able to opt out of financial responsibility for children that 
they do not want. While men cannot choose whether a pregnancy results in parenthood, they 
choose to risk pregnancy, and thus have to take responsibility for its foreseeable outcomes, 
including the child’s welfare. However, the proposal I am considering is somewhat different. It 
does not absolve men of responsibility for helping to look after a child; it allows them to 
renounce a specific responsibility that is not directly related to the care of the child, at the cost 
of losing access rights.  
This proposal still has problems. Practically, there is a question of what stage of pregnancy Mark 
should be able to opt out. Placing it after the legal abortion limit would allow Mark to change 
his mind after it is too late for Sunita to change hers. Since many pregnancies go undetected in 
the early stages, an opt-out policy must also outline Mark’s status if Sunita does not realise she is 
pregnant until after the deadline has passed. There is also danger that such a policy could end 
                                                     
76 I do not suggest that Sunita would use this unsought influence vindictively. It is right that she should 
choose in her own best interests. But Reversal sets things up so that her decision affects Mark 
significantly, and will in cases of conflict undermine his interests considerably, even if that is not what she 
wants.   
77 Teo (1975) suggests that giving prospective fathers a say over abortion need not involve coercion. The 
aim should be a joint decision, not an imposition by either individual. But Teo says that in cases of 
conflict “the court can decide the dispute” (342). Either Mark’s input comes to nothing (if the courts 
refuse to sanction forced abortion, Sunita’s decision is final), or this would sanction forced abortion.  
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up with free-riding fathers. Many single parents need all the help they can get; Reversal allows 
Mark to legally renounce his parental rights in order to retain access to ageing enhancement, but 
then retain de facto parenthood by offering help with childcare. This would be on an apparently 
voluntary basis for Sunita, so there would be no obvious legal recourse. Since mothers have no 
corollary way to game the system, it is unfair to allow fathers to do so, and an ineffective 
incentive against reproduction, at least for men.  
We have seen that Reversal can only offer Mark a free choice at the cost of compromising 
Sunita’s position considerably. The way to avoid this makes Mark’s fundamental interests 
dependent on Sunita’s choice. Aside from being unfair on Mark, a further worry is that this 
greater cost will increase incidences of coercion and violence against women. A pregnancy that 
is unwanted by the prospective father may lead to social coercion, threats, and actual violence in 
an attempt to avoid the unwanted burden of parenthood. Since conditional ageing enhancement 
places a significant cost on parenthood – effectively, earlier death and the debilitating effects of 
senescence – and takes it ultimately out of some men’s hands, it seems likely that a system that 
made access to ageing enhancement conditional on not reproducing would result in greater 
pressure on and violence towards vulnerable women.  
The justifying structure for Reversal – that it offers a free choice based on personal preference – 
again seems undermined in the case of vulnerable women whose partners are prepared to 
coerce them into abortion. Moreover, such individuals are often the least likely to have control 
over their own reproduction and contraception decisions. It is true that additional legal recourse 
might protect against such eventualities, and so they do not automatically rule out Reversal. But 
such considerations at least weaken the claim that halting access to ageing enhancement for 
those who have children is superior in terms of coercion or equal concern to other methods of 
population control, and so weaken Reversal’s attractiveness.  
7.3.1 Sterilisation  
Harris (2002a: 13) also suggests that accessing ageing enhancement could be available only on 
the condition that the individual undergoes sterilisation. Call this policy Sterilise. Under this 
policy, people can procreate freely until they opt for ageing enhancement, at which point they 
must submit to sterilisation. Unlike reproduction, sterilisation is a choice that can entirely be 
made by an individual; there is also no sense in which one person’s decision whether to sterilise 
can accidentally end up bound to another’s. But Sterilise has problems of its own. It encourages 
individuals to have children as early as possible so they still have time for enhancement. Under 
Reversal, individuals are motivated to delay parenthood. Under Sterilise, individuals have reason 
to reproduce early so that they can experience parenthood and have time to benefit from ageing 
enhancement. Under Sterilise, there is no going back once you opt for ageing enhancement. 
This means that, at least among those who avail themselves of ageing enhancement, population 
growth is significantly faster under Sterilise than under Reversal, since generational gaps are 
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much smaller. In Goldstein and Schlag’s terms, Sterilise encourages Telescoping while Reversal 
encourages Stretching. 
We might avoid this by making Sterilise more demanding (Sterilise+), such that one may only 
access ageing enhancement on the condition of sterilisation and not having already had more 
than n children. If n is 0, this avoids the generation gap problem entirely, although it offers a 
significantly starker choice than either Sterilise or Reversal. However, although the mitigating 
effect would be less if n is 1 or 2, Sterilise+ might still avoid severe Telescoping at this level. 
While this would still not be an easy choice to make, it is less stark than insisting on 
childlessness. Still, Sterilise+ reinstitutes problems associated with Reversal. Now, instead of 
losing access to additional ageing enhancement, an unwanted pregnancy can mean losing the 
chance to ever access it. The problems associated with this seem no different from those 
outlined above, although of course the higher the value of n, the less likely that a single 
accidental pregnancy would prove to be the tipping point.  
Non-financial incentives are not implausible, but they are less attractive and more complex than 
they initially appear. The next section considers more traditional financial incentives, outlines 
some problems with them, and eventually sketches a proposal that most plausibly respects the 
ethical ideals outlined in Section 7.2. However, Section 7.5 raises some further problems with 
this idea; while these are not sufficient to rule out the idea of financial incentives against certain 
levels of reproduction, they should at least prompt us to look elsewhere.  
7.4 Financial incentives 
Condition 4 says that incentives should take account of wealth disparities. A single flat rate will 
comprise a much larger proportion of some individuals’ total wealth than of others’. Even 
schemes that charge a flat proportion of income are inequitable: someone with an income of 
£500,000 a year can afford to lose 10% of their income more readily than someone on £20,000. 
Reacting to this, we might look to progressive taxation schemes for inspiration for a similar fine 
system (call this Progressive). Progressive taxation increases proportional liability with income. 
In the UK there is an untaxed ‘personal allowance’, while any amount one earns over this is 
then sorted into cumulative brackets. When it comes to financial incentives, however, 
progressiveness is more complex; as Bayles (1980: 57) notes, financial incentives can be 
progressive in two senses. They may incentivise individuals roughly equally regardless of wealth, 
and they may avoid increasing existing disparities of wealth. For negative incentives, these pull 
in the same direction: larger maluses and penalties are needed for the wealthy. For positive 
incentives, they pull in opposite directions, since the wealthy need larger bonuses for the same 
level of motivation. As such, it makes sense to focus initially on negative incentives.  
For each child above n, we might levy financial penalties of different amounts depending on 
earnings, also representing different percentages of earnings. The particular figure would 
depend on incentivising power and other concerns. This situation is complicated, as is taxation 
128 
 
in general, by the variety of sources of wealth, including income, monetary savings and 
investments. I assume that such complications can be included in a fuller account, since there 
are more immediate issues to consider.  
Condition 1 says that incentive systems should not penalise children. One benefit of a non-
financial system, such as Reversal or Sterilise, is that burdens cannot be passed to children. A 
significant disadvantage of financial burdens is that individuals may arrange their finances such 
that they suffer none of the burdens, and instead force their children to forgo certain benefits, 
or even necessities. There are policies that can mitigate such extreme cases. Fines can leave 
room for mitigation if dependants’ fundamental interests are at stake. Moreover, the most 
extreme deprivations that could be considered by a negligent parent – refusing to spend money 
on food, for instance – are already illegal. Independently of population control policies, states 
clearly have a duty to maintain systems that monitor children’s basic interests and intervene in 
cases of abuse. In cases where the state has created an incentive for deprivations, the state may 
also be obligated to enable parents to provide such basics to their children for free. States 
should also avoid policies that restrict access on a financial basis to services or goods that affect 
children’s basic interests, such as the erstwhile Singaporean policy of removing large families 
from social housing lists (Isaacs, 1995: 363).  
A second concern is that a progressive policy will leave some individuals with negligible or no 
incentive to limit procreation, particularly if we include an equivalent of the personal allowance 
for the very worst off, which seems unavoidable if we are to avoid fining people to the extent 
that it affects their fundamental interests or becomes coercive. This is of primary concern for 
theories that take the problem of population to be solely related to the number of people alive. 
There is some negative correlation between wealth and family size (although this relationship is 
complex. See, e.g. Schulz, 2005), so a policy that fails to incentivise the worst off against 
reproduction would fail in its central aims, according to these theories. Since my definition of 
overpopulation includes consumption, it would be of considerably greater benefit to prevent 
births of excess children to wealthier families. Nonetheless, there is still a potential issue here. 
There is no guarantee that those who have their children in poverty will stay in poverty, or that 
the children themselves will not break out of poverty. Indeed, I presume that most participants 
in this debate hope that this will occur. As such, it may still be problematic if families who are 
exempt from Progressive are also typically those that have the most children, if we also intend 
to bring people out of poverty, presumably increasing their consumption.  
If there are income levels for which there is no amount that is both fair as a fine – because it 
would become coercive – and sufficiently incentivising, we might retain Progressive, but also 
institute positive incentives for those who fell into this lowest income bracket, so that we had a 
Mixed system. The worry identified above, that positive incentives must offer more to the 
wealthiest to be effective, does not arise here, because only the worst off are offered bonuses. 
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So the state might, for instance, pay the worst off for every year they remain childless and 
fertile. This does not face typical criticism of such schemes, that it is unjustifiably targeted at the 
worst off, since under Mixed we are also targeting all other income brackets, albeit in a different 
way. Still, even a bonus system may amount to coercion if it makes access to certain 
fundamental goods dependent on remaining childless (and so imposes significant maluses on 
those who fail to comply). In a society which does not successfully provide the basics for all its 
citizens, there are at least some people for whom any financial incentive scheme would become 
coercive. Perhaps the best that proponents of incentive schemes can hope for is that this 
number is sufficiently small to make incentive schemes effective overall.  
There are still clearly undesirable aspects of Mixed. It is in general undesirable to have the state 
involved in setting negative sanctions on people’s reproductive behaviours (although 
undesirable does not mean impermissible). Moreover, if both negative and positive financial 
incentives are sizeable – even if they do not involve access to essentials – there may still be 
coercive and even violent pressure on women to undergo abortion when they would not 
otherwise wish to. There will also be considerable resistance to the government intervening in 
people’s reproductive lives, even at ‘arm’s length’ through a fines system.78 
Furthermore if, as I have argued, overpopulation (once properly considered with regard to 
consumption) is a problem of wealthy countries, this implies that reductions in fertility efforts 
should focus there, particularly if wealthy countries will be the sole beneficiaries of ageing 
enhancement. However, this also means there will be countervailing local pressures due to 
worries about underpopulation79 and population ageing.80 Some economists deny that these 
effects will arise,81 or indeed whether effects such as economic stagnation are negative.82 Some 
proponents of ageing enhancement contend that it will in fact solve national population ageing 
without requiring considerable population growth, since people will be able to work for 
considerably longer and so there will be no need to produce new generations of workers, 
although this relies on assumptions that people will be willing to accept considerably longer 
working lives than they currently have.83 At the very least, such worries suggest that an effective 
                                                     
78 There is some support in the UK for restrictions of benefits for large families; but this is primarily 
supported by those who are not affected.  
79 See e.g. Hüther (2008: 38) Kraemer et al (2008: 109); Manyika et al (2015: vii).  
80 Straubhaar (2008)  
81 e.g. Straubhaar (ibid); Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001); Coleman and Rowthorne (2011).  
82 e.g. The Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy  
83 One might suggest that people could change jobs when they became bored, or take semi-periodic 
retirement. But many people lack the transferable skills to change professions, while there is reasonable 
concern that a periodic retirement could place people at a severe competitive disadvantage so that in 
practice only the fairly privileged could afford to take such time out. For a parallel see Graeber (2013) and 
130 
 
population policy must not only balance the increases to population size that emerge from 
ageing enhancement on a ‘one in one out’ basis, but may also face countervailing pressures that 
an already blunt instrument such as financial incentives may not be well equipped for; so even if 
methods of placing controls on reproduction are permissible, we should consider alternative 
solutions as well. This is the subject of Chapter 8. Before that, Section 7.5 considers the 
implications of the above discussion for the Overpopulation Objection’s conclusion.  
7.5 Implications for C2   
Condition 3 suggests that reproductive constraints should avoid compromising fundamental 
interests. As the intervening sections have suggested, some proposals to restrict reproduction 
threaten one or more of these interests (extreme cases such as forced abortion, which I have 
not even considered as a viable option, violate all of them), or are otherwise unattractive for 
various reasons. Certain levels of financial incentive may restrict important choices to various 
degrees and at extreme levels may force an unpalatable choice between parenthood and 
personal welfare. I suggested that there might be some way to avoid the violation of 
fundamental interests, by appealing to the idea of a mixed system of financial incentives. But the 
worry here is that it may not be sufficiently effective to balance population increases caused by 
ageing enhancement, especially when we consider some of the potential economic 
consequences of an ageing and/or declining population in developed countries. Still, I have not 
ruled out the possibility of striking a reasonable balance, perhaps supplemented by other 
measures, such as those that I will outline in Chapter 8. If such a policy can be found, the 
Overpopulation Objection fails. 
Even if such a balance cannot be found, there is a further problem for the Overpopulation 
Objection as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The objection rests on the 
unacceptability of acts that will result in many people falling below a particular threshold of 
welfare. But it also relies on the idea that not performing a particular act will avoid such results. 
The problem for the argument is that a failure to provide ageing enhancement will also 
undermine several fundamental interests for those who would benefit from enhancement. It is 
clear that some levels of physical senescence significantly reduce the amount of control one has 
over important decisions, and can have an adverse effect on welfare. Similarly, death from age-
related diseases signals the end of all choice and welfare. Ageing can also lead to a failure of 
bodily integrity since it reduces one’s ability to have full control over one’s body.  
The empirical premise P12 claims that a refusal to pursue ageing enhancement will avoid 
unsustainable overpopulation. This may be untrue because avoiding ageing enhancement may 
not be sufficient to avoid overpopulation. But even if it is true, it should now be clear that it 
                                                                                                                                                      
Quiggin (2012), both discussions of how the technological advancements of the 20th century have not led, 
as some (including Keynes) predicted, to an increase in leisure time because of economic forces.  
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does not connect with the moral premise P10 in the right way to complete the argument. P10 
says that we should avoid an act A which, if pursued, would lead to a number of people falling 
below a threshold T, but only if not pursuing A avoided that unwelcome result. But as I have 
argued, not pursuing ageing enhancement will bring a number of people below T: people who 
would have benefitted from ageing enhancement. So a version of the Overpopulation Objection 
that defends P12 by appeal to something like fundamental interests in reproduction also 
undermines its own conclusion (C2) that we clearly ought to avoid ageing enhancement, or at 
least highlights the incompleteness of that conclusion. That is, even if it is true that there are 
strong moral reasons to avoid ageing enhancement – if the only effective alternative is an 
unacceptable kind of reproductive control – there are also similarly strong reasons of the same 
kind to support it. We either need to think of a third option or, if none is available, find some 
other way of deciding between two unattractive options. If rejecting ageing enhancement and 
placing constraints on reproduction are the only options, it may of course be that on balance it 
is better to reject ageing enhancement; but this cannot be decided authoritatively by the claim 
that ageing enhancement will (indirectly) harm many people, because not pursuing ageing 
enhancement will also harm many people.  
7.6 Summary 
This chapter outlined the Overpopulation Objection, and considered some initial responses to 
it. A number of suggestions relating to controls on reproduction were found wanting from an 
ethical standpoint. While there are ethically permissible ways to curb reproduction, I suggested 
that it is at least unclear whether these would be sufficiently effective to balance the population 
growth generated by significant ageing enhancement, while sufficiently effective incentives may 
threaten people’s fundamental interests and lose their ethical permissibility.  
However, I also suggested that this does not lend much support to the Overpopulation 
Objection, since a refusal to pursue ageing enhancement also threatens fundamental interests. If 
failure to extend life is also harmful to fundamental interests, then there is no simple argument 
from the view that restrictions on reproduction threaten fundamental interests to the conclusion 
that we should not pursue ageing enhancement. 
If threatening fundamental interests renders an act impermissible, then many forms of 
reproductive control are ruled out, but so is a refusal to pursue ageing enhancement. But this 
seems an implausible position, since it implies that it is morally impermissible to refuse any life-
saving intervention. More plausibly, undermining fundamental interests gives us a strong but 
defeasible reason to avoid a particular choice; but these reasons may need to be weighed against 
one another. On this view, empirical factors will decide whether it is better to curb 
reproduction, refuse ageing enhancement, or even allow overpopulation (assuming that the only 
objection to this is itself the effect on fundamental interests for many people).  
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As I briefly outlined in Section 7.4, there is a further option, which is to focus primarily on 
consumption. It may not allow completely unrestricted reproduction or avoid all restrictions on 
ageing enhancement; but it at least gives us some leeway to try to avoid the worst excesses of 



























Chapter 8: The Overpopulation Objection – Consumption 
and risks  
I have suggested that although addressing there are potentially permissible ways to address 
overpopulation by regulating reproduction, even these face problematic tensions between 
efficacy and respect for fundamental interests. However, an appeal to fundamental interests 
cannot by itself rule out the pursuit of ageing enhancement, because fundamental interests are 
also involved in the provision and denial of enhancement. Although further argument might 
decide between these two options, this chapter argues that an alternative approach, which 
focuses on consumption, is preferable.  
Section 8.1 suggests two points of clarification about the concept of overpopulation. As I 
suggested in Chapter 7, the question of whether an area – including the world – is 
overpopulated can only be answered by reference to some threshold, below which population 
increase threatens to bring some unacceptable number of people. As Ryberg (1998, 413) puts it 
“Overpopulation is a normative concept...That a population is too large cannot...be deduced from 
any statistical data about population size, growth or density [alone]”. I also outline Ord’s (2014) 
distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ limits when it comes to overpopulation. Concerns about 
overpopulation are indeterminate between these two.  
This has implications for the relevance of consumption: Section 8.2 argues that if we are only 
concerned with soft limits, we should prefer reductions in consumption over curtailments of 
reproduction or refusal to engage in life-extending medical interventions, including ageing 
enhancement, because the interests involved in the latter two are considerably more morally 
compelling. This section argues for universal consumption reductions over making access to 
enhancement contingent on consumption behaviour, and considers some ethical worries about 
state intervention in reducing consumption. 
It is morally best to reduce consumption and pursue ageing enhancement. However, Section 8.3 
considers a worry that even if we could, and should, take this route we will not in fact change 
our consumption behaviour as required. Instead, we will pursue ageing enhancement under the 
guise of a commitment to cut consumption, but then fail to do so, leading to a worse situation 
than if we had avoided enhancement in the first place. This leads me in Section 8.4 to consider 
the role of uncertainty in our moral decision making. I suggest that an appeal to risk cannot 
mandate against research into ageing enhancement – and indeed demands it – but I also argue 
in Section 8.4.1 that risk might inform how we actually implement ageing enhancement, and 
how we should prepare for it.  
It is worth acknowledging that economic stagnation, a potential problem raised against 
reproductive controls at the end of Chapter 7, is also connected by many economists with 
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reductions in consumption (although this idea has been criticised).84 So there may be similar 
tensions between national demands for increased consumption to maintain economic growth, 
and global requirements for reduced consumption in developed nations. If both plausible 
responses to overpopulation risk economic decline, that can hardly be an objection to either (so 
long as we judge economic decline less serious than overpopulation).  
Nonetheless, several considerations favour a focus on consumption. First, some ways of 
‘reducing’ consumption actually involve transferring consumption to different media e.g. a 
transfer to renewable energy sources. The unwieldy nature of policies to control population size 
through influencing individual reproductive decisions – especially with such blunt tools as 
financial incentives – coupled with countervailing pressure (real or perceived) to increase 
population levels locally suggest that reductions in consumption may be necessary in any case. 
And as I will suggest in Section 8.2, a focus on consumption is in any case ethically preferable to 
a focus on reproduction.  
8.1 Soft and hard limits  
A concern about overpopulation is essentially a concern that we will breach various sustainable 
limits, of space, resources, and other finite goods. As Ord (2014) argues, we should distinguish 
between two kinds of limit with respect to population growth. “Soft limits” occur when a 
population size will have unwanted results if we do not change our behaviour, but ethically 
acceptable changes are available that would avoid these results. According to Ord (55), soft 
limits are “really a sort of cost” rather than a limit as such. Many of us enjoy our current level of 
consumption, and may want to increase it, so it would be costly to rein ourselves in; but since 
there are avenues that are (practically and morally) open to us which will avoid catastrophe, we 
cannot really conceive of soft limits as limits. While Ord is right that soft limits are not limits in 
the sense that we are incapable of surmounting them, it is perhaps misleading from a policy 
perspective to suppose that soft limits are not ‘really’ limits; there are all sorts of ethically 
permissible changes we might make to accommodate greater population that require significant 
changes to our lifestyles, and which any government or other institution would face significant 
resistance in pursuing. Soft limits are limits in a perfectly meaningful sense.  
Still, they are not the most stringent kind of limit; there are also population levels whose 
consumption pressures cannot be accommodated by even quite significant (ethically acceptable) 
changes in behaviour, so that we “can’t exceed that population without disaster” (56). These are 
                                                     
84 e.g. Jolly et al (1998: 1). My definition of consumption differs from a mainstream economic definition, 
which counts consumption as consumer spending, in contrast with production. My understanding of 
consumption includes production in this sense, so even those who argue that economic consumption is 
not a major driver of growth, but production is, may worry from this perspective about restrictions on 
‘consumption’ as I understand it. 
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“hard limits”. And without behavioural changes, soft limits result in similarly disastrous results 
as hard ones. 
Ord argues that we are currently approaching various soft limits, but that because there are 
significant changes we can make, we cannot yet see ourselves as broaching hard limits (55). Of 
course, even if Ord is right about this, we cannot necessarily surmise that ageing enhancement 
too will bring us only to soft limits. There is a possibility – depending on its effectiveness, 
uptake and other external factors – that certain levels of ageing enhancement will bring about 
hard limits. Our current position with respect to that possibility is one of uncertainty, so hard 
limits constitute a risk of ageing enhancement, an issue I address in Section 8.4. Before that, 
Section 8.2 argues that if ageing enhancement only involves soft limits then we should prefer 
changes in consumption to restrictions on reproduction or a refusal to engage in ageing 
enhancement.  
8.2 Is it ethical to reduce consumption? 
This section defends the claim that if we are approaching soft limits, we ought to prefer 
reductions in consumption to restrictions on reproduction, or refusal to save and extend lives. 
This does not entail the claim that reductions in consumption will be sufficient, only that they 
should be our initial recourse. 
While some levels of consumption reduction may not require significant changes in living 
standards, others will. So if I am right that even quite significant reductions in consumption are 
preferable to a refusal to extend people’s lives or controls on reproduction, this implies that we 
should prefer to reduce living standards rather than reduce absolute population size up until we 
hit a lower threshold of quality of life, at which point we should switch our attention to 
reducing numbers instead (although if we can reduce numbers voluntarily and without coercion, 
then that is of course preferable to a reduction in living standards). I will now consider some 
possible objections to this claim.  
One worry is that this claim bears similarity to Parfit’s (1984: 381-391) infamous “repugnant 
conclusion” that under certain conditions we are morally obligated to increase a population’s 
size, even if that significantly decreases quality of life, up to the point where everyone has a life 
that is only just barely worth living. As Parfit says, this conclusion seems morally repugnant; but 
it might appear that a policy that uniformly prefers cutting quality of life (until some minimal 
threshold for individuals) over refusing to extend lives or intervening in reproduction faces a 
similarly appalling logic.  
However, I have not argued that we have an obligation to create new individuals where we can 
– and indeed, I rejected that claim at the start of Chapter 7 – so my claim is not nearly so 
demanding as the repugnant conclusion. There is no obligation on people to procreate where 
that would increase the number of barely tolerable lives in existence; rather, the obligation is not 
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to restrict procreative rights in ways that are coercive or invasive, or to refuse to extend people’s 
lives, where cuts in consumption could address the worries associated with increased 
population.  
Moreover, the intuitive repugnance of Parfit’s conclusion seems to depend on the assumption 
that the threshold is extremely low, so that we imagine vast numbers of people not with 
worthwhile existence, but with just barely tolerable existence. I suggested in Chapter 4 that the 
idea of tolerability should contribute to a lower sufficientarian threshold. But I also insisted that 
sufficientarians need not aim to maximise the number of people with tolerable lives, as the 
repugnant conclusion insists. Rather, in outlining what constitutes excess consumption, we 
should refer back to the second sufficientarian factor in a lower threshold, worthwhile 
existence. When thinking about levels of consumption, the idea of a worthwhile existence 
implies that it is ethically preferable to reduce consumption levels to the point at which people 
consider their existence worthwhile, or could reasonably be supposed to do so if they made 
such judgements. There is no reason why that judgement might not include, for many of us, 
some of things that may superficially seem to fall by the wayside when we talk about cutting 
‘unnecessary’ consumption. If a life of bare subsistence is judged by most people not 
worthwhile – and it is surely such a judgement that makes the repugnant conclusion seem so 
repugnant – then the view I have outlined draws the line of ‘excess’ consumption above bare 
subsistence, so that it makes some reference to culture, frivolity, and so forth. Many of us in the 
developed world are very far above even this line in our current consumption habits. In 
principle, there seems no reason to think that there is a repugnant conclusion at the end of the 
claim that we ought to prefer cutting excess consumption in many cases over refusing to save 
lives or constraining reproduction. 
A more plausible concern is that some people would reasonably prefer to forego ageing 
enhancement than face significant cuts in their levels of consumption. So we face a parallel issue 
to that faced by many proponents of reproductive controls as a response to ageing 
enhancement: some people reasonably prefer not to make the relevant trade, and it seems prima 
facie unattractive to force on option on them when they prefer the other. The best option is 
presumably to give people a free choice; since either preference is reasonable, it is prima facie 
better to offer both options.. One way of doing this is by tying access to enhancement to 
personal reductions in consumption, akin to the proposals on reproduction (Reversal; Sterilise; 
and Sterilise+) described in Section 7.3. Unlike reproduction, consumption really is for many 
people something over which they have individual control, and so does not face the problem of 
unavoidably tying one person’s access to ageing enhancement to another’s decision. 
But there are problems with this policy. Not everyone does have significant control over their 
consumption patterns. Children and other dependants are a clear case; although from a policy 
perspective we could clearly insist on the link being implemented after a particular age 
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threshold, such a caveat clearly reduces the ameliorative force of making access to enhancement 
conditional on consumption habits. And while many states already have reliable systems for 
monitoring personal reproduction, the monitoring of personal consumption habits would 
require significantly more comprehensive surveillance of citizens. Perhaps we could set things 
up so that people who wanted to access ageing enhancement would be barred from certain 
consumption-intensive industries, or establish some technology for tracking personal 
consumption. This looks practically demanding, and far more intrusive than other options; our 
route from our current society to there is unclear, though not impossible. 
A further problem is that if those who undergo ageing enhancement contribute to population 
growth not just by not dying, but also by having more children, these additional people might 
choose not to constrain their consumption; the consumption impact of one enhanced person 
might thus be larger than they could cancel out by cutting their personal consumption.  
Most problematically, the most effective method of curbing consumption is likely to involve a 
focus on resource-intensive production, and to engage in large-scale transformation of energy 
usage and product availability at a systemic level. While overall consumption is reducible in 
some sense to individual decisions, those decisions are made within social and economic 
contexts that have significant impact on the overall picture. This is not to say that there is 
nothing individuals can do about their consumption habits, although this clearly varies 
depending on personal circumstance; but to focus on individual consumption habits is to miss 
the systemic problems involved in wasteful and excessive consumption. Even if it were morally 
permissible to focus solely on individual consumption when individuals can only choose among 
the array of options available to them, the practicalities and politics of such a divided society 
look significantly demanding, especially if ageing enhancement is widely adopted, and the 
comparative effectiveness of such targeted restrictions is questionable.  
Still, since preferences for consumption and ageing enhancement are both prudentially 
reasonable, one might think that even if we must choose a single policy to apply to everyone, 
there is nothing to choose between them; either way, some people will have a significant cost 
imposed on them for a benefit which, in their eyes, is not worth it.  
But there are important differences between what it is reasonable to prefer as an individual, and 
what it is appropriate to impose on others. According to time-relative sufficientarianism, we 
have greater reason to avoid people falling below sufficiency than to avoid them incurring other 
costs. A failure to pursue ageing enhancement compromises time-relative sufficientarianism 
because it threatens fundamental interests. But restrictions on consumption do not necessarily 
suffer the same problem. This marks an important difference in our collective choice that is 
absent in individual preferences.   
Excess consumption does often involve interests that I characterised as fundamental in Chapter 
7. For instance, consumption is a source of personal welfare and restricting it involves limiting 
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free choice. This suggests a need for further refinement of the idea of fundamental interests; 
categories such as ‘welfare’ and ‘personal choice’ are too broad to give us a reasonable 
restriction on policy. For instance, while exercise of choice is important, such that curtailment 
of choice by the state always requires justification, it does not follow that all instances of 
exercising choice are equally in need of protection. Some choices are trivial to the chooser, and 
a great deal of consumption involves choices that fall in this category. Some research suggests 
that people make a conceptual distinction in their consumption habits between necessary and 
luxury consumption (e.g. Lunt and Livingstone, 1992: 150-158), although this distinction may 
shift according to social and economic context, and even according to the framework within 
which people were considering the distinction (e.g. subsistence necessity versus ‘modern life’ 
necessity). This implies that even as consumers we make a distinction between choices that are 
fundamentally important, and choices we make simply because we are able to. This maps onto 
the idea of a worthwhile existence; some choices relate to matters that people judge centrally 
important to having a worthwhile life, whereas many others do not. And even if there is 
considerable deviation between different individuals, from a policy perspective we can again 
assume some core commonality of the kinds of decisions that people will think it fundamentally 
important to have free choice over.  
One worry is that reducing consumption is overly intrusive compared with refusal to pursue 
ageing enhancement, since the latter only involves inaction. The truth of this claim will depend 
on certain facts about the affordability of enhancement; if certain optimistic views discussed in 
Section 6.3.2 are correct, ageing enhancement might eventually be sufficiently inexpensive that 
many people will be able to afford it; if we have chosen a rejection of ageing enhancement as 
our route to avoiding overpopulation, the state might have to intervene if sufficient numbers of 
people were able to make use of the technology.  
Control of quite general consumption by the state also need not be as intrusive as regulating the 
minutiae of individual behaviour. The idea of the state restricting consumption can conjure 
images of bureaucrats coming round to individual homes to assess how long each individual is 
spending in the shower; to have such a regime applied to all areas of consumption would be 
egregiously intrusive, and practically unworkable. But we can see large-scale efficiency 
improvements in consumption practices by quite general measures: governments can change 
investment policies; levy prohibitive taxation;85 pass environmental regulations that place the 
burden of saving on manufacturers and distributors; prohibit certain products from entering the 
market; and implement efficiency measures on a mass scale. Indeed, some environmentalists 
insist that an important way to tackle overconsumption is not by assuming that individual 
consumers are at fault, but by addressing systemic pressures that lead companies to produce in 
excess. For instance, Fitz (2013) says that “instead of focusing on food eaten by individual 
                                                     
85 Although this runs the risk of disproportionately affecting the worst off if not managed well.  
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consumers, rationing by production would severely limit the amount of resources going into 
packaging, processing, chemicalizing, storing, transporting and genetically engineering food”.86 
It may still seem unjustified to impose significant cuts in consumption on a population, even in 
the name of a considerable benefit, without consulting them, especially if those who prefer to 
maintain current levels of consumption are in the majority. One response to this is to suggest a 
referendum on the issue; if the majority of people prefer foregoing ageing enhancement, then it 
would be deemed illegitimate to impose it on them at the cost of significant cuts in 
consumption.  
I will consider a further, pragmatic argument for this in Section 8.5. But proponents of this kind 
of argument must be cautious. As Saunders (2010) notes, democratic legitimacy is a broader 
concept than mere majoritarianism. It would not be democratically legitimate, for instance, to 
vote for the violation of a social minority’s basic legal rights, even if most of us preferred that 
policy. While I do not suggest that extending people’s lives, or supporting medical interventions 
that would avoid them becoming significantly frail, should be basic legal rights, this point 
nonetheless retains some of its force when applied to the diminution of fundamental interests. 
Democracy in a broad sense demands that we respect one another as citizens, which includes 
enabling a basic ability to function in society; this may include access to certain kinds of health 
intervention. This by no means demands that we take all and every measure available, but it 
does suggest that a simple majoritarian vote may not be a legitimate way to decide on this issue.  
A further worry has a more global scope. Even if current levels of consumption in wealthy 
countries are excessive, there are countries in which we ought to support and facilitate 
economic development because of the poor quality of life experienced by many of their 
residents. Development requires resource consumption, and developed countries use more 
resources per capita. So a further worry is that a focus on consumption clashes with the 
obligation to support economic development. Weld (2012: 57) puts this charge forcefully when 
she says that “those who claim consumption is the problem consider the poor virtuous only as 
long as they remain poor”. A focus on consumption, goes the charge, commits us to rejecting 
the claims of the worst off to economic development. 
But while one could take the restriction of consumption to mandate the rejection of 
development aims, this is not necessary.87 Focus on consumption derives its legitimacy from the 
expected impact on fundamental interests of alternatives. If a focus on reducing consumption is 
taken so far that it mandates keeping individuals at levels of development that substantially 
affect their fundamental interests, then it undermines its own rationale.  
                                                     
86 One might agree with some of these and not others. Genetic modification of food is contentious 
among many on the environmental left, but we need to beware of automatically dismissing technologies 
that have the ability to provide basic nourishment to many more people.  
87 See, for example, the United Nations’ Division for Sustainable Development.  
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An overall reduction in consumption also need not demand equal reductions everywhere. It 
may be that developing countries cannot follow the same path to development as has been 
enjoyed by currently wealthy countries. But this does not mean that those countries cannot 
continue to develop while wealthy countries make the first and most significant moves in 
cutting consumption. This involves sacrifice on the part of both groups; developing countries 
must resign themselves to eschewing the heights of wealth currently enjoyed by developed 
countries, who must in turn accept the imperative to cut first and further. Developed countries 
should not attempt, either rhetorically or through more robust pressure, to cap economic 
development in other countries at levels below which they would not be prepared to find 
themselves.88 
8.3 Moral failure  
If ageing enhancement will not make us breach soft limits, there is no distinct problem of 
overpopulation. If it will bring us up against soft limits, the right thing to do is to control 
consumption. And if hard limits are in store, then a focus on consumption is still preferable, 
even if we must also make more fundamental sacrifices, perhaps including restrictions on 
enhancement and/or reproduction. 
However, this range of options does not tell us what to do currently, because we do not know 
which of these scenarios will emerge. Even if we could be sure that ageing enhancement would 
only bring the population up to soft limits, establishing that we could cope by reducing our 
consumption in such a case does not demonstrate that we will do so, for we may not be willing 
to change.89 This might support a pragmatic argument that acknowledges that there are morally 
feasible ways to engage in ageing enhancement, but denies that these routes are sufficiently 
likely that we can rely on them; since we will not in fact engage in the right mitigating 
behaviours, we should act as if such escape routes were unavailable.  
To see how this argument would work, take the analogous, more mainstream debate over 
whether a response to overpopulation should focus on reproduction or consumption. Kates 
(2004) and Cafaro (2012) both claim that regulating reproduction is the only feasible option, 
irrespective of whether a focus on consumption is morally preferable, because the necessary 
cuts in consumption are politically and personally infeasible. Cafaro claims we should focus on 
reproduction because of the “unwillingness of most governments” and the fact that “human 
beings have proven selfish and short-sighted” (50) when it comes to curbing consumption. 
Kates (71) appeals to public unwillingness to cut personal consumption, claiming that “it is 
                                                     
88 As Harris (1997) shows, wealth transfers from wealthy to poor countries to alleviate environmental 
pressure are justifiable from a range of views on justice.  
89 Ord (56) also notes this issue, though he does not discuss it in detail.  
141 
 
likely that, faced with a choice between population reduction or dramatic reductions in 
consumption...most people would choose the former”.  
Although neither author discusses it, this worry about ‘moral failure’ may have implications for 
ageing enhancement. If governments support ageing enhancement (which, in certain 
circumstances, I have claimed they should), but we find that this will threaten soft limits, they 
should also implement consumption controls; if they will not do the latter, they cannot justify 
the former. But, says the extended moral failure objection, governments will not try to control 
consumption (or reproduction) because they know that they will quickly be voted out of office 
if they try to, that their citizens will not countenance such controls, and that special interest 
groups and lobbyists will revoke influential financial and vocal support. This would then result 
in ageing enhancement without mitigating policies, translating soft limits into de facto hard limits. 
If overpopulation is severe, this may lead to greater overall harm (and, as I will note below, a 
harm that is more unfairly distributed) than refusing to engage in ageing enhancement. So 
according to the argument from moral failure, we ought not to engage in ageing enhancement 
even if there is a permissible way to do so, because we will not take that permissible option. It 
thus assumes that since we will not behave as we ought to once we access ageing enhancement, 
we ought not to start down that road at all.  
One might conclude that this shows that although it was right to consider alternatives to 
reproductive controls, they are ultimately our best option. As Chapter 7 acknowledged, there are 
ways of regulating reproduction that, while somewhat unattractive, need not be impermissibly 
so. And if we are to focus on population numbers, as Cafaro and Kates insist, Cutas and Harris 
(2007: 797-798) note that reproduction currently contributes to population growth in a way that 
dwarfs the contribution of advances in life-extending medical care. So it may seem that Cafaro 
and Kates and – albeit from a different perspective – the majority of ageing enhancement 
proponents have things right, and we should turn to reproductive controls after all. 
However, things are not so simple, particularly if we consider more radical increase to lifespans. 
It is overly simplistic to separate out the contributions of births and (avoided) deaths to 
overpopulation; a birth rate can only be meaningfully said to contribute to a certain level of 
population growth given a particular death rate. When the death rate drops, as it would under 
ageing enhancement, the degree to which reproduction would have to be cut to achieve the 
same reduction in population growth also increases.90  
It is worth reiterating that we also cannot rely, as Cutas and Harris (ibid) appear to, on the 
thought that ageing enhancement would predominantly benefit those in wealthy countries 
where fertility is already quite low, and shows no sign of increasing; as I have said, if the real 
concern is the increase in consumption that derives from population growth, population 
increases in the developed world, even if slower than that in the developing world, ought to 
                                                     
90 This may be less of a problem for Cafaro and Kates, if they would also oppose ageing enhancement.  
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worry us more in global terms. The greater the effect of ageing enhancement, the more 
restrictive we would have to be on reproduction if population numbers were our focus. And 
this reduces both the ethical permissibility and, importantly for the argument in question, the 
popular acceptability, of necessary restrictions on reproduction. Indeed, what is striking about 
the pessimistic argument offered by Cafaro and Kates is that it moves from popular 
unwillingness to act on consumption to a recommendation that the state constrains 
reproduction. But there is no reason to be more optimistic about reproductive restrictions 
targeted at well-off members of wealthy countries, who already have fairly low birth rates and 
are less likely to be amenable to the levels of financial incentives that traditional targets of such 
population policies – i.e. poor people – may feel forced to accept.  
In fact, it seems likely that a refusal to engage in ageing enhancement is the most plausible in 
terms of public acceptability. As I noted in Section 7.3, there is a possible argument that 
although ageing enhancement is not intrinsically different to other medical interventions, its lack 
of integration in popular expectations is a morally relevant extrinsic difference. A similar 
argument might be offered here; although a refusal to engage in ageing enhancement is morally 
worse than controls on consumption (and maybe, depending on the mechanism, on 
reproduction) it is morally better that some action be taken than none, and ageing enhancement 
may be the most feasible target. So if Cafaro’s and Kates’ pessimism is justified, and we are in 
fact facing overpopulation that we simply will not take appropriate action against, foregoing 
ageing enhancement seems a viable option. Of course, if they are right then this alone will not 
solve the problem. But at the very least, it will not increase the pressure on population size or 
consumption, reducing the political difficulty of the further task of coping with an already 
sizeable concern.   
The asymmetry in this argument between consumption and reproduction on the one hand, and 
ageing enhancement on the other is a pragmatic difference, where some activities are embedded 
in our social practices so that they are difficult to reverse in a democratic way, and others are 
not. With novel and controversial91 technologies such as ageing enhancement, there may be less 
resistance to a refusal to adopt the technology than to imposing burdens on existing practices. 
First, as I have noted, a failure to benefit is non-intrusive, and foregoing ageing enhancement 
might – depending on the level of uptake – only require inaction. Second, people tend to regret 
less severely foregone benefits than the loss of benefits we already have (see e.g. Tversky and 
Kahnemann, 1984), even if the two are equivalent in value. So the fact that ageing enhancement 
is a novel technology may be a politically relevant factor in how easy it would be to regulate.  
                                                     
91 See, e.g. Pew Research Center (2013), which suggests that “more [Americans] think it would be a bad 
thing than a good thing for society if people lived decades longer than is possible today”. I do not mean 
to endorse this conclusion, only to point out that realistic moral proposals have to take account of how 
people will actually behave.  
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So even if the morally ideal option is to pursue ageing enhancement along with (perhaps 
significant) changes in our consumption, if we will not in fact make those changes then we 
ought not to pursue ageing enhancement. As Baker (2012) puts it, “when our vices will lead to 
problems, we ought to opt for less damage”, even if a more virtuous response is available, and 
would have us choose differently.92 Even though governments really ought to reduce 
consumption and support ageing enhancement, this should not change our practical advice if 
they won’t behave as they ought. If governments withdrew support for ageing enhancement 
because of the strength of popular opinion against reductions in consumption, or because of 
the threats of lobbyists, they would have been pressured into doing the wrong thing. But it is 
the wrong thing that we can nonetheless say that they ‘should’ do, at least in some sense of 
‘should’, given relevant assumptions. Of course, this kind of argument does not single out 
ageing enhancement alone; as I suggested in earlier discussion it seems likely to identify a 
number of novel life-extending treatments that do not yet have the advantage of being 
embedded in our expectations.  
Still, the argument guides us only if we in fact will not engage in appropriate control of our 
consumption or reproduction; it does not apply simply when the right action would be difficult 
or costly. Predictions about the feasibility of restrictions on consumption are less reliable than 
the moral failure objection implies. Cafaro and Kates cite our past unwillingness to voluntarily 
restrict our consumption as evidence that restrictions on consumption are infeasible. But rather 
than indicating that people are too selfish to change, this may indicate a sense of the futility of 
acting alone. For instance, people may be concerned with issues related to overconsumption, 
but feel that there is little purpose in modifying their own behaviour without reassurance that 
this would be replicated by government, business and other individuals,93 or face uncertainty 
about how to begin what may seem like an overwhelming task94 – precisely the kind of 
coordination that state intervention could achieve. While this is not conclusive evidence that we 
will make the necessary changes, we also cannot move so easily from the failure of individuals 
to reduce consumption to the idea that we will collectively punish a government that made 
significant changes. As such, it seems as though we are in fact dealing with a question of risk 
rather than certainty. 
                                                     
92 An appeal to the right to life cannot help here (e.g. Cutas, 2008). If we do not significantly restrict our 
consumption, access to ageing enhancement competes with the effects of significantly worse climate 
change and other results of overconsumption; the resulting environmental and resource catastrophes will 
lead to deaths that otherwise would not have occurred, so lives are at risk either way. 
93 e.g. The Harwood Group (1995)  
94 e.g. Newton and Meyer (2013)  
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8.4 Imposing risk   
I have considered various worries about how population – and consumption – might become a 
sufficiently significant concern to merit a refusal to pursue ageing enhancement. Ageing 
enhancement might take us to a hard limit in terms of consumption that would require 
unethical responses to mitigate. It might produce a soft limit that would, due to our moral 
intransigence, effectively be a hard limit.  
The issue that ends this chapter, and the thesis, is risk. The threat of overpopulation is 
unnerving, but it is not guaranteed; different possible levels of overpopulation constitute risks 
of engaging in ageing enhancement. These risks are not easily quantifiable; they are thus not just 
risks but ‘uncertainties’.95 That is partly due to the intervention under consideration; human 
ageing enhancement is not currently feasible, so we cannot so easily constrain possibilities when 
we consider how effective, how widely adopted, or how expensive it might be. There are also 
uncertainties about how people will behave in an ageing-enhanced world. Perhaps they will 
recognise the need to cut consumption or reproduction. Perhaps they will do so voluntarily as 
they adapt to a new extended lifestyle, or perhaps they will demand extended life without 
sacrifice. For all that Kates and Casal rely on past failure to predict future intransigence, a future 
of ageing enhancement is uncertain. 
Since even the probability of these risks is unknown, we cannot rely in any simple way on 
traditional tools of decision-making such as cost-benefit analysis. We need to consider how to 
act given significant uncertainty. This is a common feature of novel technologies, but there is a 
complicating consideration for ageing enhancement; while for many technologies the 
uncertainties that concern us would result from the technology misfiring, the overpopulation 
concern for ageing enhancement increases as the technology is more successful and widely 
adopted. This means that whereas in a typical case our desire for successful functioning will 
ideally lead to measures that reduce risk, a desire for successful ageing enhancement increases 
certain risks. If we want ageing enhancement to be widely accessible, not simply reserved for the 
privileged, greater success again means greater negative impact. 
Other uncertainties with regard to ageing enhancement and overpopulation do not obviously 
have this feature; it seems unlikely that people would be less willing to change their reproductive 
or consumption behaviours the more successful and widely adopted ageing enhancement 
becomes. But proponents of ageing enhancement cannot simply engage in platitudes about 
minimising risk, since some risk is at least partially predicated on the central aim of ageing 
                                                     
95 Knight (1921) classifies risks as possibilities whose odds we can know, and uncertainties as those whose 
odds we cannot. I will use the term slightly differently, where uncertainties are risks whose probability is 
inaccessible given our current epistemic situation. On this view, new information might transform an 
uncertainty into a risk.  
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enhancement. In part, how effective we can allow ageing enhancement to be depends on public 
willingness to alter behaviours. As such I will focus on this uncertainty in discussion. 
One strategy when faced with uncertainty is to adopt the ‘precautionary principle’ (PP). As 
Harris and Holm (2002) note, it is misleading to say that there is a single principle described by 
all mentions of PP, but one interpretation is that where there is a suspected harm from a novel 
practice, the burden falls on proponents to prove that the harm will not occur, or will not be 
significant. Further demands may include that this principle applies even when those concerns 
lack demonstrated links with the technology in question.96 In the absence of such proof, PP says 
that we should take some aversive action, such as a moratorium or ban on research.  
As Harris and Holm argue, this is unwarrantedly risk-averse, and effectively rules out the 
development of any new technology so long as we can dream up some possible disaster that 
might occur from it.97 Moreover, it is by now a familiar criticism that the principle as stated 
ignores harms that can occur from failing to employ novel technologies, and which can be as 
bad as or worse than harms of application (e.g. Sunstein, 2003). Harris and Holm further claim 
that any version of PP that exhibits sufficiently weak risk-aversion to become plausible will have 
to include some reference to proportional risk, and hence recommend the gathering and 
weighing of evidence of harms and benefits in the usual fashion, rather than the kinds of 
moratoria or bans that often feature in versions of PP. 
Several distinct points emerge when applying this discussion to ageing enhancement. An 
application of some variant of PP to ageing enhancement need not invoke one of the more 
questionable elements of the PP that Harris and Holm criticise, that there need be no 
demonstrated link between a technology and a possible harmful effect. The links between 
lowering death rates and population increase, and between population increase and 
consumption, are in principle clear. And even if our collective failure to control our 
consumption thus far does not reliably predict the future as Cafaro and Kates assume, that 
failure does demonstrate the plausibility of some political obstacles that figure in their concerns. 
So if there is an available version of PP that does not invoke this strong demand, but does not 
collapse as Harris and Holm suggest into an injunction to gather more information, it might be 
applicable to ageing enhancement. Such a view would say that when a novel technology 
                                                     
96 Even if the normal evidential boundaries do not apply, I assume that some kind of conceivability 
boundaries must. While I will criticise the principle as it stands, it would be obviously indefensible to 
insist that proponents of novel technologies must answer to any and all worries, no matter how 
outlandish.  
97 Weaker versions of PP might suggest that we take stronger than normal preventive or safety measures 
in the face of uncertainty. But even this is problematic. Without some baseline to decide what constitutes 
normal precaution, even weak PP risks saddling new technologies with prohibitively expensive and 
onerous safety regulations.  
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threatens some harm through established links, but we cannot plausibly even estimate the 
probability of this occurring, some (as yet undetermined) precautionary action is appropriate.  
Precisely what that precautionary action is will depend in part on whether we are considering 
research into a technology or its application. With regard to research, another of Harris and 
Holm’s comments is relevant: if we are ignorant about risk, research is the proper response 
according to usual standards of choice (2002: 362). If PP tells us that the proper precautionary 
activity is to gather more data so that we can make a more informed decision, it fails to be a 
distinct position with regard to research, for it essentially tells us to carry on as normal. And it 
seems clear that if we are considering research into ageing enhancement, a moratorium or ban 
on relevant research is not an appropriate response to the risk of overpopulation; it may even be 
a requirement that we support some research into how effective ageing enhancement will be, 
since that will allow us to make a more informed decision on a technology where both 
implementation and prohibition could have significant costs.   
Still, since scientific research on effectiveness is only one part of the total relevant evidence 
regarding the risk of overpopulation, we are left with the question of what to do if we develop a 
workable enhancement, and we have some notion of its effectiveness, but we are still unsure 
about its overall impact due to the other risks (in particular, moral intransigence) mentioned in 
this chapter. Section 8.4.1 discusses this issue.  
8.4.1 Application  
Assume that we know roughly how effective ageing enhancement will be, and how popular its 
uptake, and so have some idea of what level of consumption reduction we must engage in (and 
also that reducing consumption will be sufficient). We are thus still faced with uncertainty over 
public willingness to accept reductions in consumption. It seems clear that, just as with research 
into the effectiveness of ageing enhancement, we should attempt to gather information on this 
uncertainty. However, unlike the issue of strict research, gathering evidence here is consistent 
with a moratorium on actual implementation. So perhaps a restricted version of PP, which tells 
us to hold fire on application of ageing enhancement until we have resolved the uncertainties 
involved in our risk assessments, could be both plausible and distinctive. In the absence of clear 
evidence that people will accept the necessary behavioural changes, this principle says that we 
should assume they will not.  
This ignores another of Harris and Holm’s objections, that PP contains a significant bias toward 
inaction, even when inaction also has significant costs. For ageing enhancement, this cost is 
numerous deaths from old age, and significant suffering caused by physical senescence. So we 
are still faced with risk of harm on each side. In fact, the uncertainty in this case is asymmetrical 
in a way that may favour ageing enhancement. While we have established that we cannot be 
sure whether overpopulation will occur, we can be sure that people will die if we do not extend 
their lives. This asymmetry does not apply pre-research; at that stage, since we cannot be sure 
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how effective the intervention is, we also cannot be sure how much harm we risk imposing if 
we refuse to research ageing enhancement. Once we have established these facts, there is greater 
certainty of the risk involved if we refuse to apply ageing enhancement than if we hold back. 
However, even if we can establish the costs of refusal, if we are uncertain about the risks of 
overpopulation we will also be uncertain whether the expected cost outweighs the expected 
benefit. So any asymmetry cannot ultimately resolve the question in proponents’ favour. 
Two further important features of ageing enhancement that are not present in all novel 
technologies are consent and the distribution of risks and benefits. Harris and Holm criticise 
PP’s injunction to avoid any activity that risks harm to humans as impossibly restrictive, noting 
that it “entails that the inventor of apple pie should have applied the PP, and let the first pie be 
the last, since there have been people who have choked on apple pie” (360). This is a reasonable 
criticism of PP itself, but one feature of the risk associated with apple pie that is not present 
with ageing enhancement and many other technologies is that the individual taking on the risk is 
able to consent to it on the basis of the expected benefit.  
The absence of consent may be a morally salient difference; as Ryan (2007:174) puts it, while we 
might “think someone foolish to drive at high speed round a racetrack [risking only himself]; we 
would think him wicked if he did it...on a busy main road [risking others]”. The thought here is 
that the same harm, with the same probability, requires greater caution if the risks involved are 
not consented to. Shrader-Frechette (1991: 105) suggests that we should make a clear moral 
distinction between chosen and imposed risks.   
This seems overly restrictive; when you drive a car, putting fellow drivers at risk, it is not true 
that they have chosen that risk. What they have chosen to do is drive, albeit in the knowledge 
that they risk an accident. But as Thomson (1986) notes, choosing to take a risk is not 
equivalent to consenting to that risk. Hansson (2007: 31) suggests that we should instead refer 
to a system of risk imposition; while you might not choose the risk I put you under as a fellow 
driver, you also put me under the same risk when you drive; since we all benefit from this 
system of risks, and engage voluntarily in it, we can be seen as consenting to it. Even this seems 
too restrictive; if we required everyone who was put at risk by a practice to also be capable of 
putting others at similar risk with the same practice, pedestrians with disabilities that make them 
unable to drive would undermine this practice. Instead, we should focus on the distribution of 
benefits and risks of a practice, consented or otherwise. We should be warier of a simple trade 
off of harms against benefits if there is a considerable asymmetry in their distribution, especially 
if those who lose out in a distribution tend to lose out in such tradeoffs repeatedly.  
So it is more important to note the distribution of benefits and risks than to focus strictly on 
consent, although very often an imbalance in risk and benefit arises because of a lack of 
consent. The harm of overpopulation most significantly affects those in poorer countries, while 
the risk being run is that citizens of developed countries will fail to curb their consumption 
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adequately. Of course, there is also risk from overpopulation for the developed world, but the 
risk is far greater for less wealthy states. So unless we commit to extending access beyond the 
wealthy, ageing enhancement is a clear case where risks are distributed unevenly, and where 
those who bear the greatest risk tend to lose out in such trade-offs anyway. This situation is 
made considerably starker if pessimistic predictions discussed in Chapter 6 are correct, and 
ageing enhancement will predominantly benefit the wealthy. Ageing enhancement is by no 
means unique in this respect; many technological developments benefit the already wealthy 
while causing problems that predominantly affect the worst off, who often also lack any 
influence over those decisions. If ageing enhancement is more widely available, then this 
asymmetry is less stark, though it will still be the case that the bulk of the risk is borne by the 
worst off.   
Uncertainty of efficacy can only be solved by research; a moratorium on research necessarily 
commits us to acting under ignorance. But uncertainty of the consequences of action is 
consistent both with refusing to implement a technology, and with implementing it. When faced 
with an uncertainty whether, if we began to implement ageing enhancement at t1, we would take 
the necessary ameliorating action to avoid disaster at t2, we have three broad options. First, we 
could refuse to act at t1, on the grounds that the overall profile of risk and benefit is already 
unfairly skewed against the poor. This seems overly pessimistic; even if an uneven risk profile 
means that we should be more cautious than usual about imposing further risk with no promise 
of benefit on developing countries, flat refusal to implement ignores the fact that there is a 
feasible route to ethically acceptable ageing enhancement. 
The second option is to press ahead with ageing enhancement at t1, and to commit to various 
actions that will make it more likely that we make the right choice later on. Since the concern 
facing ageing enhancement is a sustained pattern of behaviour, rather than a one-off decision, 
we need to work on binding ourselves in the future in ways that are external to our agency at 
the time. Similarly, governments are capable of binding future agreements which, while not 
impossible to get out of, at least make it more costly to drop prior commitments.  
This strategy also gains support from the fact that there is an asymmetry in our ability to acquire 
new information regarding the respective risks of foregoing and implementing ageing 
enhancement. If we begin to implement ageing enhancement, we can update our view of how 
likely we are to engage in sufficient consumption reductions as we go; this leaves us the option 
of reversing our decision on the basis of better information (although the longer we leave this 
decision, the more ingrained it becomes in our expectations, and the harder it is to reverse). But 
if we refuse to engage in ageing enhancement, there is no similar updating of information; since 
we will not be attempting to engage in reductions in consumption, we will acquire no new 
information on the likelihood of its success. We will never know whether implementation 
would have worked, and so we can never ‘reverse’ our decision to refuse to implement ageing 
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enhancement. As Goklany (2001: 10) says, we should ceteris paribus prefer reversible risks to 
irremediable ones. This seems to favour ageing enhancement. Still, this strategy may strike some 
as overly risky because although it commits to trying to avoid bad outcomes, it does not do 
everything it can in that regard. If we take seriously the idea that a currently unfair distribution 
of risk and benefits means we should give greater moral weight to risks that affect those who 
repeatedly do worst in that distribution, this option may strike us as overly optimistic; in a 
reversal of the previous strategy, it sees a feasible strategy for engaging in ageing enhancement 
permissibly and considers mere availability sufficient, even with little evidence that we will 
actually follow such a strategy. 
This leads us to a final option, delaying implementation until we have sought more reliable 
information on the likelihood of achieving sufficient cuts in consumption i.e. a moratorium. 
This has several advantages: it takes seriously the risk that we will not behave as we should and 
the idea that this risk contributes undesirably to a broader distribution of risks that is already 
unfairly skewed towards some. But it does not insist that we must react to this fact by banning 
further development; rather, it insists that we take seriously an injunction to turn uncertainties 
into mere risks when ignorance benefits us at potentially great cost to others.  
Of course, there is also a significant cost to this strategy. As de Grey (quoted in Volpicelli, 2014) 
passionately puts it, people are dying “every fucking day” because of ageing. Delaying 
implementation would cost lives, potentially very many. However, focusing on this set of deaths 
makes the same mistake as opponents who focus only on deaths and suffering caused by 
overpopulation, since there are deaths risked by both decisions. Moreover, we have some 
reason to be optimistic about this strategy. I have been discussing the speculative issue of 
implementation as though we are currently ready to engage in ageing enhancement, and are only 
ignorant about its repercussions. But we are only at the stage of research; if we need in any case 
to engage in scientific research to get to the point of implementing ageing enhancement this 
argument suggests that we should engage in social research in tandem to gauge the likelihood of 
consumption cuts being implemented. And since the risk involved in this issue is behavioural, 
proponents must seize the chance to engage in persuasion that the cost of cutting consumption 
is worth the gain from ageing enhancement.98  
Section 8.2 suggested the possibility of a referendum on ageing enhancement and consumption. 
While I am still doubtful that this would be sufficient to give democratic legitimacy to a decision 
either way – especially when we consider that any realistic poll would be unlikely to include 
those in developing countries – it may be that we should engage in such a referendum for 
epistemic purposes. One reason that we don’t currently know whether sufficient cuts in 
                                                     
98 Depending on how long it takes to research ageing enhancement, it may also turn out that some of the 
cornucopian possibilities outlined in Chapter 7 (e.g. interplanetary colonisation) become sufficiently likely 
that we can rely on less significant cuts in consumption; but this is merely hypothetical at the moment.  
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consumption are feasible is that we do not know whether the majority of people who would 
have to make such cuts value their current consumption patterns more than they do life 
extension. As such, referenda may be an important step in reducing our uncertainty to an 
acceptable level. We should see this as a negative test; i.e. if ageing enhancement fails a 
referendum, then this is extremely good evidence that the requisite public will to engage in 
consumption reduction is lacking. On the other hand, we should not take the passing of a 
referendum as sufficient evidence of public will – it is one thing to vote for a measure, another 
to commit to individual behaviours – but it is a reasonable first step. 
8.5 Summary 
The distinction between soft and hard limits offers the Overpopulation Objection greater 
precision. If ageing enhancement threatens soft limits then we ought to change our 
consumption behaviour before we refuse to extend people’s lives, or start restricting 
reproductive behaviour. Although there are coherent objections to this claim on the basis of 
fundamental interests, and reasonable preference, I argued that it is ultimately right to focus on 
reducing consumption for everyone in the first instance.  
Still, even if reducing consumption is the right thing to do, it may not happen. I accepted that if 
ageing enhancement will lead to soft limits, and we will in fact not adapt our consumption 
behaviour as needed, then the right course of action may involve foregoing enhancement. 
However, both of these conditions may not in fact emerge; perhaps ageing enhancement will 
not even lead to soft limits; if it does, perhaps we will collectively do the right thing and accept 
cuts in consumption. The Overpopulation Objection thus turns out to be a stance on risk, 
which says that the right response to risk is to avoid action. 
I finished by assessing this kind of response in the light of a broader discussion of risk. I 
accepted with critics of the precautionary principle that blocking research on the grounds of 
uncertainty is incoherent; in the light of the Overpopulation Objection turning out to be such a 
stance, I claimed that it has no argumentative power to block research into ageing enhancement. 
However, I acknowledged that the stance underlying the objection may have some force, under 
plausible conditions where the balance of risk and reward from ageing enhancement (at least 
initially) benefits the wealthy at great cost to the worst off; under these circumstances we cannot 
transfer reasoning about intrapersonal risk assessment to this decision in any simple way.  
The implication is that if we reduce our uncertainty about the effectiveness and popularity of 
ageing enhancement through research, and find that ageing enhancement will bring about soft 
limits, but we still face significant uncertainty about whether we will in fact make necessary 
changes to consumption, then (a significantly weakened version of) the Overpopulation 
Objection tells us to hold off until we have both reduced that uncertainty, and put in place 
safeguards to ensure that we will make such changes. This is by no means the strong conclusion 
that opponents of ageing enhancement support, but it is also not an unequivocal endorsement 
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of ageing enhancement under any and all conditions. It is true that effective ageing 
enhancement would improve and save potentially millions of lives. But it is also true that its 
unintended consequences could severely impact the lives of those who already bear the brunt of 
many of our decisions. That cannot be ignored, and is the reason why although I have argued 




























The motivation for this thesis was to place three significant objections to ageing enhancement 
in broader philosophical context, and to consider the ageing enhancement in the light of these 
objections and various potential practical constraints. I clarified each objection, and argued that 
at best, they may offer some guidance on how we should implement ageing enhancement, but 
they do not have force as arguments against enhancement per se. However, they do suggest that 
under some plausible circumstances, the pursuit of ageing enhancement would not be right.  
I began in Chapter 1 by outlining the Meaning Objection, and explained why it is implausible to 
think that physical ageing, or acceptance of death at a certain point in life, are necessary 
components of a meaningful life. This argument rested on a broadly liberal, subjective 
understanding of meaningful life. Chapter 2 addressed a related concern, that radical ageing 
enhancement would change our assessments of everyday risks, such that we would refuse to 
engage in relationships that currently give meaning to our lives. While I accepted to some extent 
the conservative bias that underlies this worry, I argued that its empirical predictions are 
implausible, and ignore factors about our psychological motivation to remain connected with 
loved ones. I concluded that no version of the Meaning Objection provides compelling reasons 
to avoid ageing enhancement, either as a personal choice or policy target.  
In chapters 3-6 I outlined the Egalitarian Objection, and considered various versions of it that 
rest on different egalitarian principles. Chapter 3 established an important feature of my own 
account, that we should have distinct egalitarian lifetime and time-relative principles. I defended 
this claim from two Rawlsian accounts that also lend some support to the Egalitarian Objection.  
Having established that we need both lifetime and time-relative principles, Chapter 4 defended a 
sufficientarian time-relative principle as the only one capable of meeting our concerns with 
hardship, responsibility and compensation. A sufficientarian time-relative principle is an 
important component in explaining why egalitarian concerns do not automatically support 
preferences for young people over old people. Chapter 5 defended a prioritarian lifetime 
principle, considering and rejecting versions of the Egalitarian Objection that depend on other 
lifetime egalitarian principles. I argued that an equalitarian lifetime principle is unable to 
properly capture our concern with people’s absolute states, while a sufficientarian principle 
depends either on an unmotivated appeal to statistical average, or an overly narrow normative 
view of lifetime sufficiency. I therefore supported an overall egalitarian account that combines 
prioritarian lifetime concerns with a special concern for sufficiency at particular times.  
Chapter 6 considered a view that would have lifetime priority break ties between people who 
were below time-relative sufficiency, potentially supporting a limited view of the Egalitarian 
Objection. I argued that we should avoid such tie-breakers in situations where the loser in a 
competition over resources faces irremediable insufficiency, including death. I justified this by 
appeal to the idea of rescue. However, I acknowledged some force from the Egalitarian 
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Objection by suggesting that prioritarian lifetime considerations should play a role in macro-
level allocations of resources, and possibly as a weighted criterion in allocating non-emergency 
interventions; this suggests that if ageing enhancement will mainly benefit the best off in 
lifetime terms, it should be a lower priority than proponents claim, although I argued that this 
does not support the original Egalitarian Objection’s focus on age per se. I also acknowledged 
that there may be some further constraints on this view from claims of reparative justice; where 
those who have culpably benefitted from injustice are in competition with those who are the 
victims of injustice, it may be justifiable to use this fact as a tiebreaker. On some views of 
systemic injustice, this may support a significant preference towards certain groups; but I also 
argued that broader egalitarian concerns give prima facie support to expanding access to care 
before making such rationing decisions. 
Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 consider the Overpopulation Objection. Chapter 7 outlined the 
objection and raised some concerns with a predominant response from proponents of ageing 
enhancement, that we should turn our focus to reproduction. However, I also suggested that 
similar concerns undermine the objection’s conclusion that we should avoid ageing 
enhancement. Chapter 8 finished by considering an alternative way to address the concerns 
underlying the Overpopulation Objection: changing our consumption habits. I acknowledged 
that even if this is the right course of action, there is a risk that we will not do it, and argued that 
since this risk is unfairly distributed compared with the likely benefits of ageing enhancement, 
this objection also places some potential constraints on how we should engage in ageing 
enhancement. However, this most plausible version of the objection still gives no forceful 
reason to abandon ageing enhancement altogether. It merely suggests that that if there is 
significant risk of pressure on population and consumption, we should be cautious in ensuring 
the existence of public willingness to adapt behaviour before applying transformative 
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